AN IMAGINED NATION: THE IDEA OF THE OTTOMAN NATION AS A KEY TO MODERN OTTOMAN HISTORY

Masami ARAI*

I

Some historians have recently tried to rewrite the history of the Ottoman Empire from the latter eighteenth through to the early twentieth century. They have been studying that history, in particular, from a social and economic viewpoint; the Ottoman history of the day is, according to them, the process of Turkey's incorporation into the world capitalist economy or, to be more exact, Turkey's joining the periphery of the world economy. These studies naturally regard modern Ottoman history, even including that of the early Turkish Republic, as sequential, and consequently, distinguish it from that of the classical age of the Ottoman Empire.⁽¹⁾

I would like to present, in the course of this paper, another keynote of modern Ottoman and Turkish history, in order to comprehend it sequentially. The keynote is the idea of nation. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, in particular the age of *Tanzimat* onwards, most of the Ottoman reformers seem to have intended, consciously or unconsciously, to construct a nation-state from the various subjects of their empire. The idea of an Ottoman nation, or *Osmanlı milleti* and *millet-i Osmaniye*, was born accordingly.

As is well known, the concept of Ottoman was not originally connected with national or ethnic origin; nor did the word "*millet*" mean nation. The concept of Ottoman meant the ruling class of the empire, and that class was open to every ethnic group and even, until at least the sixteenth century, to every religion.⁽²⁾ As for *millet*, it essentially meant religious communities in the Ottoman Empire, although it is still a matter of debate whether the so called *millet* system actually existed in the empire's classical age.⁽³⁾

* Associate Professor of History, Osaka City University

A considerable change was wrought after the French Revolution. The idea of nation, a body of people associated with a peculiar territory and a consciousness of unity, was gradually implanted in the minds of the Ottoman ruling elites. They began, for example, to attach the meaning of fatherland, instead of home, to the word "*vatan*". In addition, they later became aware that the word "Ottoman" was the mere title of a dynasty, and not the name of the territory of their empire; they used then, for a while, the word "*Türkistan*" as the name of their country, inspired, this time too, by the French word "*la Turquie*"⁽⁴⁾

Needless to say, however, the idea of nation and, in particular, that of an Ottoman nation was not easily established. The received wisdom is that it was in the imperial rescript of *Gülhane* of 1839 that the word of *millet* was used officially for the first time in the sense of nation. Certainly, the word appears in the rescript four times; in all the cases, the word is put side by side with another word, *devlet*, or state.⁽⁵⁾ Furthermore, the other word *vatan* or fatherland can also be seen in two places, in both of which the word is associated with the word love (*muhabbet*) or protection (*muhafaza*). This shows that Mustafa Reşit, who drew up the rescript, used the word *millet* to represent a nation as a whole in the Western sense, and considered the fatherland to be an object of patriotic feelings. A fatherland which consists of a nation, if it really existed, naturally means a nation-state. On the other hand, however, Mustafa Reşit, when describing elements of the nation, distinguished non-Muslim subjects from Muslim ones, and used the plural of the word *millet* in the traditional way: *ehl-i islâm ve milel-i saire* (the people of Islam and the other religious communities).⁽⁶⁾ The word most frequently used in the rescript to signify Ottoman inhabitants is *tebaa* or subject. This can of course be regarded as the natural consequence of the document's being as a rescript; the same is true of the edict of reform of 1856.

Nevertheless, in a memorandum (*lâyiha*) written presumably just before the issue of the reform edict in 1856, Mustafa Reşit did use these terms in the traditional manner.⁽⁷⁾ In this memorandum, on the conditions of ceasefire of the Crimean War, Mustafa Reşit treated of the fourth condition of the truce protocol of Vienna concluded some two weeks before the issue of the reform edict.⁽⁸⁾ The condition required the Ottoman Sultan to reconfirm the legal equality of Christian subjects with Muslim ones, although the fourth article in itself prescribed that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman

