コンゴ紛争とパックス・アフリカーナの模索-一九六〇-六五年-

現代アフリカの政治と国際関係

抄録

The purpose of this paper is to examine the attitudes of African states towards the two Congo conflicts between 1960 and 1965 from the point of view of the search for “Pax Africana”. “Pax Africana” is the idea that the peace of Africa is to be assured by the efforts of Africans themselves, and has been a basic idea in attitudes to African security at the continental level among African states since the period of decolonization. The Congo conflicts gave the newly independent African states two chances to realize this idea.
In the first Congo conflict (1960-1963), Africa made use of the framework of the United Nations and almost succeeded in realizing a “Pax Africana”, even though they divided into three groups; the Brazzaville group, the Casablanca group and the neutral group, and opposed one another at least from time of the Congo central government's collapse until its reconstruction. They, especially the Casablanca and the neutral group, were able to oppose foreign intervention by any state and take the initiative in the UN Congo policy by maintaining an African position. They were also able to oppose the secession of Katanga from the Congo. They were ineffective only in the matter of the Congo central government's collapse. They were not able to resolve the problem and could only wait for a solution by the UN.
In this way the conflict was ended through the UN with results which were possibly satisfactory for Africa, and as regards security this experience never made African nations dependent on the UN either. It was the discontent with the UN's methods and the desire to control African security more directly by their own initiatives, that led to the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the framework to realize “Pax Africana”.
The second Congo conflict (1964-1965) was expected to be resolved within the framework of the OAU, but the OAU found itself unable to do so. It was totally incapable because the member states were divided again on how the OAU should cope with the conflict. It was not only unable to resolve the conflict peacefully, but it was also unable to exclude foreign powers from the conflict. Finally the OAU allowed the conflict to be resolved by force with the intervention of non-African states. This conflict showed the OAU's lack of ability to resolve such conflicts.
The two conflicts examined in this paper showed different results, but rather than this difference we should pay attention to a common problem in the African states approach to the conflicts, that is, Africa's inability to resolve internal conflicts within the borders of any given state. The African states merely became divided on the problem in both cases and worsened it. This means that the African states had a vague desire for “Pax Africana”, but did not have any consensus as to the content. Only when the states have achieved this consensus can the dream of “Pax Africana” become a reality.