国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
アメリカの初期核政策と科学者の立場 -オッペンハイマーの視点を中心に-
科学技術と国際政治
中沢 志保
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ジャーナル フリー

1986 年 1986 巻 83 号 p. 126-142,L14

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Nuclear disarmament negotiations began with “the Baruch Plan” of June 14, 1946. The Baruch Plan was the first proposal for the international control of atomic energy presented by the United States to the United Nations.
It was evaluated as an epochal proposal that the United States, then the only nuclear weapon state, publicly expressed her intention to abandon its monopoly on nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the “strictness” of that plan—namely, its provisions of “punishment against violators” and “restriction of the veto power” in the United Nations—brought about rejection by the Soviet Union.
As a result, the first negotiations for nuclear disarmament were completely upset. But that failure provided an important suggestion regarding those factors which decide disarmament negotiations and international relations after World War II. And we cannot forget the great contributions of atomic scientists to ideas on the international control of atomic energy.
This article re-examines the process of establishing the first plan for international control of nuclear energy focussing on the viewpoints of atomic scientists. David E. Lilienthal and his group, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, drew up a plan for the international control of atomic energy in March, 1946. “The Acheson-Lilienthal Report”, as it was usually known, was a draft plan of the Baruch Plan. But these two plans contain important differences in their contents.
The Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which was based on Oppenheimer's ideas, proposed setting up an international organization which should possess all the fissionable materials and should control all nuclear activities. This organization was envisioned to be the center for research and development in this field.
The Baruch Plan, which laid the foundations of United States atomic policy, partially followed the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, but it emphasized inspection and sanctions against violations. Namely, the Baruch Plan demanded enforceable punishment of violators rather than cooperation in atomic energy development. It is well known that the emphasis of punishment and problems relating to the veto in the United Nations became obstacles in gaining Soviet approval of the plan.
Disarmament negotiations to follow inherited this kind of disharmony. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, which aims to prevent the appearance of any new nuclear powers, supports the dominant positions of the nuclear big powers rather than protects the benefits of non-nuclear states. The political character of the treaty meant severe antagonisms between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers. If we try to find the beginning of such deadlock in disarmament negotiations, we must re-examine the Baruch Plan. And if we compare that plan with the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, more significant facts will be found. One is the ideas of Oppenheimer, who represents both scientists and politiciants. And the other is the paradoxical meaning that his ideas exerted no influence on decision making, which provides a case study to consider the close relationship between scientists and nuclear policy.

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© 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
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