江兆銘南京政権参戦問題をめぐる日中関係

日中戦争から日英米戦争へ

抄録

This article attempts to shed light on the heretofore little known aspect of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations during their protracted war of 1937-1945. More than fifteen years ago, John H. Boyle published a highly commended book on Wang Ching-wei's peace movement and his Nanking regime, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945. But among the important topics he did not deal with in detail (but rather discussed only in passing) was the controversial issue of Nanking's participation in the Greater East Asian War. It is hoped that this short article will make some contribution to better understand the missing part in the wartime history.
If there was anything Wang Ching-wei and his followers has least dreamed of or dreaded most, it was the outbreak of a new war in the Pacific between Japan, their sponsoring nation, and the U. S. In spite of the seemingly close ties between Nanking and Tokyo due to the latter's heavy multi-faceted commitments to the former, the Japanese government did not make any advance notice to Wang Ching-wei about its decision to open hostilities with the United States and its allies. On the eve of the war, it even decided unilaterally to prohibit the Nanking regime from joining the Japanese by declaring war against the Allies.
The Pearl Harbor attack was a sudden jolt for the nucleus of the Nanking regime. Above all else, Wang had been surprisingly optimistic about the prospect of the peace talks in Washington. The other side of the coin of this optimism was Wang's great frustration with and serious disappointment at the prospect of his regime under Japanese occupation. Peace with Chungking looked dim and almost impossible. Japan's demands and impositions on Nanking after Pearl Harbor were rising, and, as was rightfully pointed out by Chen Kung-po, Wang's foremost disciple, the regime was seriously beset with major problems of low morale and profiteering attitudes.
Now that the Sino-Japanese War had to be fought and eventually settled in the context of World War II, Wang made a critical decision to live and die with the Japanese by declaring war against the Allies.
However, Nanking had to wait long until Tokyo, after many turns and twists, reached a consensus to signal a green light. This article treats at length the decision-making process of the Japanese side, and tries to analyze the gradual shift of views, from a flat “no” to a more conciliatory attitude, held by the Japanese politico-military leaders. As the trends of the war in the Pacific became increasingly less favorable, they came to realize the need to beef up politically the Nanking regime, and the idea of letting Nanking declare war against the Allies became more receptive to the Japanese. However, this idea proved to be contradictory and self-defeating, as Japan wanted to use Occupied China as a rear base to keep their war machine rolling.