The Private Property and *Awqāf* of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barqūq

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Qāytbāy (r. 1468-96) and Qānsūh al-Ghawrī (r. 1501-16), the two most prominent sultans of the late Circassian Mamluk period, donated substantial properties such as agricultural lands, houses, caravansaries, public baths, etc. as religious trusts (*waqf*; pl. *awqāf*). C. F. Petry regards their activities as a “financial policy” intended to secure a private source of revenue independent of the traditional state financial system against the political and economic crisis of the times. However, it must be noted that the preceding sultans had also striven to hold private and *waqf* properties. It is necessary to comprehend the meaning of their “financial policy” from the point of view of the historical development of the sultanic private financial affairs. It seems that the sultans developed their own resources because of practical necessity due to fundamental problems of the state and the political structure in this period.

From this aspect, this paper examines the process by which Barqūq, the first sultan of the Circassian Mamluks (r. 1382-89, 90-99), accumulated property and its background, using narrative and archival sources. Consequently, the following facts have become clear: firstly, Barqūq held various kinds of private and *waqf* properties, and thus the Diwān al-Amālik wa-al-*Awqāf* wa-al-Dhakhira, the special office having charge of them, headed by an *ustādar*, was established; secondly, holding those properties was helpful for him in operating a government in the midst of political instability and the malfunction of the traditional state machinery; thirdly, he accumulated the properties by both fair means and foul, such as the diversion of state property, confiscation, *istibdāl* (exchange of *waqf* properties), etc. Subsequently, the role of the sultan’s property in the political and financial spheres grew in importance throughout the Circassian Mamluk period.

**Keywords**: Mamluk Sultanate, Waqf, Financial system, Politics, Egypt and Syria.

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Introduction

In recent years, waqf (pl. awqāf; religious trust) deeds have been attracting scholars’ attention as historical sources and several important studies on the Mamluk period that use these deeds as sources have been published. Particularly noteworthy are C. F. Petry’s recent papers, which proposed a new interpretation of the sultanic waqf endowments by analyzing a huge number of waqf deeds of al-Ashraf Qāytbāy (r. 872–901/1468–96) and al-Ashraf Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r. 906–22/1501–16), the two prominent sultans in the late Mamluk period. Petry regards these endowments, comprising a huge amount of real estate in urban and rural areas, as a “financial policy” intended to secure their own financial resources against the political and economic crises of the times, independent of the traditional state financial system. It is generally agreed that benevolence was not the military rulers’ primary motivation to establish waqf endowments, which generally accompanied the construction of religious or public institutions such as mosques, madrasas, and khānqāhs (Sufi convents); rather, they bestowed these endowments in an effort to portray themselves as “the guardians of Islam” or to protect their fortunes from being confiscated or finely divided through the process of inheritance. In comparison with this widely accepted opinion, Petry’s new interpretation of the sultan’s awqāf as a part of their financial policy is very stimulating.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the sultans preceding Qāytbāy and al-Ghawrī had also striven to hold private and waqf properties (mawqufāt) even though these properties were not as large as those of Qāytbāy and al-Ghawrī. The fact that the Diwan al-Amlak wa-al-Awqaf wa-al-Dhakhira, the special bureau that was in charge of the sultanic private and waqf properties, headed by an ustādār (director), existed since the early years of the Circassian Mamluks (784–922/1382–1517) proves that endowing awqāf was widely employed as a means of creating assets. Therefore, it is necessary to comprehend the sultans’ financial policy from the viewpoint of the historical development of the sultanic private financial affairs. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that some practical necessity arising from fundamental problems in the state and the political structure of this period required the sultans—who in their capacity as sovereigns ought to have been holding the state treasury—to create such separate revenue sources.

From this perspective, this article examines the historical background and process by which al-Ẓāhir Barqūq, the first sultan of the Circassian Mamluks (r. 784–91, 792–801/1382–89, 1390–99), accumulated property, using narrative and
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Archival sources. I believe that clarifying the actual status of his property will provide a starting point for a discussion of the problem and also for comparative studies of the cases of successive sultans, because a regular management authority that would oversee the sultanic private and *waqf* property was instituted during his reign.4

I. The Sultanic Private Property and its Management

1. The Sultans and Atabaks preceding Barquq

The sultans of the Bahri Mamluks (648–784/1250–1382) preceding Barquq also devoted efforts to acquire private assets, irrespective of whether they endowed them as *awqāf* or not. One conspicuous example is the establishment of the *Diwān al-Khaṣṣ* (the bureau of the privy funds) by Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn (third reign: 709–41/1310–41). With the abolishment of the vizirate, the chiefship of the financial administration of the state, al-Nāṣir separated the financial affairs of the Royal Court from state finance and incorporated several new income sources into the Royal Court as its own resources. Consequently, a large proportion of the tax revenues, which were hitherto deposited in the state treasury, were transferred to the sultan’s private treasury (*Khizānat al-khāṣṣ*). Thus accordingly, al-Nāṣir consolidated the economic foundation of his autocratic power through the secure possession of the property under his direct control, and the *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ*, or the chief manager of this bureau, acquired political influence during his reign.5

However, as D. P. Little pointed out, what should be noted is the fact that this bureau has its origins in an office that even the preceding sultans had maintained—that of the sultan’s private agent (*wakīl*), who engaged in trade transactions and commercial speculations for his master.6 In theory, tax revenues collected through the state machinery would first be deposited in the state treasury and then be disbursed for official purposes. However, since the incomes and expenditure of the state were almost fixed, it was convenient for the sultans to maintain their own private sources of revenue in order to manage finances more flexibly or to raise money for their own purposes, such as the purchase of slaves for the organization of their mamluk corps (called *mushṭarawāt*) or the expenses of the Royal Court. Therefore, the successive sultans had striven to accumulate assets through the moneymaking activities of their *wakīls*. It can be said that al-Nāṣir, who achieved autocratic power, strengthened the position of the *wakīl* in order to develop his own resources, and that eventually resulted in the establishment of *Diwān al-Khaṣṣ* and the reorganization of the financial
management structure.\textsuperscript{7}

Along with the weakening of sultanic power, the political and economic situation was deteriorating rapidly after the death of al-Nāṣir in 741/1341. Nevertheless, Sultan al-Nāṣir Ḥasan (second reign: 755–62/1354–61) and Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'bān (r. 764–78/1363–77) managed to attain real political power to some extent. Despite this, the state of their private properties was qualitatively different from that of al-Nāṣir and his predecessors. The difference lay in the fact that the two sultans had large-scale agricultural and urban real estate holdings. Ḥasan purchased for himself large tracts of agricultural land located in various districts of Egypt and Syria, and the madrasa he founded near the Citadel in Cairo had an expansive waqf landholding, which originally belonged to the state, as its source of revenue.\textsuperscript{8} According to Ibn al-Ji‘ān’s Tuhfā, which recorded the name and the size of the cultivated land, and the tax revenues of each tax district (nāḥiyya), Sha'bān also held considerable milk property in Egypt, comprising twenty-three tax districts with the annual revenue (‘ibra) estimated at approximately 105,250 dinārs jayshi\textsuperscript{9} besides two districts turned into his waqf property.\textsuperscript{10} In addition to these, he endowed Mecca with nine Syrian villages.\textsuperscript{11}

I believe that the sultans’ inclination to possess such large-scale landholdings stemmed from the prevailing political situation: majlis al-mashūra (the supreme council) consisting of prominent amirs assumed the reins of government and performed the role of a “cabinet,” while reducing sultanic political power after 748/1347. This political system of collective leadership of amirs developed into the “Atabak regime.” In this system, an amir who occupied the post of atābak al-'āsākir (the commander-in-chief), the highest military position among the amirs, bearing the title of “the Grand Amir” (al-amir al-kabir) would administer state affairs as an actual ruler.\textsuperscript{12} In these political circumstances, there were ceaseless tensions and contests for power between the Qalāwūnīd Sultans, who were the amirs’ puppets at the beginning of their enthronements but aimed to regain real power, and the prominent amirs heading the government—foremost of whom was the atābak al-'āsākir. In view of this political structure, it may be reasonable to suppose that the sultans who were striving to assume the reins of power could not rely on the state treasury, which had fallen under the amirs’ control, for their political funds. Thus, they had to secure their own revenue sources independent of public finances. This compelled them to hold agricultural land that could provide a constant flow of income.

