日本の軍縮外交 -非核三原則と核抑止力依存とのはざま-

現代の軍縮問題

抄録

Japan's so-called three non-nuclear principles-of not possessing, not manufacturing, and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons-express its independent and characteristic position in the disarmament policy as well as its determined principle that it shall never become a military power threatening other nations. This paper tries, primarily through the Diet debates, to review how the Japanese disarmament policy with such non-nuclear principles as its basis has evolved in the face of reality.
The three non-nuclear principles were set up by the then Prime Minister Sato, first in December 1967 and again in January 1968 in the form of the answer to the question in the Diet debates. However, these principles were originally considered to constitute “the four nuclear policies.” In fact, the government and the ruling party decided to keep the three non-nuclear principles only if the Japanese national security is insured by the U. S. nuclear deterrence. This is how the Japanese disarmament policy started to evolve under the strange combination of the opposing policies, which adheres to the three non-nuclear principles on the one hand and continues to rely on the U. S. nuclear deterrence on the other.
At first the dilemma showed itself when ratification of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was put on the agenda of the Diet debates. The government made it clear to the ruling party to continue its reliance on the U. S. nuclear deterrence, but it also stressed to the opposition parties its adherence to the non-nuclear principles as well. And the second occation appeared at the first and second U. N. Special Sessions on Disarmament. While the Japanese government proclaimed to the international community that it would continue to keep the three non-nuclear principles, it declined, from the standpoint of nuclear balances, to support the U. N. resolutions on no use and no deployment of nuclear weapons.
The gap between its pursuit of the ideal of non-nuclear policy and its real course of action has increasingly widened particulary after the Afgan incident. The way Japan acted itself in the Williamsburg summit of May 1983, in connection with the INF negociations between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. made it clear that Japan stood on the side of the West in the field of the nuclear disarmament. Since then, the effectiveness of the nuclear deferrence and nuclear balances has been stressed much strongly, and it seems that the Japanese non-nuclear policy based on the three non-nuclear principles has declined in its importance.
It is also true that recently, out of deep concern for such trend, there has been voices to call out the danger of being rested on the nuclear balances and stress the importance of bringing down the nuclear balances to much lower level. What Japan needs to do now is to clarify once again its position as the only country which suffered atomic explosion, and establish an independent nuclear disarmament policy which clearly sees to the starting point of the non-nuclear policy, and promote the nuclear disarmament diplomacy which is firmly based on that policy.