The Malfunction of the Electoral Threshold in the Turkish Electoral System:

Strategy of/for the Peoples’ Democratic Party and the Electoral Alliance

Abstract

This paper aims to clarify the reasons for the recent malfunction of the high electoral threshold―one of the characteristics of the Turkish electoral system, which adopts the proportional representation method. Originally, the threshold was introduced to reduce the number of political parties in the parliament and to prevent the Kurdish-minority faction from acquiring seats. The reasons pointed out in this paper refer to the strategies of Kurdish political parties and their voters, as well as the electoral alliance system introduced in the 2018 parliamentary elections. In particular, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) succeeded in expanding its support during the June 2015 parliamentary elections by adopting a new policy to defend the rights of various minorities in Turkey, not only of the Kurdish people. Moreover, the HDP showed that, by gaining more seats, the expansion of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power for a long time, can be limited. The introduction of the electoral alliance system and the HDP’s decision not to participate in the alliance accelerated this situation. In the 2018 parliamentary elections, a clear strategic voting, namely, the “threshold insurance for balancing,” intended to exceed the HDP threshold by restricting the power of the AKP.