中台関係と国際安全保障-抑止・拡散防止・多国間安全保障協力-

東アジアの地域協力と安全保障

抄録

This paper aims to provide insight into the future security environment in East Asia by examining the PRC-Taiwan relations. In particular, I look at issues involving interaction among the following areas: the deterrence of the PRC's use of force against Taiwan, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions (WMD), and the multilateral security cooperation.
This paper makes four conclusions: First, the United States deters both the PRC's use of force against Taiwan and Taiwan's “provocative” words and deeds against the PRC. The United States secures deterrence of the PRC's use of force against Taiwan not vis-à-vis international security regimes such as the United Nations, but through domestic legislation, such as the Taiwan Relations Act. On the other hand, the United States persuades the Taiwanese leadership not to provoke Beijing through unofficial bilateral channels.
Second, the United States tries to control the terms of both nuclear development and non-proliferation in the PRC and Taiwan. Since the PRC firmly sticks to the position that “the Taiwan issue is a domestic issue, ” it is impossible to have bilateral arms control negotiations between the PRC and Taiwan. If Taiwan possesses nuclear weapons, the PRC's use of force will be inevitable. From this viewpoint, the PRC has benefited from the U. S. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiatives to let Taiwan have “de facto” involvement in international nonproliferation regimes. The United States has also gained the involvement of the PRC in international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and also has succeeded in making Taiwan follow international norms despite the fact that it is not a formal member of such regimes.
Third, the United States have made efforts to persuade the PRC and Taiwan to prevent proliferation of materials and technologies related to biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles. However, both the PRC and Taiwan have not participated in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—the reasons for this are different for each. The PRC fears that it will lose certain technology export rights if it is to fully observe international norms of export. Moreover, the PRC believes that by adhering to export control regimes such as the MTCR it may lose significant leverage for keeping U. S. arms sales to Taiwan “in check.” Since Taiwan is under the influence of the United States, Taiwan resigns itself to observe international norms without getting membership in the MTCR. The United States thus continues to encourage both the PRC and Taiwan to obey international norms through bilateral channels rather than through a multilateral framework.
Fourth, a bilateral framework for promoting confidence-building between the PRC and Taiwan does not exist. Further, Taiwan is eliminated from formal participation in the framework of the multilateral security cooperation. Therefore, there is no official international forum at which discussion takes place on the Taiwan Strait issue and Taiwan's potential international role in the non-proliferation of WMD.
From the above four points, we can see that the security environment of East Asia, especially in the PRC-Taiwan relations context, is extremely dependent on the United States, while the formal international security regime is completely helpless. Unless the PRC changes its Taiwan policy, this structure will not change. However, the PRC leadership may fear that such policy changes will promote independence of Taiwan. Thus, decisive U. S. influence, not international regimes, will continue to play an important role in the Taiwan Strait for the foreseeable future.