The Conditions that Make “Semi-Parliamentarism as Executive System” Possible:

The Implication of Australian Bicameralism

Abstract

  This paper analyzes the academic value of the concept “semi-parliamentarism”. Steffen Ganghof introduced this concept to refer to one type of executive system. According to him, semi-parliamentarism has three features: 1] the chief executive is not chosen by popular election, 2] legislature is divided into two parts which are directly elected, 3] only one part can dismiss the chief executive in a no-confidence vote. He classified Australia and Japan into semi-parliamentarism. Moreover, he insisted that semi-parliamentarism can balance competing vision of democracy i.e. “Majoritarian” and “Proportional” vision.

  However, the case of Australian bicameralism showed that the reality of semi-parliamentarism is different from theoretical assumption. Based on the fluctuation of two-party system in Senate, law centred majoritarian formation took hold at 1990s at last. Nevertheless, the possibility of single majority in both chambers has not disappeared. These show the importance of the conditions that make semi-parliamentarism possible. Especially, the rise of Independent and small party in Senate, and the share of political belief which opposition in Senate should not collapse government are important.