「思いやり予算」の原型 -沖縄施政権返還における財政取り決めの合意形成過程-

国際政治のなかの沖縄

抄録

The terms of US-Japan agreement on Okinawa Reversion that have come to light in recent years reveal that Prime Minister Sato ultimately gave the United States much greater latitude on the use of US bases than had previously been thought, including the right of re-entry of nuclear weapons in case of an emergency. But negotiations over Okinawa Reversion also provided the US with the opportunity to change yet another aspect of the US-Japan security relationship. As negotiations proceeded on how to dismantle the military bases and other facilities owned by the US government in Okinawa, a new approach to thinking about Japan's role in the alliance emerged. In fact, the prototype of what later came to be known as Japan's “omoiyari” budget, the financing of US military deployments in Japan, was created during the Okinawa Reversion negotiations.
This article reviews the process by which the US sought to convince the Japanese government to assume the costs of deploying US forces in Japan. The backdrop to these deliberations in the late 1960s was, of course, the US balance-of-payments deficit created as a result of the Vietnam War. Part and parcel of the Nixon Doctrine announced in 1969 was the emphasis on greater allied responsibility for the “burden” of the cold war, and greater allied contributions to the goals of US cold war strategy. The US government argued that Japan's reluctance to increase its own defense spending, along with the growing inability of the US to pay for its overseas basing, made it necessary to find another mechanism for demonstrating Japan's “commitment” to the alliance.
The problem of how to dismantle and consolidate US military assets in Okinawa was complicated, and the process was costly. The terms of the final agreement reached between the US and Japan have been deliberately kept from the Japanese public. US archival documents and Japanese court testimonials for the trial of a Japanese diplomat privy to the terms of this agreement reveal why the Japanese government wished to keep this secret. The deliberations ended with an agreement in 1971 that provided the US government with more than $200 million for its military bases and facilities on Okimawa as well as for bases on the Japanese main islands. Japanese government not only provided the US government with a lump sum payment, over which the US had full discretion, but it also paid for a variety of direct costs associated with the improvement of US military bases in Japan under the terms of the SOFA agreement. In short, the Japanese government not only fully accepted the costly burden of financing US military bases on its territory, but it also provided funds for the US government to use to remedy its balance-of-payments problems.