動的相対主義の無基準性

特に「確定」「不確定」について

抄録

Prof. Ueda says, “The dynamic A cannot be identified with an abstract generality, Ao, in the final analysis.” I admit it makes some sense to distinguish an object (A) from an abstract notion of it (Ao).
But is he right when he asserts on the basis of this distinction that any actual cognition of an object is entirely uncertain and fluctuant? Is it right to deprive actual cognitions of certainty?
I argue against his assertion for the following reasons.
i) We should not treat “Certain” and “Uncertain” as an absolute dichotomy. Being certain to some degree necessarily implies being uncertain to some degree at the same time. The real question is to what degree a notion is certain. Many-valued thinking is necessary.
ii) It is quite a nonsense to say that our actual cognitions can be uncertain altogether. To regard them uncertain, there must be some unquestionable viewpoint according to which we can measure the degree of uncertainty of the cognitions. Without such a viewpoint, we cannot regard them uncertain at all.
iii) It is necessary to measure the degree of certainty of actual cognitions. What matters for this measurement is to analyze the content of individual cognitions. But in his book, Prof. Ueda ignores the content of cognitions in particular cases, so he fails to recognize how indispensable are the criteria to distinguish “Certain” from “Uncertain”.