ベトナム労働党の外交闘争からみたテト攻勢-パリ会談開始との関連で-

現代史としてのベトナム戦争

抄録

The Tet Offensive, from January to February 1968, was a “Turning Point” in the Vietnam War, which led to the beginning of the Paris Talks in May 1968. In fact, it had a great psychological influence on the Johnson Administration, toward “de-escalation” of war. This article is an attempt to reconsider the connections with the Tet Offensive and the Paris Talks, through a view from the Vietnam Labor Party' diplomatic struggles.
The VLP had adopted “the Resolution of Promotion for Diplomatic Struggles” at 13th Central Committee on January 1967. This Resolution had two objects; 1) to obtain a victory against U. S. on “the peace talks”; 2) to combine “diplomatic struggle” with “armed struggle” and “political struggle, ” that is to say, to promote “three prongs of struggle” of the armed, the political and the diplomatic. And the combination of “armed struggle” and “political struggle” was intended to execute a “general offensive and general uprising” in Southern Vietnam. Therefore, this resolution meant that North Vietnam would obtain “a final victory” on “the negotiation table” after “a decisive victory” on “the battlefield.” In other words, the VLP had planned that Hanoi would begin the peace talks with Washington after the victory of the Tet Offensive.
Hanoi, however, failed to obtain its objects on the battlefield for the frustration of the Tet Offensive. After that, President Johnson declared to hold peace talks with Hanoi at March 31st, and Hanoi accepted his proposal. Then the Paris Talks begun on May 13th. Therefore, Hanoi had to sit the negotiation table without obtaining a decisive victory through the Tet Offensive.
For Hanoi, the failure of Tet led to some changes of “military issue” and “political issue.” Concerning the “military issue, ” Hanoi thought that the “military issue of North, ” as “completely stopping the bombing of North” issue, had priority position to the “military issue of South, ” as “withdraw of U. S. forces” issue. Concerning the “political issue, ” Hanoi thought that the recognition of the NLF by U. S. had priority over the foundation of a coalition administration in South. In its background, there were “North Vietnamization” in armed struggles and political struggles for a reason of the weaken NLF with Tet's blow.
For Washington, on the other hand, its scenario for peace was affected not by the Tet Offensive but by the decision for the beginning of the Paris Talks. In “fighting while negotiating” situation, the increasing military saturation from North to South could have a bad influence on the battlefield in South and Saigon's existence. Therefore, Washington had to suspend “mutual” reduction of both side forces for the reason of no recognition of U. S. forces withdraw. Because Washington needed to reinforce Saigon as strong political substance, for the plan of using Saigon as a core of “political issue” settlement.
Afterward, the Paris Agreement had a separate solution for “military issue” and “political issue” in January 1973. Eventually, there had been the complexity of Vietnam issues in the different intentions of both sides at the beginning of the Paris Talks.