1998 年 1998 巻 118 号 p. 166-180,L18
This paper treats the policy process of U. S. atomic diplomacy in 1945. During the Second World War, the United States was engaged in the development of atomic bombs. The project was treated as top secret, becoming public only when the first bombs were used against the Japanese. At that time a Presidential statement was supposed to be made.
Even after the end of the war, however, President Truman declared no definite foreign policy regarding the atomic bomb. The reason was that during his stay in Potsdam he had judged cooperation with the Russians not to be practical at least in this matter. Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, decided to monopolize the bomb, anticipating that the monopoly would render the Russians “more manageable.”
At the London meeting of foreign ministers held in September, Byrnes talked “with the implicit threat of the bomb in his pocket, ” a tactic that met with no success at all. Truman and some of his advisors started doubting the wisdom of Byrnes' atomic diplomacy. In October, Truman made it clear that the U. S. would undertake the problem of international control of atomic energy.
In Washington, some opponents of Byrnes' diplomacy advocated approaching the Russians directly and more frankly, while Byrnes still wanted no approach at all. In November, Truman, who thought he must go forward but do so slowly, expressed his hope for atomic disarmament and proposed the establishment of an advisory commission within the United Nations Organization. This was the very step the opponents of Byrnes were most afraid of, because the Russians would regard it as a means to gang up against them. As was expected, the State Department repeatedly heard the news that the Russian people blamed the U. S. for threatening them with the bombs. In the end, the U. S. proposed another meeting of foreign ministers.
Thus the Moscow conference was scheduled for December 1945 and a policy committee for the conference was set up. Draft proposals were elaborated, including a proposal for bilateral negotiations. At this time, both Truman and Byrnes realized the need for liberal proposals which could help build mutual confidence between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. But such proposals were not submitted to the conference, for American Congressional leaders were violently against them.
In Moscow, the Russians agreed to the establishment of the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission. But they did so because they could ensure their veto power on any recommendations it might make. Despite the apparent success of the Moscow conference, the wheel of the nuclear arms race was rolling steadily by the end of 1945.