However, it must be noted that the powerful amirs of the time were also
striving to hold their own property and accumulate more, in addition to *iqṭā*’s (their official source of income), in a similar manner. This was true in the case of atabaks who were in power after the establishment of the Atabak regime in 755/1354. For example, Shaykhū al-Nāṣiri, the first atabak who assumed the title of *al-amīr al-kabīr*, held *iqṭā*’s and private and leased lands (*mustaʿjarāt*) in various regions of Egypt and Syria, which yielded 200,000 dirhams per day, and administered them through his private *diwāns* and staff. In addition to this, he built a large madrasa and a *khānqāh* in al-Šaliba quarter (outside the city wall of Cairo) and endowed them with expansive tracts of agricultural land throughout Egypt and Syria. If we consider that the revenue from the *waqf* property substantially exceeded the expenses necessary for the maintenance of the two institutions and charitable services, and the huge surplus that would come under the sole control of the administrator of the *waqf* (the office was held by the *wāqif*, i.e., Shaykhū himself), we can regard the *waqf* endowments as a part of the financial policy securing Shaykhū’s private source of revenue.

Amir Sarghitmish, who succeeded to the position of atabak after Shaykhū’s death in 758/1357, also attempted to purchase lands from the state treasury and endowed the madrasa he built with these lands. These examples indicate that purchasing state lands and converting a part of them into *waqf* properties was the novel method commonly used by the ruling military elite of the late Bahri Mamluk period for securing private revenue sources. The growing ineffectuality of land management under the sole authority of the state allowed them to adopt such a method. As more amirs participated in leasing lands designated as government resources at a nominal rent and purchasing *iqṭā*’ lands and converting them into *waqf* properties, they acquired a large proportion of agricultural land. Accordingly, the alienation, privatization, and “waqfization” of the state land reserves accelerated, accompanying the collapse of the state landholding system.

Incidentally, there was a key term for referring to such private properties of this period, namely, *dhakhira* (pl. *dhakhīr*), which originally meant “treasure” in Arabic. During the period under consideration, the term *dhakhira* usually connoted “movable property” of the sultans or amirs, such as cash, gold, silver, jewels, luxurious textiles, and other luxury items, which were often concealed by the sultans and amirs. These hidden treasures only came to light through painstaking searches after the estates were confiscated following the death or downfall of the sultan or amir. The various sources often include descriptions of the *nāẓir al-dhakhira*, i.e., the controller of the sultan’s *dhakhīra*, under Sha‘bān’s reign, proving that this office attracted the chroniclers’ attention.
because it was newly established or acquired importance due to the sultan's increasing wealth at the time.\textsuperscript{19}

On the basis of these political and financial scenarios, we shall now discuss the case of Barqīq, who ascended to power in these circumstances.

2. Barqīq's Private Property

Barqīq appeared on the political scene through a series of power struggles following the assassination of Sha'ban, which resulted in the coup d'état in 778/1377. Five years after his actual rule as atabak from 779/1378, Barqīq dethroned the nominal Qalāwīnīd Sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Ḥājji and then officially ascended to the sultanate in 784/1382. He remained in power until his death in 801/1399; his rule stretched over a period of 20 years, although he was temporarily dethroned from 791/1389 to 792/1390. Barqīq also succeeded in acquiring a huge estate during his long reign.\textsuperscript{20} I believe that the \textit{Diwan al-Amlāk} (the bureau of private real estate) founded by Barqīq played a crucial role in this acquisition. Al-Qalqashandi describes the bureau as follows:

This (\textit{Diwan al-Amlāk}) is a bureau that al-Ẓāhir Barqīq, who was already mentioned above, founded. He assigned lands that he labeled as private (\textit{bilād\textsuperscript{en} samāh-hā amlāk\textsuperscript{en}}) to [the resources of] the bureau and appointed a director (\textit{ustādhdār}; syn. \textit{ustādādār}) and officials (\textit{mubāshirūn}) independent of [the official financial organization of the government]. This bureau was for the sultan's exclusive use (\textit{khāṣ̱ bi-al-sulṭān}), and thus any assessments of allowances (\textit{nafaqa}) or [official] expenditures (\textit{kulfū}) were not assigned to it.\textsuperscript{21} (*The underlined part is discussed later)

The post of \textit{nāżir al-amliik al-sulṭāniyya}, i.e., the vice-director of the bureau, is described as follows:

The duty of [the individual holding] this post is to take charge of the private real estate of the sultan, such as agricultural lands (\textit{ḍiyā'}), houses (\textit{ribā'}), and others.\textsuperscript{22}

On the basis of these descriptions, the bureau is characterized as follows: First, the object of this bureau's management consisted of real estate such as farmland and houses that could be expected to provide a more assured income; this distinguished the \textit{Diwan al-Amlāk} from the \textit{Diwan al-Khāṣṣ}, which existed during al-Nāṣir's reign. Second, the income of the \textit{diwan} was used freely by the sultan because it was considered as his \textit{milk}. Now, we shall look more carefully into the political background that prompted Barqūq to establish this bureau, and how the \textit{wagf} he established fit into his policy for private finance.

It is clear that Barqūq already held a certain amount of private assets when
he was an amir, because some sources include descriptions of the officers in charge of the lands he privately owned or leased and his \textit{dhakhira}.\textsuperscript{23} Undoubtedly, Barqūq retained these assets even after his enthronement in 784/1382, as is evident from the fact that the eunuch Ṣandal al-Manjaki, who served as \textit{khāzindār al-dhakhīrā} (treasurer of \textit{dhakhīrā}), a post he held throughout Barqūq's reign,\textsuperscript{24} was responsible for the incomings and outgoings of Barqūq's finances; moreover, Barqūq's immense \textit{dhakhīrā} money that had been concealed was found when Barqūq temporarily lost his position in 791/1389.\textsuperscript{25} One of his income sources was an \textit{iqtā} of the amir of one hundred, which he held during his amirate and retained after enthronement, refraining from allotting it to another amir (it would be transferred to the resources of \textit{al-Dīwān al-Mufrad} as will be explained later). However, the amount of information available about Barqūq's private property during his amirate and first sultanate is less than that available about his property during the later period of his reign.

Let us now attempt to extend this observation to his \textit{waqf} endowments. He constructed \textit{al-Madrasa al-Ẓāhirīya}, a religious complex comprising a school and a \textit{khanqāh} in 788/1386 during his first sultanate.\textsuperscript{26} Barqūq endowed this madrasa with large property holdings, the anticipated earnings of which substantially exceeded the necessary expenditures.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, a large amount of cash, amounting to 7,500 dinars, was found in the madrasa and was confiscated when Barqūq was dethroned in 791/1389.\textsuperscript{28} These facts prove that the \textit{waqf} endowments made by him were also a part of the policy for his private finance.

Barqūq then invested more energy into managing his private property during his second sultanate from 792/1390, especially in the later years of his reign. The actual process was as follows: first, the first reference to the \textit{Dīwān al-Amlāk} (mentioned above) was made in Rajab 797/April 1395, in which Barqūq appointed Amir Ṣāliḥ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Tankiz as the director of the \textit{dīwān}, and ex-vizier Ibn al-Baqari as its vice-director. Accordingly, it appears probable that this \textit{dīwān} was instituted at this time.\textsuperscript{29} In the following year, Muḥarram 798/October 1395, Barqūq made an amendment to the provision regarding \textit{waqf} administratorship, which had hitherto been occupied by a judge (\textit{qādī}), and assumed the post himself.\textsuperscript{30} This indicates that Barqūq intended to play a major—more direct and vital—role in the management of his \textit{waqf} property. We shall later discuss the abovementioned amendment in detail, using the \textit{waqf} deed as a source. In the following year, Sha'bān 799/May 1397, Amir ‘Alā' al-Dīn ‘Alī b. al-Ṭablawī, who was the governor of Cairo (\textit{wāli al-Qāhira}) and had taken up the additional charge of
managing the financial duties and interests through the Sultan’s favor, was appointed the general-director of the Diwan al-Amlak wa-al-Aqwaf wa-al-Dhakhira. This is the first instance wherein Barqūq’s movable, immovable, and waqf properties were collectively placed under the sole control of an office. This indicates that the authorities managing these properties were thereafter unified under the office of “sultanic financial affairs.”

