A JAPANESE VIEW OF LORD CROMER’S RULE IN EGYPT
—A Lesson for Japan’s Colonial Policy—*

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I. Katō Fusazō’s theory concerning Japan’s colonial policy in Korea in comparison with Lord Cromer’s rule in Egypt.

On July 10, 1905, Katō Fusazō*** (sometimes referred to under the nom de plume of Fusō, will henceforth be mentioned here as Fusazō, by his first name) presented his book through the Keika Nippo Publishing Co. in Tokyo, entitled Hogokoku Keiei-no Mohan: Ejiputo (Egypt: a Model for Governing a Protectorate). This piece of Fusazō’s writing, however, cannot be found in either the Meiji Nenkan Chōsen Kenkyū Bunken Shi (A Bibliographical Survey of Korean Studies during the Meiji Era), Shomotsu Dōkōkai Pub Co., Seoul, 1941 or Chōsen Kenkyū Bunken-Shi: Meiji Taishō Hen (A Bibliographical Survey of Korean Studies during the Meiji and the Taishō Era), Ryūkoku Shyōsha Pub. Co., Tokyo, 1979, both compiled by Sakurai Yoshiyuki. Only another piece of Fusazō’s writing which was entitled Chōsen Sōjo-no Shinsō Zen (The Truth about the Korean Riots), Keijō Nippō Pub. Co., 1920, was mentioned in the latter bibliography of Sakurai. The Truth about the Korean Riots was a compilation of Fusazō’s editorial articles and some other essays, which appeared serially in the Keijō Nippō (The Seoul Daily Newspaper), the President of which was Fusazō himself.

From the viewpoint of an academic bibliographical survey as such

* The present paper is based, with some corrections and addenda, on the author’s own article which was written in Japanese, namely, Katō Fusazō to Yoshimura Gentarō no Ejiputo Tōchi Ron (Katō Fusazō and Yoshimura Gentarō’s view of British Rule in Egypt) in the Nihon Oriento Gakkai 35 Shūnen Kinen Oriento Gaku Ronshū (Collected Papers of Oriental Studies in Celebration of the Thirty-Fifth Anniversary of the Japan Society for Near Eastern Studies), 1990, edited by Nihon Oriento Gakkai (Japan Society for Near Eastern Studies).

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*** In accordance with the normal Japanese practice, with regard to all Japanese names the surnames have been placed first throughout this paper, except the author’s name.
however, we could not draw the conclusion that Fusazō was not a prominent figure among writers on Korean affairs, or on Japan's policy with regard to Korea at that time. We may however correctly draw another conclusion, namely that Fusazō must have written a considerable number of editorial articles and essays other than The Truth about the Korean Riots, because Fusazō was not only an editorial writer and director of Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shinbun (The Tokyo Daily Newspaper), and later an editorial writer and President of Keiō Nippō (The Seoul Daily Newspaper), but also a well-known expert on Korean affairs among Japanese journalists. The reason why his book was omitted in Sakurai's bibliographical survey may be attributed to the fact that first, it was the custom in the journalism of that time that the editorial articles and essays written by the staff appeared usually without by-line, so that Sakurai could not confirm exactly as to which were written by Fusazō himself. Second, the editorial articles and essays in a newspaper were usually omitted from an academic bibliographical survey, unless they possessed an exceptional importance as historical documents. Third, his book, Egypt: A Model for Governing a Protectorate could be properly classified as a book of Egyptian affairs rather than of Korean affairs, if it be judged solely by its title.

Egypt: a Model for Governing a Protectorate aimed at comparing Lord Cromer's rule in Egypt with Japan's rule in Korea, and then recommended a policy regarding the right way to the Government, concerning the question of ruling Korea. His book was numbered among those books and articles which discussed a similar topic, such as Tomizu Hirondo's Ejiputo-to Chōsen (Egypt and Korea) and others. If we have enough time to rake up the writings covered on Korean affairs, I think, we would probably discover some other similar writings dealing with similar comparisons, though in a manner different from Fusazō's. This is because British rule in Egypt, and in particular Lord Cromer's rule in Egypt was well-known among Japanese intellectuals and policy-makers during the last decade of the Meiji Era, so much so that the Japanese translation of Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt was published in 1911, only three years after the publication of its English original.

