Effectiveness of “Ineffective International Institutions”:

Blame Avoidance as a Domestic Function

Abstract

Theories of international institutions have assumed that states use international institutions basically for achieving international cooperation. However, it has been argued that states have used many ineffective international institutions that scarcely change state behavior. Why do states use ineffective international institutions? Existing literature presents some explanations, such as the difficulty of building effective institutions, path dependence, and the miscalculation of policymakers. Nevertheless, there is a group of cases in which these factors were nonexistent and ineffective institutions were used. This paper argues that even institutions that do not change state behavior internationally have a domestic political utility and are used by governments for domestic purposes. In particular, this paper hypothesizes that a government can use an ineffective international institution to avoid blame from domestic actors that have conflicting preferences. The hypothesis is verified by process tracing of the case in which the United States used the International Monetary Fund to designate China as a currency manipulator. This case is suitable for testing the hypothesis because it deviates from existing literature and is also the least-likely case of this paper’s argument.