Empire be preserved. In the face of such intervention by the Great Powers in domestic Ottoman policies, Mustafa Reşit objected to excessive concessions to Christian subjects although it was Reşit himself who granted the first concession to them in the Gülhane rescript. In order to represent the Christian subjects, he mostly used the term *hristiyan tebaa*;⁽⁹⁾ by contrast, he used, when referring to Muslims, the term of *ehl-i islâm*.⁽¹⁰⁾ In addition, when describing the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, he chose the terms "*millet-i hâkime*" and "*milel-i mahkûme*", or the ruling religious community and ruled ones.⁽¹¹⁾ In another place, he stressed that only the Muslim subjects contributed and made sacrifices for the Ottoman Empire; he used the term *millet-i islâmiye* for the Muslims.⁽¹²⁾ Thus, Mustafa Reşit obviously understood, in this memorandum written in 1856, the concept of *millet* as religious community.

It was in only one sentence that he used the term in the sense of nation. In this sentence, he gave expression to his patriotic feelings and loyalty to the throne. He enumerated the objects of his patriotism: *padişahımız*, *devlet-i aliyeleri*, *vatan*, and *millet*, that is our Sultan, sublime state, fatherland, and nation.⁽¹³⁾ This clearly shows that the term *millet* was used in the Western sense of nation only in the context of patriotism, which, in itself, had been transmitted to the Ottoman Empire from the West. One may see the idea of nation becoming fixed in the Ottoman mind after about twenty years.

At first glance, however, even in the Midhat Constitution of 1876, there is no use of the word *millet* either in the traditional or the Western sense, although in the edict issued at the same time to declare Constitutionalism, the word appears three times in the sense of nation.⁽¹⁴⁾ The fact is that instead of using the word *millet*, they duly defined, in the text of the Constitution, the concept of Ottoman. The eighth article runs as follows: all the subjects of the Ottoman State are termed Ottoman without exception regardless of their religion.⁽¹⁵⁾ The idea of an Ottoman nation was thus firmly and officially established. It is, of course, quite possible that the idea had already spread over the empire through the activities of intellectuals.⁽¹⁶⁾

In the sixteenth article of the Constitution itself, there can be seen the only exceptional use of the word *millet*, which prohibits the conduct of independent education by non-Muslim subjects in the empire. These subjects are termed, in the article, *milel-i muhtelif* or various religious communities.⁽¹⁷⁾ This certainly appears to be the traditional use of the word, yet the

connection with the educational issue ought to be considered. Needless to say, education is a soil in which national sentiment is fostered. Actually, in the edict of reform of 1856, too, schools of these communities are stipulated to be under control of the central government. The term *millet* is also used there to signify these schools: *milletçe mektepler*.⁽¹⁸⁾ These facts enable us to assume that the word *millet*, even if it was used in the traditional sense, had already meant a community claiming its nationhood and most probably bearing the possibility of separation from the empire.

Thus, in the middle of the nineteenth century, every inhabitant of the Ottoman Empire was, on the one hand, expected to be a member of one nation or the Ottoman nation; on the other hand, the rulers of the empire perceived the existence of subgroups claiming their peculiar nationalities. The ruling elites should pursue the gradual unification of these elements to construct a nation-state, as France and Britain did.

This desire to construct a progressive nation-state in the Orient was so keen that no Ottoman intellectuals, whatever ideal they cherished—Westernist, nationalist, and even Islamist—could repress it.

II

The aim of the Westernist Ottomans was the progress of the Ottoman Empire towards Western standards. These naturally included the model of a nation-state, to which its all members gave their loyalty. The nation-state model was thus one which they thought was suitable to advanced nations. Abdullah Cevdet, for example, sincerely hoped that all the inhabitants comprising Turks, Albanians, Kurds, Armenians, and so forth within the Ottoman borders should unite under the idea of common fatherland.⁽¹⁹⁾

Contrary to the received wisdom, the aim of Turkish nationalists in the Ottoman Empire was to build up a nation-state, Ottoman in name, but which consisted of Turks and other Turkified people.⁽²⁰⁾ Concretely speaking, one branch of Turkish nationalism inherited the idea of an Ottoman nation from nineteenth century Ottoman patriotism. When referring to Turkish nationalism, one should touch on Pan-Turkism, which, at first sight, seems incompatible with the idea of an Ottoman nation. In reality, however, the two ideas were, in accordance with a nationalist's view, interdependent. The nucleus of the future Turkic state in which all Turks would be involved was Ottoman

Turks; Turkic people in Central Asia would Ottomanize, or civilize and thereby help Ottomans to preserve their empire.⁽²¹⁾ The nation-state to be built would therefore still be called Ottoman.