According to the Jinji Kōshin Roku (Who's who), namely the sixth edition published in 1921, Fusazō's career which is given very briefly is as follows: “Born in 1867, Heimin (Commoner) of Tokyo Fu (Tokyo Prefecture), President
of Keijō Nippō Sha (The Seoul Daily Newspaper Co.)." So far the author has not been able to obtain any other biographical information concerning the details of his career. In October 1904, Katō Taka-aki (henceforth to be mentioned here as Katō by his surname) who enjoyed the financial support of the Iwasaki Zaibatsu (The Mitsubishi Group) by virtue of his being a son-in-law of the Iwasaki family, bought up the Tokyo Daily Newspaper and appointed himself as its President. When Katō resigned from the position of President and remained as an owner of the Company, he reorganized the board of executives and introduced the three-man board of executives, under the new President Honda Seiichi. At that time thirty-nine years old Fusazo was appointed as one of the three executives. (Katō was not a relative of Fusazo though they had the same surname.). Unfortunately, owing to an accident the detailed record of Fusazo's activities during his days at the Tokyo Daily Newspaper Co. is not available either, because soon after the Tokyo Daily Newspaper Co. was merged with the Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun (the Osaka Daily Newspaper Co.), the records concerned with the Tokyo Daily Newspaper Co. were almost entirely lost in a fire which broke out during the Taishō Era.

Fusazo was recognized for his abilities by Katō, a senior official of the Government (who later became Prime Minister, 1925~26) as well as a leading individual of the business circles; and also recognized by Hirata Tōsuke (who later became the Minister of the Interior) through an introduction by Katō, and Fusazo also edited the Hirata Tōsuke Haku Den (Biography of Count Hirata Tōsuke) at his own request, which was published in 1927. Katō and Hirata served as influential patrons for Fusazo, and they were always behind him. He enjoyed their patronage and ensured his position as a policy-oriented executive journalist, in particular concerning Japan's colonial policy. Katō contributed the following Foreword to Fusazo's book:

As Mr. Katō Fusazo was planning to publish his latest work about Egypt, he asked me to contribute the Foreword to it. Then I asked him, "I think that we need to learn a lot of things concerning how to settle relations between Japan and Korea from the British experience in Egypt. Does your work rightly point to this issue?" He answered, "Yes." Then again I asked him, "When the financial conditions in Egypt were falling into the stage of extreme derangement, Lord Cromer devoted himself to an industrious effort to settle the financial difficulties, and
was able to recover a complete credibility of the Egyptian finance as a result of his ten years’ efforts. Does your analysis deal with this matter properly?” He said, “Yes.” So I told him finally, “In that case, your theory is rightly directed to the effect, and the theory should be of statesmanship and practical use. I feel assured that your work will be very instructive for the readers.” Thereupon I would like to write down our talk as it appeared in the Foreward for his book.

In the Middle of May 1905, Katō Taka-aki

Katō was a diplomat and politician who was proud of himself for being a leading figure among the pro-British group in Japan. In August 1890, as Director of the Political Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he took the initiative to conclude the Provisional Joint Agreement on the reforms of the Korean domestic administration, and then *the Treaty of Alliance between Japan and Corea*. In 1894, as the Japanese Ambassador to Britain, he advocated adhering to a hard line diplomatic stance towards Russia, and opposed a plan for exchanging the rule of Korea for the rule of Manchuria between Japan and Russia, which was supported by some of the high officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was favoured by the recognition of Itō Hirobumi, and after returning from his inspection tour of China and Korea in 1900, he was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Itō Cabinet and participated in a political maneuver to obtain British support for Japan’s hard-line policy toward Russia. Needless to say, he was at the center of the negotiation for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. As the Japanese Ambassador to Britain, he negotiated with Britain in order to obtain approval of the Treaty regarding the Annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan. Furthermore, as President of *the Tokyo Daily Newspaper*, he wrote several editorial articles on Japan’s colonial policy, in particular concerning the administration of Korea and the Kwantung Leased Territory, criticizing the militarist way of colonial rule over there. As mentioned above, Fusazō was under the patronage of Katō and later he became President of *the Seoul Daily Newspaper Co.*, which was an affiliated company of *the Kokumin Shinbun Sha (the National Newspaper Co.*) under the Presidency of Tokutomi Sohō, a leading liberal-nationalist journalist of that time.