If so, what were the circumstances that compelled Barqūq to adopt such a financial policy for his private property despite an uncontested reign, unlike his predecessors in the late Bahri Mamluk period, who had been engaged in power struggles with the atabak’s government? We must attempt to answer this question by taking into account the establishment of al-Diwān al-Mufrad (also founded by Barqūq) because the political and financial situation in which Barqūq ascended to power was intrinsically related to the establishment of the two diwāns. In order to establish his regime, the most urgent and important task for Barqūq was gaining control over the Royal mamluk corps (al-mamlāk al-sultaḫiyya). This was because the corps frequently used its armed strength to intervene in politics and had consequently acquired great political clout throughout the period of political confusion prior to Barqūq’s accession to power. Moreover, the financial affairs of the state were in dire circumstances, mainly because powerful amirs had acquired state lands (as mentioned above), causing a drop in the land-tax revenues for the government purse. In those circumstances, Barqūq founded al-Diwān al-Mufrad in 788/1386; this bureau had the exclusive charge of providing monthly salaries and other essentials to the Royal mamluk corps, by transferring the iqṭā‘ held by Barqūq during his amirate into the revenue source of the diwān. On the other hand, the total failure of Barqūq’s attempt to reconstruct the state’s finances during the years of his first sultanate and his temporary dethronement must have increased his desire to establish the Diwan al-Amlak during his second sultanate. The aim of the Diwan al-Amlak was to secure the source of Barqūq’s private revenue, which he could freely deal with, and ensure the availability of cash necessary for slave purchases in order to reinforce his mushtarawāt or other personal expenses such as maintenance costs of the Royal Court and rewards given to his cohorts. In other words, Barqūq established the two diwāns based on the official and private assets he had acquired during the years of his amirate, placing them outside the framework of the traditional financial machinery of the government. He did this for the purpose of overcoming the contemporary political and financial problems he faced. Based on this, we can say that Barqūq’s establishment of the Diwān al-Amlak and subsequent unification of the managements of his milk, waqf and
dhakhira were not revolutionary tactics of financial administration, but rather an organized means of securing his private revenue sources that were distinct from the state finances. The use of this method was widespread among the Mamluk military elite of the time, given the contemporary context wherein the traditional financial system of the Mamluk state was dysfunctional.  

In the following chapter, we attempt to examine the realities of Barqūq's private property more closely, through an analysis of archival sources.

II. The Realities of Barqūq’s Private Property: An Analysis of the Deeds

1. The Assets
The archival collection that contains the waqf deeds, sales contracts, etc., of the Mamluk era is kept in the National Archive (Dār al-Wathā‘i‘iq al-Qawmiya) and the Ministry of Waqf (Wizarat al-Awqāf) in Cairo. The archives contain seven documents concerning Barqūq, including the primary waqf deed of the Čāhirīya madrasa.  

Assets recorded in these deeds are listed in Table 1 according to the date of their acquisition or endowment. There were thirty-three assets, twenty-six of which were turned into waqf properties. The assets comprised agricultural lands; urban estates such as public baths, houses, caravansaries, and stables; and various other holdings such as an oil press and a waterwheel and its equipments. However, these might be just a part of Barqūq’s assets, and we cannot regard these deeds as listing all his property.

These assets are classified according to their sites in Table 2. This table indicates that the objects located in Egypt occupied about seventy percent of all holdings (twenty-three of thirty-three), and most of them were located in Cairo (fifteen) or its suburbs (three). There were also a certain number of the assets located in the two Syrian provinces of Damascus and Aleppo, both in the provincial capitals as well as in other areas.

In Table 3, these assets are classified into three categories: agricultural land, urban estates, and others. From this table, we can see that the total number of urban estates was twenty, double that of agricultural lands (ten); in particular, all the assets located in Egypt were urban estates, with the exception of three agricultural lands. Nonetheless, we cannot simply state that Barqūq was not interested in the acquisition of agricultural lands, since the conclusions arrived at from the table were based on the data from extant documents only. According to Table 4, which lists the tax districts in Egypt classified as “Barqūq’s waqf” on the basis of Tuhfa, the agricultural land of Barqūq’s waqf in Egypt comprised sixteen districts with annual revenues estimated at a minimum of 80,800 dinārs.
jayshi. However, only two districts from among them are found in the descriptions of the deeds (nos. 5, 15). Moreover, although the table shows that nine districts of Barqūq's waqf were located in the province of al-Fayyūm, the deeds contain no reference to a landholding possessed by Barqūq in this province, neither as milk nor as waqf. The Tuhfa cannot help us identify the beneficiaries of the awqaf. Based on the fact that Barqūq established awqaf for various purposes in addition to those whose deeds are still extant,34 we could assume that these waqf properties were dedicated to beneficiaries other than those stipulated in the deeds.

2. The Process for Accumulating Property
i) The dates of acquisition/endowment of property
According to the deeds, Barqūq acquired property or endowed awqaf fourteen times; I have arranged these instances in chronological order with a brief explanation of the prevailing situation (see Table 5). This table shows that Barqūq acquired or endowed the property as waqf once when he was an atabak, five times during his first sultanate, eight times during his second sultanate, and more frequently as he approached the later years of his reign. This trend corresponds with the previously discussed findings obtained from the analysis of the chronicles. As the table indicates, it is natural that most acquisitions or endowments were made during relatively peaceful times. I will cite a characteristic case: Barqūq acquired a village on 7 Jumādā al-Ūlā 792/23 April 1390, only three months after his restoration to the sultanate on 14 Ṣafar 792/1 February 1390 (no. 7). He went on to endow it as waqf when the rebellion of Amir Mintāsh, the cause of his temporary dethronement, was drawing to a close (no. 8). Acquisitions such as these clearly prove that Barqūq was directing his efforts toward the creation of his private property immediately after his restoration to the sultanate. In addition to these, he endowed many assets as waqf properties in the month following his return to Cairo, after Mintāsh's revolt was successfully suppressed through the military expedition to Syria (no. 9). Let us consider another example: he additionally endowed his madrasa with some assets in Syria and Cairo on 6 Jumādā al-Ūlā 796/9 March 1394. According to the chronicle, on this day, he was near Gaza en route to Syria for the expedition against Timūr (Tamerlane) (no. 11). His actions were similar to those of Qānṣūh al-Ghawri, a later sultan, who was devoted to waqf endowments just prior to the encounter with the Ottoman army that brought about the fall of the Mamluk sultanate.35 The actions of these sultans show that they hastened to establish their awqaf during emergencies in order to secure their private property and also
ii) The means of acquisition

Islamic law stated that only a *milk* of which the founder’s ownership was legally established could be endowed as *waqf*. However, of the twenty-six assets of Barqūq’s *waqf*, confirmation of the date or details of passing into possession were available only in the case of nine. Thus, in most cases, it is impossible to know how or when Barqūq acquired these properties. In addition to the nine assets, we can learn the details of the means of acquisition of eight other assets that form part of Barqūq’s *amlak* from the deeds of the purchase contracts or other such documents. Based on the findings, I classified the seventeen assets into three groups based on the means of acquisition. I now present a description of each group.

A) Assets purchased or transferred from others

Barqūq purchased the two caravansaries listed under no. 18 (Table 1) from Timurbughā al-Manjaki; and the caravansary listed under no. 27 (Table 1) from the sons of Baktamur al-Saqī al-Nāširi (d. 733/1332); assets nos. 28–33 passed into Barqūq’s possession through Timurbāy.

