行政協定の作成過程 -米国公文書を中心に-

日本占領の多角的研究

抄録

While the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 has been analyzed extensively, the Administrative Agreement of 1952 governing the status of U. S. forces stationed in Japan following the Peace Treaty has not been so adequately analyzed, perhaps due to the relative lack of primary sources. In recent years, however, U. S. documents, in which some important Japanese documents are included, have been released. The purpose of this article is to analyze the making of the Agreement by using these U. S. documents, thus filling the missing chapter in Japan-U. S. relations. The article focuses on interactions among U.S. officials rather than on bilateral interactions, though it does briefly analyze them whenever sufficient materials are available.
Part 1 traces the process of drafting the first U. S. draft by analyzing NSC 60/1 (September 8, 1950), impact of the Korean War, and the Dulles Mission's visit to Tokyo in early 1951. Part 2 deals with interactions among U. S. officials, particularly among the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department, which led to the final draft presented to Japan in early 1952 as the basis of negotiation. The issues analyzed rather extensively are articles on criminal jurisdiction, areas and facilities, and the joint U. S. -Japan command. Part 3 analyzes the bilateral negotiations in Tokyo in early 1952, but it limits its analyses to the joint command issue, not only because it was the only article that was revised due to persistent Japanese requests, but also because the two other important articles (criminal jurisdiction, and areas and facilities) have been adequately analyzed by Kumao Nishimura who, as a member of the Japanese negotiating team, participated in the negotiation.
Major findings are: 1) an often disputed proposition in the bureaucratic politics model that “stands depend on positions” seems largely relevant in this case, of particular interest in this respect being the stands taken by CINCFE in Tokyo, who was responsible for defending Japan from external attack, thus demanding the maintaining of the status quo, but was also compelled to honor Japan's integrity as a sovereign nation; and 2) the major articles mentioned above were outcomes of much bargaining among U. S. officials, which resulted in compromises in which none was fully satisfied; and 3) the fact that the article on the joint command was revised in the Tokyo negotiations was due largely to Dean Rusk's strenuous and skillful coalition-building both in Tokyo and Washington as well as skillful negotiation on the part of the Japanese.