推論的ジレンマと司法審査の正当性

抄録

The aim of this paper is to clarify the theoretical possibilities for judicial review by arguing the influence and implication of social choice theory.
  There are three schools of thought concerning this issue. First, scholars such as William Riker consider the negative implication of Arrow's theorem against populism, and defend the normative validity of judicial review. Second, social choice theorists such as Amartya Sen study the mathematical formulas of constitutional choice. Third, scholars such as Cristian List have recently defended the normal validity of judicial review as one solution to discursive dilemma.
  This paper supports the third scholar, as his thinking can clarify the fundamental character of judicial review. However, List's perspective can only justify the normative validity of judicial review, without formalizing it. The paper concludes with examples of further possibilities for the application of List's arguments.