Now, let us closely examine Timurbāy’s case. He purchased assets nos. 28–33 (WA, j67) from four men on 20 Sha’bān 798/29 May 1396, and then sold them to Barqūq for the same price on 5 Rabi’ al-Awwal 799/7 December 1396, only seven months after their purchase. Similarly, a portion of the caravansary no. 28 (WA, j736) was first purchased by Jarkas al-Khalili, a prominent amir during the first sultanate of Barqūq, as a part of his *milk*, and was inherited by his sons after his death in 791/1389. Subsequently, Jarkas’s sons transferred (*intaqala*) it to Timurbāy on 7 Sha’bān 798/16 May 1396; Timurbāy then transferred it to Barqūq on 5 Rabi’ al-Awwal 799/7 December 1396.

Of course, we can consider these acquisitions as regular transactions between Barqūq and Timurbāy. However, since Timurbāy surrendered these holdings to Barqūq as soon as he acquired them, it is possible he originally accumulated these assets as an unofficial proxy for Barqūq, with the aim of surrendering them to his master. Another possibility is that these holdings were actually part of property confiscated from Timurbāy by Barqūq, camouflaged as assets acquired through fair transactions in order to prove the legality of the latter’s ownership. This was similar to the method adopted by Qānsūh al-Ghawri. According to C. F. Petry, almost all the names of people listed in the deeds as those who had surrendered assets to al-Ghawri were found in the narrative sources as those whose assets had been confiscated. However, a lack
of definite information on Timurbay prevents us from delving deeper into this issue.

B) The purchase or diversion of the state’s property
The sultans in the Circassian Mamluk period often converted state lands into their own waqf properties without depositing the payments for these lands into the state treasury. For instance, in the waqf deeds of Sultans al-Zahir Jaqmaq (r. 842–57/1438–53), al-Ashraf Inâl (r. 857–65/1453–60), and Qâytbây, we find a confirmation of the legality of the diversion of the lands from the state treasury into the sultans’ waqf properties. In some cases, the sultans designated the lands after they purchased them from the state treasury as waqf properties.

Although opinion was divided over the legality of the diversion of state land into the sultans’ own awqâf or the sultans’ purchase of the state property for their own use, the sultans used this method throughout the Circassian Mamluk period.

In the case of Barqûq’s waqf, judging from the closing remarks in his waqf deed (DW, 9/51), which imply that his waqf property contained assets acquired from the state treasury, it is clear that he also diverted a part of the state property into his waqf. Furthermore, he acquired the caravansary (no. 19, Table 1) from a wâkit bayt al-mâl (agent of the state treasury). If we recall the underlined parts of the quotation describing the Diwân al-Amîlîk (given earlier in this paper), it seems reasonable to suppose that the claim that Barqûq allocated lands “he labeled as private” to this diwân refers to Barqûq’s conversion of the state lands into his amîlâk. In fact, in one instance, Barqûq converted an iqtâ’ land, possessed by an amir, into his milk. From these facts, it seems quite probable that the deeds contain little reference to the means of acquisition of waqf properties because a large number of them had originally belonged to the state. As supporting evidence, most of the agricultural lands of Barqûq’s waqf listed in Table 4 (thirteen of sixteen) originally belonged to the financial bureau of the state (six) or to iqtâ’s (seven). Although it is not clear as to whether these lands, which belonged to the state treasury, were directly converted into his waqf property or were handed over to others before Barqûq acquired them, Barqûq’s establishment of waqf was, as it turned out, one of the factors that led to the encroachment on and decrease of state land in the period under consideration.

C) The other methods of acquisition
In another case, Barqûq acquired a part of the inheritance of Amir Înâl, atâbak al-’asâkir of his second sultanate. Based on the data available in the deeds, it is not possible to trace the process by which Barqûq acquired it. However, based on the fact that Amir Înâl was placed under house arrest during the final years of
his life because of the antagonism between him and Barqūq and the rumor that Ḫnāl was killed by poisoning, it is quite likely that Barqūq confiscated Ḫnāl’s property after the latter’s death.

In the other case, Barqūq acquired the assets that had already been designated as awqāf through the means of istibdāl (exchange of a waqf property for another asset). Despite the fact that istibdāl had hitherto rarely been carried out because of its uncertain legality, it grew widespread until the period around Barqūq’s accession to the sultanate, during which awqāf were increasing. Barqūq also adopted this “new stratagem” to acquire private property.

iii) The agent (wakīl)

Barqūq did not always engage personally in the acquisition of assets by himself—in some cases, he acquired the property through an agent. Table 6 lists the names of Barqūq’s agents found in the deeds, and their careers have been verified on the basis of the narrative sources. First, we shall pay attention to the case of Ibn Tankiz (no. 4). He was the first director of the Diwān al-Amlak in 797/1395, as stated earlier; later, he was referred to as general-director of the Diwān al-Amlak wa-al-Awqāf wa-al-Dhakhira, at the time when he was dismissed from the office in Sha‘bān 799/May 1397. Thus, the descriptions in the deed provide evidence that the appointee to this post would actually undertake the work of accumulation of assets for Barqūq. In addition, Amir Qurqmās (no.1) and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Karaki (no. 2) were also close associates of Barqūq. These facts prove that the individuals close to Barqūq participated in the latter’s private financial policy.

As has been noted, Barqūq used all possible means—including some questionable means whereby he abused his authority as sultan—to accumulate various kinds of property throughout Egypt and Syria, the legality of which was debatable. However, we should not regard Barqūq’s adoption of such a financial policy for his private property as his greed; rather, I would like to emphasize again that the prevailing political circumstances (as explained earlier) required him to hold private revenue sources in order to secure his regime.

In that case, how was the property acquired by the sultan by taking advantage of his authority dealt with after his death? Specifically, was this property inherited by his descendants and termed as “family property,” providing a permanent financial basis for their lives? These questions will be considered in the next chapter.
III. Dealing with the Property after the Death of Barqūq

1. Milk

Upon the death of Barqūq in 801/1399, his son Faraj succeeded to the sultanate. At this time, a question arose about the vast hoard of money and wealth that Barqūq had left behind in his treasury; like ordinary private property, would it be inherited by the heirs, i.e., Faraj and others, or would it be conveyed to the state treasury because it essentially belonged to the state? Ibn Ḥajar’s account reads as follows:

On 17 Dhū al-Qa‘da (801/21 July 1399), a conference with Shaykh al-Islām and the judges was held in the presence of the atābak al-‘asākir. They were asked whether the property Barqūq left in the treasury should be inherited by his heirs or whether the property belonged to the state treasury. (Shaykh al-Islām) al-Bulqīnī said, “The incomes from his (Barqūq’s) iqtā’ or trades are for his heirs. Except for them, [everything] belongs to the state treasury.” But when he was told [in reply] that these (Barqūq’s assets) were [all] mixed together, he answered, “Allot a part of them to his heirs.” They voiced different opinions [about the share of the allotment to the heirs], ranging from one-third to one-sixth. [According to another version,] al-Bulqīnī said, “Allot one-fifth [of the property] to them.” However, [the veracity of] this [claim] is uncertain.\textsuperscript{51}

This indicates that the property Barqūq left behind was not regarded as wholly private; furthermore, a major part of it was confiscated for the state treasury. Based on these circumstances, it is highly probable that the real estates owned by Barqūq, especially farmlands, were also expropriated and added to the state land as tax revenue sources for the government or reallocated to amirs as iqtā’s. Such a confiscation of the sultanic property proves that the holdings included not only the estates he acquired in the capacity of an individual but also those originally belonging to the state treasury, which he had diverted into his private holdings by taking advantage of his position as sultan, as we have discussed earlier. Consequently, despite Faraj’s accession to the sultanate, he was prevented from inheriting his father’s private property, which was a part of his power base. One of the reasons he failed to claim his inheritance might be that he was a very young sultan and therefore did not have any real power when he was first enthroned. However, in view of the fact that the properties of other powerful mamluk amirs were usually confiscated and added to the state treasury after their death,\textsuperscript{52} it is not surprising that the sultan, enthroned as the “principal Mamluk” originally standing on an equal footing with other amirs, was no
exception to this rule. This rule of inheritance and confiscation can be explained by the political structure of the Circassian Mamluks that never fully accepted the principle of inherited position.