In the same manner as Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism in the Ottoman Empire ought to be carefully examined. As some researchers have already remarked,⁽²²⁾ the origin of Pan-Islamism can be found in the eighteenth century. In the Russo-Turkish treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, the Ottoman Sultan asserted spiritual authority over Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire, in particular over Muslim subjects of Russia. This assertion was, of course, a reaction against the Russian pretext for interfering in Ottoman policies: the czar should be a protector of Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire whose rights were infringed by infidel rulers. The legend arose then too that Sultan Selim I had inherited the Caliphate in 1517 from al-Mutawakkil, a descendant of the last Abbasid Caliph under the protection of the Mameluke Sultanate. These facts lead to the hypothesis that Ottoman rulers intended to prevent or, at least, control the interventions and invasions of Western powers by asserting that the Ottoman Empire was a ray of hope for Muslims most of whom were losing their independence and consequently that the Ottoman Sultan was actually the master of all Muslims.⁽²³⁾ Such intentions naturally led Ottomans to expect all Muslims not only to cooperate with each other but also to obey the Ottoman Sultan in order to revitalize the Ottoman Empire, which Ottomans thought was the nucleus of the Islamic world.

Pan-Islamic propaganda carried out in the Ottoman Empire under the reign of Abdülhamit II should be understood in the context of this intention. The propaganda was double-ended: inside the empire, it aimed at maintaining the loyalty of non-Turkish Muslims to the Sultan; outside the empire, it was aimed at gaining political and financial support from Muslims under foreign rule. Further to that, unification of these Muslims with those in the Ottoman Empire might have been intended, since, as Professor Landau has observed,⁽²⁴⁾ they could see models of such unification very near to them: in Germany and Italy. Even in this case, the role of Prussia and Sardinia should solely be played by the Ottoman Empire.

This suggested, although implicitly, that Pan-Islamism was treated in the context of nation-building. The author of a booklet published presumably in the Young Turk era and entitled *İttihad-ı İslâm* or the union of Islam

added the United States of America as another model for such an Islamic union.⁽²⁵⁾ As is widely known, the United States was a hopeful model for the future Ottoman nation, all of whose citizens would preserve their self-consciousness as Ottomans, although their ethnic origins and religions were very diverse.⁽²⁶⁾

Furthermore, the substance of the "Ottoman nation" became exclusively Muslims, in particular, after the Berlin congress of 1878, which forced the Ottoman government to abandon *de facto* most of its Christian provinces. This situation, combined with the notion that the Ottoman Empire was the ray of hope for and hence the nucleus of Muslims, might introduce a new recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a Muslim state. Namık Kemal, for instance, admitted the impossibility of imposing the Turkish language on non-Muslim subjects such as Greeks and Bulgarians, while he encouraged the spread of Turkish among non-Turkish Muslims, thereby assimilating them with "Ottomans".⁽²⁷⁾ Yusuf Akçura, although he can hardly be regarded as an Islamist, wrote, when examining the policy of Pan-Islamism in his 1904 article, that the policy could unify all Muslim subjects in the Ottoman Empire.⁽²⁸⁾ He also asserted, when dealing with the policy of Pan-Turkism, that owing to this policy, non-Turkish subjects, especially Muslim ones, could be assimilated with Turks.⁽²⁹⁾

These examples clearly show that Turkish intellectuals expected the Ottoman state to consist of a homogeneous, probably Muslim, element. If so, this was an essential change in the kind of Islamic state which the Ottoman Empire had for a long time represented. It is widely accepted that the Islamic state left heterogeneous elements as they were if they acknowledged Muslim sovereignty; they were guaranteed the preservation of their faith, Christianity, Judaism, or any other religions if any, honor and property as *zimmi*, or the status of protected non-Muslim subject. In contrast to this, the nation-state was to be constructed by assimilating minority groups into a majority one, excluding heterogeneous elements, although this process is usually described with moderate expressions such as national integration and nation-building.

