抄録
This paper explores the possibility of “non-propositional but conceptual
content” in perceptual experience by re-examining the debate between Hubert Dreyfus
and John McDowell on conceptualism and non-conceptualism. While Dreyfus
emphasizes non-conceptual, absorbed coping in everyday actions, McDowell insists that
conceptual capacities permeate all perceptual experiences. I suggest that their positions
can be reconciled by rejecting the assumption that conceptual content must be proposi
tional. Drawing on Tetsurō Watsuji’s notion of the “formless form”, I develop a model in
which conceptual content exists implicitly within perceptual experience without being
propositional. This model allows for meaningful, norm-guided perception and action
without requiring explicit propositional articulation. Through the example of mimicry
in comedy performance, I illustrate how people can non-propositionally grasp subtle
personal traits in a shared, socially meaningful way. I conclude that non-propositional but
conceptual content is a viable notion that bridges the gap between Dreyfus’s phenomeno
logy and McDowell’s conceptualism, providing a richer account of human perception and
understanding.