2. Waqf

It is widely accepted that assets designated as *waqf* properties were not easily confiscated, and therefore, *waqf* endowments were used as a means to safeguard their inheritance against confiscations. For example, based on an analysis of *waqf* deeds, L. Reinfandt suggests that Sultan al-Ashraf İnāl's *waqf* actually performed such a role. Through an investigation of Barquq's *waqf* regulations with regard to beneficiaries and administratorship as stipulated in the deed, we will now examine the role Barquq expected his *waqf* to play after his death. Next, using the chronicles, we will examine whether or not his expectations were actually fulfilled.

i) The regulation described in the *waqf* deeds

The *waqf* deed of the Ẓāhiriya madrasa stipulated that the surplus *waqf* income—after the current expenditure incurred on maintenance and the purchase of equipment for the madrasa, personnel expenses for teachers, students, sufs, clerical staff, and so on—would be divided among Barquq's descendants. In addition to this, Barquq established another single *waqf* for his descendants, although it was on a small scale (WA, j51). Based on these facts, it is clear that Barquq established his *awqāf*, expecting them to yield a steady profit for his descendants after his death. Adopting such a regulation of expenditure was not limited to the *awqāf* belonging to Barquq or the other sultans, but was widely practiced during the Mamluk period.

We can obtain information on the administrators of Barquq's *awqāf*, only from the deed of the Ẓāhiriya madrasa. The regulation with regard to the assumption of the office of *waqf* administrator (*nāzir, mutawalli*) enacted in 788/1386, at the time of his first *waqf* establishment, is described below: Barquq himself occupied the post during his lifetime and he could name another person as deputy. After his death, the post would be filled by one of his male descendants. In the case of the extinction of descendants or the absence of people qualified for the task from among them, one of the amirs of one hundred would assume the post in the following order of priority: *ra's nawbat al-umara* al-jamdāriya al-kabir > dawādār kabir (executive secretary) > ḥājib al-ḥujjāb (grand chamberlain), in cooperation with kātib al-sīr (chief secretary), who was the head of the civilian officers, and the Ḥanafi shaykh of the madrasa. If, for some
reason, these amirs were unable to take charge of the task, these two civilians undertook the task in cooperation with the man best qualified for the task, chosen from among the amirs who were originally Barqūq’s emancipated slaves (i.e., mamluks). If such amirs were also extinct, only the two civilians were to be responsible for the task. At the same time, the amir entrusted with the task of administratorship was obliged to name “the most learned man among the Ḥanafi ‘ulamā’ (intellectuals) in Egypt” as deputy in order to entrust the administrative work as the waqf administrator to the latter. One of the means of waqf endowment, widely practiced during the period under consideration, was the formulation of a regulation that ensured that the wāqif himself was installed as administrator of his waqf during his lifetime, and that his descendants succeeded to the post. This made it possible for wāqifs and their descendants to retain possession of the waqf-endowed property as virtual “family fortunes.”

The revised regulation regarding the waqf administrator was written on the reverse of the deed document. Although the date of the revision is not clear, due to the damaged state of the document, it is reasonable to suppose that this is the regulation revised by Barqūq in 798/1395, when he began to actively manage his waqf. According to descriptions, the regulation was revised as follows: It was provided that the post of nāẓir would be occupied by the following five amirs of one hundred in order of: ra’s nawbat al-umarā’ al-jamdārīya al-kabīr > amīr majlis (amir of the council) > dawādār kabīr > amīr ākhūr (amir of the stable) > ḥājib al-ḥujjāb. In each case, the kāṭīb al-sīr and the Ḥanafi shaykh of the madrasa cooperated with the selected official, as in the former regulation. However, the regulation about Barqūq’s descendants’ assumption of office as nāẓir was abolished. In addition to this, all amirs who assumed the post were prohibited from appointing deputies against the former regulation. With regard to the mutawalli, it was prescribed that the sultan himself would fill the post.

The revisions can be summarized as follows: first, the former regulation concerning Barqūq’s descendants’ assumption of office as waqf administrator was abolished; second, the waqf administratorship was divided into the two posts of nāẓir and mutawalli, and the sultan’s powers of supervision over the waqf were strengthened through his assumption of the latter post; third, two amirs (amīr majlis and amīr ākhūr) were added to the list of amirs who would be the administrators and they were required to undertake the task by themselves, resulting in the reduction of the role of the ‘ulamā’ in waqf administration; fourth, the stipulation that amirs from among Barqūq’s mamluks would be the administrator was withdrawn. These revisions appear to reduce the influence of Barqūq’s descendants over the waqf, while, at the same time, strengthening the
control of the Mamluk ruling elite, either the sultans or amirs, over the waqf. Such a pattern of regulations regarding waqf administratorship was quite unique to Barquq’s waqf; to the best of my knowledge, no other awqaf had similar regulations in Mamluk Egypt.

Why then did Barquq to revise the original regulation in a way that seemed to destroy the benefits his descendants’ would desire? One possibility is that this amendment was related to Barquq’s policy against the increase of waqf land. Throughout his rule, Barquq intervened actively in the waqf administrations, which had heretofore been under the qa’dis’ authority. He did this by conducting detailed checks on the financial management of waqf-financed institutions and dispatching special administrators appointed from among his mamluks to the institutions that had fallen into financial difficulties. Barquq repeatedly summoned councils in order to discuss the problem of the increase of waqf land when this problem, which arose late in the Bahri Mamluk period, was heavily impacting the ihtisā’ system and the traditional state structure based on it. These actions by Barquq prove that he devoted consistent efforts to place awqaf under governmental control, which had hitherto been limited because the awqaf were “religious trusts.” From this point of view, it can be said that Barquq intended to change the manner of waqf administration through the amendment of the regulation regarding waqf administratorship: apart from the fact that Barquq exploited waqf incomes during his lifetime, the waqf would be maintained under governmental control after his death. Furthermore, if Barquq, who had by then entered the twilight of his reign, believed that his descendants would succeed to the sultanate as the “Barquqid Sultanate”—family dynasty—in place of the Qalâwûnid Sultanate to which he himself had put an end, the idea that the new regulation, which appointed the sultan as a mutawalli of his waqf, to secure his descendents’ authority to participate in the waqf management, is not too far from the truth.

ii) The actual state of Barquq’s waqf after his death

However, was the new regulation strictly observed in actuality? Consequently, was Barquq’s intention realized? The fact that his descendents argued over the right to receive stipends from the waqf in 877/1472 proves that the payment of stipends from the waqf income to Barquq’s descendents continued, although the reign of Barquq’s family dynasty ended as early as 815/1412, when Faraj was assassinated. Moreover, the Zâhirîya madrasa seemed to be operating smoothly, without any financial difficulties. Viewed in this light, Barquq’s waqf was well preserved, and the two purposes of his waqf endowment—maintaining the
madrasa and yielding benefits to his descendants—were achieved.

