2005 年 2005 巻 141 号 p. 10-24,L6
The Iraq War was a typical case of military intervention aimed at bringing about a regime change in a hostile state. The Bush administration had regarded Saddam's regime in Iraq as a threat to US security since 2001 and decided to bring about a regime change by force in 2003, with the collaboration of Iraqis expatriates. The US was neither the first nor the only foreign power to be invited to intervene in Iraqi domestic political rivalry. Opposition groups such as the Islamists and Arab Nationalists who had been sponsored in Iran and Syria, had a long history of making use of their host states' desire to interfere in Iraqi domestic politics. In contrast, the US administration after the Gulf War, was reluctant to recruit from existing Iraqi opposition groups in Iraq as agents of intervention; instead the US explored new sources of collaborators from independent Iraqis in exile, such as Ahmad al-Chalabi of the INC.
After the INC failed to unite the whole opposition movement abroad, the Bush administration renewed its efforts to support Iraqi opposition groups by passing the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998. On the basis of provisions set out in this Act, the US started to openly finance Iraqi opposition groups including the SCIRI-hardline Islamists hosted by Iran since 1982. It was clear that the SCIRI and other political opposition groups with a domestic power base played a more crucial role inside Iraq in putting pressure on the regime, than the expatriates groups which had no power base in Iraq. Rivalry between expatriate and domestic-based Islamists intensified when the Pentagon simply decided to make al-Chalabi the post-War Iraqi leader, abandoning the idea of setting up a government-in-exile in preparation for the post-Saddam era. SCIRI and other Islamists in exile, such as the al-Da'wa Party overtly criticised the US military occupation, and reestablished their power bases by means of their religious networks in Iraq. They also had to compete for popular support with the indigenous Islamic movements led by Muqtada al-Sadr and the followers of Ali al-Sistani.
In due course the SCIRI and al-Da'wa started to split from other pro-US political groups when they took part in the first election for the National Assembly in 2005. They broke with the post-war strategy planned by the US by forming a Shiite coalition under the auspices of al-Sistani. For them the US military intervention was nothing more than a tool to topple Saddam's regime, and it was they who had accomplished the final stages of regime change-not as the US had intended but in a way consistent with their own political aims.