なぜアメリカに社会主義はあるか
1966 年 17 巻 p. 89-131,en6
詳細
1966 年 17 巻 p. 89-131,en6
I Introduction II The Russian Revolution and the American Intellectuals III The New Deal Coalition and the Left-Intellectuals IV The End of Ideology and the American Ideology
In contrast with the question posed by Werner Sombart at the turn of the century in the title of a book, “Why Is there No Socialism in the United States?”, this article examines the ideological adaptability of American Liberalism, as a surrogate for socialism, to the contemporary crisis home and abroad.
The impact of Russian Revolution on American liberals who shared the optimistic expectation of the inevitable spread of democracy throughout the world, had failed to impress them as a challenge on the basic value-system of American regime, because of the misunderstanding about the nature of the Bolshevik regime by the narcissistic projection of American creed. That moralistic idealism, often indicated by the reformist prejudice for the machine politics, had prevented from the. understanding about the nature of “Revolution of rising expectation” in the developing areas.
In addition to the creed, the unique character of New Deal coalition in terms of the ethnic, cultural heterogenity, the nationalization of socialism during the happy day of “popular front”, had contributed to the postponement of radical reapprasement of American creed. After the war, the democratic coalition had become so furiously disintegrated by 1952. The domestic crisis in the tortuous period of political indecision and pluralistic stagnation at a decisive turning point in America and world history, is largely a refection of the fact that the nation no longer has an effective majority and never has an stable organized opposition.
Although the American Liberalism, saved by the twenty-five years' war, hot and cold, survived under the optimistic atomosphere of “The end of Ideology”, we cannot neglect the fact that “The end of Ideology” did not mean “The end of American Ideology”, particulary for the hard-boild, tough-minded realists.
On the other hand, the reaction to “hard-boild” radicalism, with its exaggerated faith in the efficiency of direct political involvement during the day of “popular front”, often took form of the exaggerated skeptism about politics. However, it is no accident that “brilliant realists” of the Kennedy Administration has been so little concerned with the non-European world that the underdeveloped areas home and abroad was the blind spot of the Kennedy foreign policy as well as the negro problems.