Nevertheless, we should not simply believe that the abovementioned waqf regulations were strictly followed or that the waqf income was spent only for these two purposes. The scantly activity of Barqūq’s descendants after Faraj’s death proves that they did not gain profits in proportion to the scale of the waqf. Thus, we cannot assume that all surplus of the waqf income was distributed among Barqūq’s descendants, in keeping with the regulation. Furthermore, according to the chronicles, the actual waqf administrators were not appointed in the manner stipulated by the abovementioned regulation. In Şafar 824/February 1421, Amir Taghrībīrdī, the current amīr ākhūr (the fourth candidate in line to head the administration as stipulated by the regulation), was installed as the nāẓir of the Zāhīriya madrasa, despite the fact that there were other amirs, such as the amīr majlis and dawādār kabīr, who had stronger claims to the waqf administratorship. Taghrībīrdī’s immediate successor to the post of amīr ākhūr was also appointed as the nāẓir of the waqf on 27 Dhū al-Ḥijja/23 December of the same year. Moreover, when the new amīr ākhūr was appointed in Şafar 853/April 1449, “the khil’as for several (waqf) nāẓirs,” including that meant for the nāẓir of the Zāhīriya madrasa, were given to him, i.e., he was appointed to these additional posts. This instance proves that the custom of the amīr ākhūr’s appointment as nāẓir of the Zāhīriya madrasa had been established by this time. On the other hand, the stipulation that the sultan would assume the office as mutawalli of the waqf seems to have been ignored, because there are no signs to indicate that the successive sultans were participating actively in the administration of Barqūq’s waqf in the position as mutawalli.

What do such instances imply? Let us examine in some more detail the first case of the amīr ākhūr’s appointment as nāẓir of the waqf in 824/1421. In Muḥarram of that year, following the death of Sultan al-Mu’ayyad Shāykh (r. 815–24/1412–21), who had a stable reign that lasted for about eight and a half years, his son ʿAbdulmalik succeeded to the sultanate as Sultan al-Muẓaffar ʿAbdulmalik. However, Amir Ṭaṭār, who was to become Sultan al-Zāhīr Ṭaṭār (r. 824/1421), held the reins of government under ʿAbdulmalik’s nominal sultanate. At the time, a military conflict was brewing because Ṭaṭār’s regency was barely accepted by prominent amirs who were then on a military expedition to Northern Syria. These circumstances required Ṭaṭār to distribute a great deal of money and other valuables to the amirs and mamluks who supported him and, finally, within less than a year of his leadership, he exhausted Shāykh’s reserves from the treasury (khizāna). In such an emergency, when Ṭaṭār appointed the amīr ākhūr as nāẓir of the Zāhīriya madrasa and also appointed the dawādār kabīr as nāẓir of al-
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Madrasa al-Mu‘ayyadiya,\textsuperscript{65} ra’s nawbat al-nuwab as nāżir of al-Khānqāh al-Shaykhūniya,\textsuperscript{66} and the ḥājib al-ḥujjāb as nāżir of the mosques of ‘Amr and Azhar. Similarly, the appointments of the amirs of one hundred as such nāżirs were made when Ṭāṭār was enthroned to the sultanate in Shawwāl of 824/1421, and also in Dhū al-Ḥijja under the regency of Amir Barsbay (the future Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbay) after the sudden death of Ṭāṭār and the subsequent enthronement of his son Muḥammad (al-Ṣāliḥ Muḥammad).\textsuperscript{67} All these were major waqf-financed religious institutions in Cairo, holding a huge amount of waqf property as their revenue sources. In other words, these posts were expected to yield tremendous financial benefit to the appointees. Viewed in this light, it seems quite probable that both Ṭāṭār and Barsbay made such appointments for the purpose of providing financial benefits to the amirs who supported them during the period of political crisis. In any case, the appointees to these high-ranking military offices were thereafter installed as the nāżirs of these awqāf; Barquq’s waqf also came under the jurisdiction of the successive amīr ākhūrs, who came to have a vested right to the post.

Conclusion

Under the prevailing conditions wherein amirs alienated, privatized, and then accumulated state lands, Barquq also strived to secure his own private source of revenue. In this respect, the state of the private finances and the private financial policies of Barquq and the other amirs were similar. However, by dint of his accession to the sultanate, it was possible for Barquq to divert state funds into his private purse. Nevertheless, I believe that Barquq’s private property had “one-generation rights” similar to that of the sultanate itself, which did not follow a hereditary system and was succeeded by prominent Mamluk amirs in the Circassian Mamluk era. Incidentally, the sultans after Barquq followed his policy of private finance. Thus, I would like to emphasize that their private properties had the same characteristics as those of Barquq, although they employed dubious means of property acquisition—such as the diversion of state property, confiscation, and istibdāl—more freely and frequently, allowing them to establish awqāf on a much larger scale. The progress of the alienation and waqfization of state lands during that period, which has recently been brought to light by several studies, was caused by the inclination shared by the Mamluk ruling elite, including sultans and amirs, to accumulate private properties.\textsuperscript{68} However, we must not forget that this inclination has to be viewed in the overall context: the sultans were required to adopt such policies in order to maintain
their regimes against the malfunctioning of the *iqṭāʾ* system and the traditional state structure based on it; which resulted from the state land problem. Such a "vicious spiral" increased the sultans' reliance on their private properties. Consequently, the term "*dhakhīra*" (mentioned earlier in the text) became the general term for various kinds of financial resources placed under the direct control of the sultan, in keeping with the expansion of *dhakhīra*'s role in the state administration such as the fair management of the public finances and the distribution of *iqṭāʾ*'. Although questions about the historical development of *dhakhīra* and the prevailing political and state structure will be examined further in another article currently in preparation, it must be noted that Qāytbāy's and Qānšūh al-Ghawri's financial policies (mentioned in the introduction) followed as an extension of that of their predecessors.

Thus, it became essential for the successive sultans to maintain a large-scale private property. However, this raises another question that we must consider next: how and by whom were these properties that were turned into *awqāf* managed after the sultan died? In the case of Barqūq's *waqf*, I have discussed the possibility that it became the financial interest of the *amīr ākhūr*. Similarly, there were many examples of *waqf* administratorships combined with specific official posts. Amirs who occupied high government posts could simultaneously acquire the additional posts of "the *nāzīrs* [of several *awqāf*] relating to the [government] post." In the sense that these rights and interests were combined with the government posts, we can regard these *awqāf* in the same light as *iqṭāʾ*'; however, this leaves unanswered the question of how far they could actually exploit the *awqāf* under their control. Nevertheless, it seems quite probable that under the prevailing conditions, wherein the *iqṭāʾ* system—the fundamental basis of the Mamluk regime—was becoming increasingly dysfunctional due to the progress of the waqfization of properties in both rural and urban areas, seizing the properties turned into *awqāf* through the acquisition of *waqf* administratorships was vital for the Mamluk military elite to maintain their economic power and social importance. Further research on the sultans after Barqūq as well as on what and how much impact waqfization had on the state and society is essential to confirm this hypothesis. This gives rise to the question about another issue—the radical transformation of the nature of the Mamluk regime.
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Notes

1 He made a rough calculation of the total incomes from their waqf properties and the expenditures for designated charities as described in the documents, such as maintenance and operating expenses of their madrasas. Consequently, he found that there were large discrepancies between the two; in each case, only seven percent or at maximum fourteen percent of the entire income was spent on charitable purposes. Based on this finding, Petry suggests that the remainder was used for the sultan’s personal expenditure because its management was left to the waqf administrator’s discretion, and this post was held by the original waqīf (founder), namely, the sultan himself (Petry 1994, 199–200, 202–203).


4 It is of course impossible to draw a sharp line between public matters and private matters with regard to the properties held by the sultans. However, I will use the term “sultan’s private property” to refer to the property acquired by the sultan for his own use through various means and managed by an organization and staff independent of the official financial institutions of the government. These properties, especially the real estates that provided steady and reliable incomes to the holders through rental fees and were easily distinguishable from the state property, will be the main object of this study. In this sense, the “private property” referred to in this article includes not only amīlak (sing. milk), i.e., property that is privately owned in the legal sense of the term, but also the properties designated as auqāf by the sultans. This is because since the waqīfs generally took charge of the administration of these properties in the capacity of waqf administrators, it is possible to interpret that these properties remained in their “possession.”