Now we will describe what Fusazō wrote concerning the comparison of Japan’s colonial rule with Britain’s. Since he expressed at first his intention of publishing his book, let us now quote a few passages from his own Preface
Japan's first experience of ruling a protectorate has just originated from the Korean case now under way. Furthermore, because of our having no precedent in our experience concerning a proper method of ruling a protectorate, we have no choice but to discover a model for it from the experiences of the other foreign countries. Fortunately our ally Britain's policy toward Egypt as her protectorate is, I think, going to be instructive and helpful for us. If Japanese politicians would study the manner in which Britain is ruling Egypt, some deficiencies in our rule in Korea could at least be made up for. ... I would deem it a great honour if this book should prove helpful to our politicians in providing them information. I wrote this book with a particular intention, and so I aimed at describing the facts objectively and excluding radical and emotional expressions as far as possible. ... I believe that the most basic line of Japan's policy towards Korea should not be disrupted by the progress of separate minor measures to be adopted. Even though I could not agree with the basic line of the Government's policy towards Korea, I have strictly refrained from adopting a critical and offensive mode of writing as far as possible, because this book does not aim at proposing policy.

It may be inferred from this quotation that Fusazo's real intention was to advocate the political stand of Katō and his Newspaper, which maintained a close connection with the Government and opposed to Gunbatsu (militarist faction) and Hanbatsu (clanship faction) both within and without the Government, under the pretext of an objective analysis of British rule in Egypt.

In May, when Katō was writing a Foreword to Fusazo's book, Japan won the Battle of the Japan Sea, and in June, both Japan and Russia agreed to accept a recommendation for peace settlement proposed by the US President, Theodore Roosevelt. In June, the Second Draft of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was submitted to Britain, and in July, Japan agreed to recognize US rule in the Philippines in exchange for US recognition of Japan's rule in Korea, through the Katsura-Taft Memorandum. In August, the First Peace Conference between Japan and Russia was held at Portsmouth, and in September, the Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty was signed. Under those circumstances, the Japan-Corean Protocol was signed in February 1904, and in August, the First Japan-Corean Agreement was signed, by which Korea
was forced to appoint the Japanese financial and diplomatic advisers recommended by the Japanese Government, and also was impeded from concluding any kind of treaty or granting any kind of concession, without prior consultation with the Japanese Government. As a result of concluding the Second Japan-Corean Convention of November 1905, the responsibility of Korean diplomacy was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Tōkan (the Resident General) was made to reside at Seoul, as a representative of the Japanese Government. In December, Itō was appointed as the first Tōkan of Korea under direct subordination to the Japanese Emperor. Furthermore in July 1910, in accordance with the conclusion of the Third Japan-Korean Agreement, Korea's domestic administration came under the control of the Tōkan, and a number of Japanese officials were appointed to the offices of the Korean Government. Finally, the Annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan was realized in August 1910, after the assassination of Itō by a Korean nationalist in October 1909.

Fusazo's book was published at the final stage of introducing colonial rule into Korea. At the same time, as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan gained a new right to the territorial lease as well as to the railway concession in North-east China, and in August 1906, Kantō Totoku Fu (the Governor-General's Government of the Kwantung Leased Territory) was established at Talien, and the Government Committee for the Establishment of the South-Manchurian Railways Co. was also set up. In 1906, General Ōshima Yoshimasa was appointed as the first Kantō Totoku (Governor-General) and Gōtō Shinpei was appointed as the first President of the South-Manchurian Railways Co.. Thus Japan launched out into a large-scale colonial rule, which she had never experienced previously. We should not overlook the fact that from the start of the colonization process, not a little discrepancy in opinions appeared concerning the manner of carrying out colonial rule, among the Japanese high officials in Tokyo as well as in Korea, the Kwantung Province and then later in North Manchuria. In this situation, Saionji Kinmochi, Katō, Gōtō and others, under the leadership of Itō, launched a severe criticism against the so-called Budan Ha (the militarist faction), by referring to themselves as the Bunchi Ha (the civilian faction).⁶

The text of Fusazo's Egypt: a Model for Governing a Protectorate comprises two hundred and twenty pages. Following the Preface, the first chapter is entitled An Introduction: the second, The state of the Country;
the third, *History*; the fourth, *Egyptian Politics*; and the fifth, *A Conclusion: Egypt and Korea in Comparison*. The most fascinating portion for us, however, is the fifth chapter, which includes his policy-proposal. Now we shall supply some extracts from the fifth chapter, and the reader can we believe easily understand his theory, just from reading the following quotation.