Islamists must have rejected such change decidedly. They certainly criticized and refused to accept nationalism. Mehmet Âkif, a leading Islamist in the Young Turk era, for example, severely criticized nationalism. In a sermon given at the Beyazıt mosque and published in the periodical *Sebil'ür-Reşat*, he stressed that thanks to the Islamic religion many people belonging

to various *millet*s or “nation”s preserving their own languages and customs could become brothers with each other.⁽³⁰⁾ In the Ottoman Empire, too, there were a large number of nations such as Albanians, Kurds, Circasians, Bosnians, Arabs, Turks, and Lazes; but, he said, there existed a bond that fastened them together: religion. It was this bond that made all of the Ottomans live as brothers.⁽³¹⁾ Regrettably, he continued, rising nationalism among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire caused much damage to the empire. Actually, his argument was not clearly restricted within the narrow limits of the Ottoman Empire. However, the subsequent sentences reveal his real interest. He writes:

Among a great many reasons for the present calamity, the first one is the discord which has been brought on by nationalism. On this account, we have been in a dreadful situation for mere a term of four or five years.⁽³²⁾

This sermon was published in February, 1913, and hence, the dreadful situation meant what the Ottomans encountered after the Young Turk revolution; the most dreadful was, without doubt, the Balkan War which the Ottomans were then waging. Since the revolution, the Ottoman subjects, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, had been rising in revolt, inspired by nationalism. This was indeed why Mehmet Âkif criticized nationalism. But now, let's follow his argument a little more. He explained the basic reason for these revolts.

Because foreign countries want such (revolts and resulting difficulties). This is their plan to take our land from us.⁽³³⁾

According to him, the discord, the result of rising nationalism incited by Western countries was the advance guard of European imperialism, although he did not use such a modern term; on the contrary, he compared this European scheme with the early Ottoman *akıncı* or frontier raiders who attacked Christian territories in advance of the regular army. He continued as follows:

Such discord, such nationalism is a blind alley. Islam is not compatible

with this.⁽³⁴⁾

Needless to say, nationalism in Asia and Africa, a great part of which is Islamic, is essentially a movement towards liberation from colonial rule. However, Mehmet Âkif regarded it as a blind alley, since it would cause the Ottoman Empire to collapse. The Ottoman state was, according to him, a barrier against Western invasion into the Islamic world as well as a ray of hope to all Muslims. He said that Muslim inhabitants under Russian, French, and British rules barely averted conversion to Christianity thanks to the existence of the Ottoman government, though weakened.⁽³⁵⁾ He admitted Ottoman sovereignty to be weakened. He wrote,

I do not understand in what difficult situation we are today, (but it is clear that) we have been the most disunited nation.⁽³⁶⁾

Now there is no doubt that the nationalism Mehmet Âkif criticized meant the separatist movement which awakened discord in the Ottoman Empire, whose inhabitants Âkif regarded as a nation, and which weakened the empire as a result. The ideal model of state Âkif cherished should be thought of as a Muslim nation whose members preserved their identity as Ottomans. This must be why Mehmet Âkif, the Islamist, that is an antagonist of nationalism, would soon become the lyric writer of the Independence March, the Anthem of the nationalist Turkish Republic.

III

Apart from nation-building in the Ottoman sense, careful attention should also be paid to the role of the Arabs in the Islamists' ideas. Islamists' attitudes here may be classified in two large groups: nation-state oriented and Islamic state oriented, although even the latter inclined to exclude non-Muslims when ideas for a state were formulated. The former roughly represented a centralist position, while the latter was decentralist or federalist.

As is seen above, Mehmet Âkif tended towards the construction of a Muslim Ottoman nation; in this nation, the self-determination of non-Turkish Muslims might not be admitted since it could open the way to discord in the state.

Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, although he himself was of course not an Islamist but was regarded as a nationalist, paid careful attention to the Arabs when treating the measures for rescuing the Ottoman Empire. He mentioned two main elements that supported the Ottoman Empire: national Turkish identity and Islam. The two main elements that supported Islam were the Turks and the Arabs. The Ottoman state could therefore be rescued and elevated by these two peoples.⁽³⁷⁾ This is consistent with the thought of Ziya Gökalp, who intended to maintain the framework of the Ottoman Empire with the aid of three forces: national Turkish identity, Pan-Islamic solidarity and modern technology as ably represented in the title of his widely known serial of articles, Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization. By using the word "Islamization", Gökalp seems to have intended to obtain co-operation from the Arabs as well as to escape Islamist criticism of the nationalists. He even offered, in exactly the same manner as Köprülü, the Turco-Arabic state as a title of the Ottoman Empire. However, neither of them could admit the self-determination of the Arabs; they supported the centralist administration in the Arab provinces and thereby wanted to construct a nation-state. It is probable that they wanted to make an element of the Ottoman nation emerge in the Arab provinces who spoke Arabic in addition to Ottoman-Turkish.⁽³⁸⁾

The politics of Abdülhamit II certainly differed from those aiming at the construction of a nation-state. His careful attention to the Arabs seems to be oriented towards an Islamic state and decentralist. The fact is, however, that Islamist policies of the Sultan intensified conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims; the Sultan did not incline towards the decentralist administration of the provinces. His purpose was to maintain the obedience of the Arabs to the throne by attaching importance to them and their language.

Some other Islamists seem not to have inclined towards constructing a nation-state. Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, for example, intended to repel European, especially British, invasion by strengthening Muslim solidarity, in particular, by laying to rest the antagonism between the Sunnites and the Shiites. But he was not a Turk or a Turkified Ottoman. One Ottoman, Sait Halim Paşa, asserted that Islam had no fatherland. But he was a grandson of Muhammad Ali of Egypt; he generally wrote his articles and booklets in French. Mizancı Murat who elaborated an idea of a committee consisting of Muslims under foreign rule was indeed an Ottoman but was

from the Russian ruled country, Daghestan. The same is true of other Islamists who advocated an all Muslim congress: al-Kawakibi was of Syrian origin; Mirza Ali Aga Shirazi was, of course, a Persian.⁽³⁹⁾ In this way, those who could think about the Pan-Islamic idea crossing Ottoman borders were foreigners or *déracinés*, in exactly the same manner as with the issue of Pan-Turkism.

As has been repeatedly demonstrated in the course of this paper, throughout the last century of the Ottoman Empire, the desire to construct a nation-state was overwhelmingly intense. How interesting, then, is the idea of decentralization which originated at the end of the nineteenth century, and which, in particular, was born in the minds of the ruling Ottomans.

Notes

(1) See, for example, Huri İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.), *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*. Cambridge: CUP, 1987; Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism: 1820–1913*. Cambridge: CUP, 1987; Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century*. New York: SUNY Press, 1988.

(2) Metin Kunt, "Transformation of Zimmi into Askeri," in Benjamin Braude & Bernard Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*. vol. 1, New York & London: Holmes & Meier, 1982, pp. 55–67.

(3) Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the Millet System," in Braude & Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews*, pp. 69–88.

(4) Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Namık Kemal: Şahsı, Eseri, Tesiri*. Ankara: Recep Uluoğlu Basımevi, 1940, pp. XVIII–XIX. (Notes by İbrahim Necmi Dilmen).

(5) A. Şeref Gözübüyük & Suna Kili, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Tanzimattan Bugüne Kadar*. Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaası, 1957, pp. 4–5.

(6) *ibid.*, p. 5.

(7) M. Reşid Paşa, *Hristiyan Tebaya Dair Layiha*. Istanbul University Library, İbnülenin Mahmud Kemal İnal Yazmaları, No. 2612; *id.*, *Hristiyan Teb'a Hakkında Layiha*. The same collection of manuscripts, No. 2975.