5 Rabie 1972, 143–144.


7 However, the Diwan al-Khāṣṣ lost its position as the bureau in charge of the management of the sultan’s “private property” during the period after al-Nāṣir’s death, wherein the sultans began losing real power. In particular, with the establishment of the amirs’ council system, which began operating the state administration and finances in 748/1347, the sultan’s private treasury also became subject to the jurisdiction of the amirs (al-Maqrizi, Suluk, Vol. 2, 750–751). Later, the Diwan al-Khāṣṣ became a financial bureau of the government, which obtained its incomes from taxes levied in Alexandria and other coastal ports on the Mediterranean and undertook the responsibility of covering expenses for the two feasts (‘Īd’ayn, khil’as (robes of honor), etc. For details on the role and resources of this diwan, see al-Zāhiri, Zubda, 197–109; Martel-Thoumian 1992, 49–53.


9 Unit expressing the amount of tax revenues obtained from farmland. The highest ‘ibra of iqṭā’ belonging to the highest-ranking amir of one hundred (amir mi’a muqaddam alif) was 100,000 dinars jayshi. See Sato 1997, 154–156.

10 In addition to these lands that he owned, there were sixty-one districts assigned to the iqṭā’ of his ten infant sons and relatives. Cf. Haarmann 1984, 153–154.

11 Waqf Deed, Sultan al-Ashraf Sha’bān, 65–85. Moreover, he stipulated in the waqf deed that the surplus of the waqf income, after the expenditure on Mecca, would be transferred to himself or his descendants, in the event of his death (ibid. 253–254).

12 Cf. Levani 1994, 383–385. For details on the political system in the late Bahri Mamluk period, see Igarashi 2008.


16. An example is that of Atābak Yalḥugh al-Khāṣaṣkāti, who assassinated Sultan Ḥasan and assumed power in 762/1361 and also accumulated immense wealth (Ibn Ḥabīb, Tadhkira, Vol. 3, 301). Waqf Deed no. j53 is a deed of his purchase of estates, and nos. j54 and j732 are deeds of his awqaf. Uljāy al-Yusufī who assumed office as atābak in 774/1372 also founded a madrasa and endowed it with assets (al-Maqrizi, Khiṭat, Vol. 4, 615–616).

17. Igarashi 2006, 120–123.


22. al-Qalqashandi, Subū, Vol. 4, 32.


26. For information on this madrasa, see al-Maqrizi, Khiṭat, Vol. 4, 679–688; al-Suyūṭī, Ḥusn, Vol. 2, 271; Mostafa 1982. The construction of this madrasa began on 24 Rajab 786/11 September 1384 (al-Šayraṭī, Nuṣḥa, Vol. 1, 100) and finished on 3 Rajab 788/31 July 1386 (al-ʿAynī, Badr, fol. 125r; Ibn Duqmāq, Jawhar, Vol. 2, 265). According to the waqf deed, Barqūq established the waqf on 6 Shaʿbān/12 September of the same year (see Table 1).


32. For details on Barqūq’s efforts to rebuild the state finances and the establishment of al-Diwān al-Mufrad, see Igarashi 2006, 124–127.

33. DW, 9/51: the deed of the waqf benefiting the Zāhirīya madrasa and Barqūq’s descendants. WA, j51: the deed of the waqf benefiting his descendants. WA, j67: the purchase deed. WA, j704: the deed of the waqf of which beneficiaries are unknown. WA, j736: the deed of transfer. WA, j562: the deed of transfer and istibdāl (exchange). WA, j728: the deed of purchase and the waqf established by Barqūq’s sister. Mostafa 1982 includes the partial edition of DW, 9/51; and Renard 1998 is an abridged translation of the provisions concerning the staff of the Zāhirīya madrasa, such as teachers, students, and clerical workers, specified in the deed of DW, 9/51.


35. Amin 1980, 98.

36. For details on the legal doctrine of the waqf, see Peters 2000.

37. He was an amir of forty (amīr tabīkhāna) at the time. Al-ʿAynī, Badr, fols. 109r, 162v.

38. This caravansary was constructed by Amīr Baktamūr and was inherited by his descendants after his death. Barqūq purchased this at the price of 250,000 dirhams (Ibn Duqmāq, Intisār, Vol. 4, 40).

39. For further information on Jarkas al-Khalīlī, see Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba, Taʾrīkh, vol. 1, 308.
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40 According to Petry, the deeds contain many references to the fact that the amir khazā’in (treasurer) Khayrbak al-Sharifī sold assets to al-Ghawrī totaling over a hundred, and the total sum of the price amounted to 32,000 dinars during the ten years from 910/1504–5 to 920/1514–5. Petry regards Khayrbak as al-Ghawrī’s partner in the latter’s acquisition of private properties and also regards the price mentioned as Khayrbak’s commission for doing the job because the real value of these assets was far greater than the price paid to Khayrbak (Petry 1994, 205).

41 Petry 1994, 204–205.


49 According to al-Maqrizī’s *Sulūk*, “the istibdāl of *awqaf* had not heretofore been in use in Egypt and Syria and the Ḫanafī judges had rejected it prudently and timidly because there was a difference of opinion [about its legality]” until 778/1376–7, just before Barqūq came into power (al-Maqrizī, *Sulūk*, Vol. 3, 269). However, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf al-Malāṭī (d. 803/1400), who was installed as Ḫanafī judge in the last years of Barqūq’s sultanate, was criticized because “he was close to sinners, and frequently performed istibdāl of *awqaf*” (Ibn Ḫajār al-‘Asqalānī, *Inbâ’ al-Ghumr*, Vol. 2, 196). Cf. Reinandt 2000, 206–207.


52 Cf. al-Shīrīnī 1997, Vol. 1, 144–149. Such a confiscation of inheritance was called ḥawṭa in the Mamluk period.


54 Amin 1980, 72–81.

55 In Egypt and Syria under the Mamluk sultanate, in general, there was no distinction between nāẓir and mutawallī—both meant *waqf* administrator and were usually mentioned together in the portion of the regulation dealing with *waqf* administration.

56 In the chronicles, this office was usually referred to as *ra‘s nawbat al-umara‘*. It was a military post ranked almost on par with that of the atābāk al-‘asākir at this time (Popper 1955, Vol. 1, 91). Note that this office was different from *ra‘s nawbat al-nuwaḥ* (chief head of guards) mentioned later.

57 Amin 1980, 116, 304.


63 al-Sakhāwī, *Tibr*, 256.


65 This is the madrasa founded by Sultan al-Muʿayyad Shaykh. For more information on the madrasa, see al-Suyūṭī, *HSn*, Vol. 2, 272–273.


67 This is the madrasa founded by Sultan al-Muʿayyad Shaykh. For more information on the madrasa, see al-Suyūṭī, *HSn*, Vol. 2, 272–273.


### Bibliography

1. Primary Sources
   1. Archival Sources
      Waqq Deeds:
      Amir Ṣarqūḥīṭīṣh al-Nāṣirī Raʾs Nawbaṭ al-Umarāʾ: WA, q3195.

2. Narrative Sources
The Private Property and Awqāf of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barqūq


II. Secondary Works


The Private Property and Awqāf of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barquq