(8) For the protocol of Vienna, see Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire Ottoman*. tome 3, Paris: Librairie Cotillon, 1902. (repr. Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1978.) pp. 4–6; İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*. Vol. 4, Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972, pp. 173–174.

(9) See, for example, *Hristiyan Tebaya Dair Layiha*, ff. 1, 3, *et passim*; *Hristiyan Teb'a Hakkında Layiha*, ff. 1, 2, 5, *et passim*.

(10) *Hristiyan Tebaya Dair Layiha*, ff. 1, 3, *et passim*; *Hristiyan Teb'a Hakkında Layiha*, ff. 1, 5, 7, *et passim*.

(11) *Hristiyan Tebaya Dair Layiha*, f. 4; *Hristiyan Teb'a Hakkında Layiha*, f. 6.

(12) *Hristiyan Tebaya Dair Layiha*, f. 6; *Hristiyan Teb'a Hakkında Layiha*, f. 11.

(13) *Hristiyan Tebaya Dair Layiha*, f. 7; *Hristiyan Teb'a Hakkında Layiha*, f. 13.

(14) Gözübüyük & Kili, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri*, pp. 23–24.

(15) *Devlet-i Osmaniye tabiyetinde bulunan efradın cümlesine herhangi din ve meshepten*

olur ise olsun bila istisna Osmanlı tabir olunur. (ibid., p. 26.)

(16) Amongst them, for example, are Sadık Rifat Paşa, İbrahim Şinasi, and Namık Kemal. See Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Princeton: PUP, 1962, pp. 174, 189, 274, 328, *et passim*.

(17) Gözübüyük & Kili, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri*, p. 26.

(18) *ibid.*, p. 9.

(19) M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi*. İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, ca. 1981, p. 216.

(20) For this subject, see my *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992.

(21) Ziya Gökalp, "Turan Nedir?" *Yeni Mecmua*, XXXI, 1918, pp. 82a-84a.

(22) Amongst them, the most recent one is Jacob M. Landau. See his *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 10-11.

(23) For example, the fourth article of the Midhat Constitution runs as follows: His Majesty the Sultan is the protector of the Islamic religion as Caliph. (Gözübüyük & Kili, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri*, p. 25.)

(24) Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, pp. 23-25.

(25) *ibid.*, p. 79.

(26) See, for instance, Şevket Beysanoğlu, *Ziya Gökalp'in İlk Yazı Hayatı: 1894-1909*. İstanbul: Diyarbakır Tanıtma Derneği, 1956, p. 105; Akçuraoglu Yusuf, "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset," in *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, İstanbul: Matbaa-i Kader, 1327, p. 4.

(27) Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, *Namık Kemal'in Husûsî Mektupları*. vol. 2, Ankara: TTK, 1969, p. 244.

(28) Akçuraoglu Yusuf, "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset," p. 24.

(29) *ibid.*, p. 28.

(30) Mehmed Âkif, "Hutbe ve Mevazı: Bayezid Kürsüsünden Vaız," *Sebil'ür-Reşad*, IX/230, 29 Safer 1331, p. 230.

(31) *ibid.*

(32) *Şimdiki felaketin sonsuz sebepleri var ki en birincisi milliyetçilik yüzünden meydana alan tefrikadır. Yalnız dört beş senedir bu yüzden ne hale geldik. (ibid.)*

(33) *Çünkü yabancılar böyle istiyor, memleketlerimizi elimizden almak için programları bu. (ibid.)*

(34) *Bu tefrika, bu milliyetçilik çıkmaz yoldur. Din bununla beraber gidemez. (ibid.)*

(35) *ibid.*

(36) *Biz bugün ne oluyor bilmiyorum, en bölünmüş millet olduk. (ibid.)*

(37) Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, "Türklük, İslâmlık, Osmanlılık," *Türk Yurdu*, IV/9, 1914, pp. 699-700.

(38) For these nationalists, see my *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*.

(39) For these Islamists, see Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, pp. 33, 34, 84, 85.