Table 1: Assets Listed in *Waqf* Deeds Issued by Barqiq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Prov.</th>
<th>The Date of Acquisition</th>
<th>The Date of Waqf Endowment</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Number of Deed</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Four Pieces of Land and Eleven Stalls (ḥabšū)</td>
<td>Qāhirah Sh</td>
<td>19/4/784</td>
<td>6/3/795</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Two Stables (ṣūrūḥ)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Public Bath (ḥammām)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>House (dār) and Stalls (ṣūrūḥ)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/3/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>House (dār)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Structure (bina‘)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Structure (bina‘)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Tax District (nābiyya)</td>
<td>al-Jīzah</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Tax District (nābiyya)</td>
<td>al-Ṭīsah</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Village (qarya)</td>
<td>al-Quds</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Village (qarya)</td>
<td>Wāḍi al-Taym</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Village (qarya)</td>
<td>Ludd</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Village (qarya)</td>
<td>al-Ṭawāk</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Land (ṣawr)</td>
<td>al-Dimashq</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A portion of a Village (qarya)</td>
<td>al-Nusayr</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/8/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Building (makan)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah</td>
<td>6/3/799</td>
<td>12/12/799</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Structure (bina‘)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah</td>
<td>6/3/799</td>
<td>12/12/799</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Two Caravansaries (khān)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah</td>
<td>2/7/790</td>
<td>24/5/795</td>
<td>Sīsīr / Madrasah</td>
<td>WA 172</td>
<td></td>
<td>One of the caravansaries was endowed as <em>waqf</em> by Barqiq’s sister Qal‘ūz.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A Portion of a Caravansary (quṣṣāṣī‘)</td>
<td>Dimashq Sh</td>
<td>29/7/790</td>
<td>6/5/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Village (qarya)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1/7/792</td>
<td>12/9/792</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>WA 704</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Hall (qāf)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28/2/794</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Structure (bina‘)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28/2/794</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Tax District (nābiyya)</td>
<td>Asyut</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28/2/794</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A Portion of a House (dār)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>6/6/795</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>WA 1752</td>
<td></td>
<td>A portion of this asset was acquired through <em>istibdāl</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Public Bath (ḥammām) and Hall (qāf)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>6/6/795</td>
<td>6/6/797</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td>WA 1752</td>
<td>A portion of the public bath was acquired through <em>istibdāl</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Building (makan)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6/5/796</td>
<td>Madrasah</td>
<td>DW 9/51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Caravansary (khān)</td>
<td>al-Fustāṭ</td>
<td>22/7/796</td>
<td>(7/7/797)</td>
<td>Descendants</td>
<td>WA 31</td>
<td>Ibn Qutaybah, <em>Iwāmid al-Dhābi‘</em>, Vol. 4, 48, 194 ORIENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Caravansary (fundoq)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>5/3/799</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>WA 67</td>
<td>WA 736</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Two Mills (rābās)</td>
<td>al-Qāhirah M</td>
<td>5/3/799</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>WA 67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Oil Press (mī‘ārā) and House (dār)</td>
<td>Dāwūdah al-Qāhirah</td>
<td>5/3/799</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>WA 67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Waterwheel (dtūlāb)</td>
<td>al-Ṭayyib</td>
<td>5/3/799</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>WA 67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Waterwheel Fixtures</td>
<td>al-Ṭayyib</td>
<td>5/3/799</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>WA 67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Caravansary (khān)</td>
<td>Hali‘ah</td>
<td>5/3/799</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>WA 67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Property type: A) Agrarian land. B) Urban real estate. C) The Others. Province: M) Egypt (Miṣr). Sh) Damascus (al-Shām). H) Aleppo (Ḫalab). Date: Day/Month-Year (in Hijri calendar). The dates printed in bold type: in the years of Barqiq’s amirate and his first sultanate. *The detailed location of the village (no. 20) is not clear although it is sure that it was in Syria.*
The Private Property and *Awqāf* of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barqūq

### Table 2: Geographic Distribution of the Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province of Damascus</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>The Suburbs of the Capital</th>
<th>The Capital City</th>
<th>Local Town</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Province of Aleppo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4(+1)</td>
<td>7(+1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figure in parentheses: The asset listed under no.20 in Table 1.*

### Table 3: Type of Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province of Damascus</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Farm Land</th>
<th>Urban Estates</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Province of Damascus</td>
<td>5(+1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7(+1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Province of Aleppo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figure in parentheses: The asset listed under no.20 in Table 1.*

### Table 4: Barqūq’s *Waqf* Lands Listed in *Tuhfa*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>U/L</th>
<th>Province (iqlīm/māl)</th>
<th>Tax District (nāḥiyya)</th>
<th><em>Ibra</em> (dinār jayshi)</th>
<th>Original Form of Landholding</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>al-Qalyūbiyya</td>
<td>al-Qashshish</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Private Property of Sultan al-Ashraf Shebān</td>
<td>Half</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>al-Gharbiyya</td>
<td>Shintin ‘Ayyāsh</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>iqqā’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Jizīya</td>
<td>Badās</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>al-Diwān al-Sulṭāni*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Jizīya</td>
<td>Taḥmā</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>al-Diwān al-Sulṭāni</td>
<td><em>Waqf for the Zāhirīyya madrasa</em> (DW 9/51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>Arḍ al-Sarīr</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>iqqā’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>al-Rubayyāt</td>
<td>19,800</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>Baydīf</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>iqqā’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>Birka Baydīf</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>Bayyāḍ min Kūfūr Sayāla</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>iqqā’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>Dumūḥ al-Dāthīr</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>iqqā’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>Sayāla wa Kūfūr-hā</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>iqqā’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>Shāba</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>al-Diwān al-Sulṭāni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Fayyūmiyya</td>
<td>Maqqūl wa al-Rubayyāt</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>al-Diwān al-Sulṭāni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Asyūṭiya</td>
<td>al-Qaṭī‘a</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>iqqā’</td>
<td><em>Waqf for the Zāhirīyya madrasa</em> (DW 9/51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>al-Asyūṭiya</td>
<td>Taḥānhūr wa Şaqaqlūl wa Jurūf-hā</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Dīwān al-Khāṣ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*U/L: Upper Egypt/Lower Egypt  *Al-Diwān al-Sulṭāni meant the Financial Ministry of Egyptian central government.*
### Table 5: Situations in which Barqüq Acquired Property or Endowed Awqāf

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Acquisition/Endowment</th>
<th>No. (Table 1)</th>
<th>Situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atabak</td>
<td>19/4/784</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Peaceful times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (First)</td>
<td>6/8/788</td>
<td>Endowment</td>
<td>2-15</td>
<td>Peaceful times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (First)</td>
<td>6/3/789</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>16,17</td>
<td>Peaceful times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (First)</td>
<td>12/1/789</td>
<td>Endowment</td>
<td>16,17</td>
<td>Peaceful times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (First)</td>
<td>2/7/790</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Minṭalsh rose in revolt in Şafar. The plague prevailed during Rabi’ al-Awwal and Jumādā al-Uṯq,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (First)</td>
<td>29/7/790</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (Second)</td>
<td>7/5/792</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Barqüq was restored to the sultanate on 15 Şafar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (Second)</td>
<td>12/5/792</td>
<td>Endowment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Minṭalsh’s rebellion was drawing to a close.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (Second)</td>
<td>28/2/794</td>
<td>Endowment</td>
<td>21-23</td>
<td>Barqüq launched a military expedition to Northern Syria in 793, arrested Minṭalsh in Dhī al-Qa‘da, returned to Cairo on 14 Muḥarram 794.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (Second)</td>
<td>6/6/795</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>24,25</td>
<td>Peaceful times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (Second)</td>
<td>6/5/796</td>
<td>Endowment</td>
<td>119,26</td>
<td>Barqüq was on an expedition against Tamerlane; near Gaza en route to Northern Syria at that time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (Second)</td>
<td>22/7/796</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Barqüq was staying in Damascus (His return to Cairo was on 12 Şafar 797).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (Second)</td>
<td>7/4/797</td>
<td>Endowment</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Barqüq returned to Cairo from the expedition against Tamerlane on 12 Şafar 797.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan (Second)</td>
<td>5/3/799</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
<td>28-33</td>
<td>Vizier Ibn al-Baqari’s arrest and confiscation (on the previous day); Frequent government post sales; Price rise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6: Barqüq’s Agent (wakil)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Deed</th>
<th>Personal Information</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Šayfī Qunmīb</td>
<td>2/7/790</td>
<td>WA, j728</td>
<td>Probably Qunmīb al-Tahhamuri, an amir of forty and the treasurer (khāzdīḏar) at that time, and later an amir of one hundred and the director of al-Dīwān al-Mufaddad.</td>
<td>Ibn Qisdī Shubba, Taʾrīkh, Vol. 1, 362.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Ṭāฏī Zayn al-Dīn Mufīrī b. ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAllāh b. Fāḍl Allāh al-ʿUmmārī</td>
<td>22/7/796</td>
<td>WA, j51</td>
<td>Unknown. Possibly a member of the Umārī family, Damascus secretarial family produced several kāthīb al-sirrs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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