(a)... As I mentioned-above, in sharp contrast to the brilliant performance of the British rule in Egypt for twenty years since 1883, a fact which gave rise to the exclusive British occupation of Egypt, Japan's statesmanship in Korea made poor progress. If we look at the Korean affairs from a different angle, that is, from an economic point of view, we find out however that the economic foothold which we Japanese gained in Korea has been by no means inferior to that which the Britain gained in Egypt... In other words, we can say that Japan has taken the initiative of monopolizing almost all the interests of Korea's foreign trade, while the British have not been able to corner even half of Egypt's foreign trade... Japanese people have settled in the cities located in various parts of the Korean Peninsula during these decades, but in recent years the number of Japanese people who have gone over to Korea with the intention of becoming permanent residents scattered at all the Provinces in Korea, has been sharply increasing. Thus it is destined by nature that Japanese people expand settlements in the Korean Peninsula, and accordingly no person can refuse or impede it... (*Section 2: Our Economic Advantage in Korea*, pp. 209~211.)

(b) Japan has succeeded in detaching Korea from China as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, and ... then the Japan-Korean Protocol, which was signed in February 1904, paved the way for Japan to bring Korea under her protection... There is no practical difference between the Annexation of Korea and the establishing of a protectorate over Korea, and the two would amount to the same thing in the long run. There are however two key-issues for Japan to take into consideration fully and prudently, with regard to the manner of occupying the helm of state in Korea: first, the strategic issue, namely the political stances of the Powers with regard to Japan's rule in Korea; and second the administrative issue, that is, the administrative ability of Korea and Koreans (*Section 3: Our Protection and Administration in Korea*, pp. 211~212.)
(c) In relation to the first issue, that is, the political stances of the Powers with regard to Japan's policy of occupying the helm of state in Korea, ... we can draw the conclusion that the Powers would have no objection to our policy ... It is destined by nature that the Japanese people spread out their energy which is over-flowing to the brim from within, to the Korean Peninsula. Japanese migration to the Korean Peninsula is to be considered the appropriate claim of the Japanese people, which will be accompanied by the diffusion of the civilization, as well as an economic development. Owing to the fact that the relations between both countries has been from the beginning inseparably bound up with each other, it is a natural trend based on the nature of civilization, that Japan and Korea be destined to be joined together, so that even the Western Powers might never reject their merger. As a matter of fact there is no state which has a better right and a truer ability for this other than Japan...

Are we facing at all any serious situation which might provoke a diplomatic intervention? ... No, we have no reason to fear in this present situation of the World, that any Power or any allied Powers might raise an opposition to our rule in Korea... Britain is now our ally, and America has approved our policy with regard to Korea ... (Section 3: Our Protection and Administration in Korea, pp. 212-214)

(d) In relation to the second issue, we have a grave doubt concerning Korea's ability to exist as a state and to govern her territory by herself. Verily it should be decided in proportion to the degree of such an ability, the extent which Japan might be allowed to control Korea ... If Koreans have the ability or potentiality to govern by themselves and stand on their own feet, the domestic administration could be left in the hands of the Koreans as much as possible, while the Japanese could confine themselves to being supervisors or advisers for the Koreans. If Koreans do not have at all any such ability, the Japanese should not confine themselves to being mere supervisors or advisers. Rather, they should consider themselves justified in meddling in every aspect of the administration, or in managing office works by their own hands.

In confronting the question of how to rule Egypt, the British have only supervised the Egyptians and never involved themselves directly into the domestic administration of Egypt. The British have carried
out their policy of granting the right of self-administration to the Egyptians. Lord Cromer's aphorism—the British heads and the Egyptian hands—does nothing but touch the core of such a policy. In confronting the question of how to rule Korea however, it is a question of whether we Japanese should follow the same policy as the British did or not ...

Now we shall turn our eyes to the present state of affairs in Korea. As is well-known, Koreans have hardly any, or at most perhaps they have a little, of the spirit of nationalism. Moreover, the country is wallowing in great poverty and senile decay, the people living in indolence and frivolity, and the officials are insatiable and ignorant. Not a single element can be found here which is indispensable to the question of nation-building, and accordingly Korea is falling into the dreadful state of rot and decay. Before the introduction of the Anglo-Egyptian administrative collaboration, Egypt was undoubtedly suffering due to the corruption of government officials and a great drain on the public purse, bearing a close resemblance to, or perhaps being more severe than Korea today ... Certainly she came to much the same state as Korea today namely a nation in a ruinous state. We cannot say however that the declining fortunes of Egypt were caused by a decay of her essential root. For that reason, once Egypt's poor administration is properly reformed for us to introduce a civilized form of administration, the Egyptians could be properly guided into becoming a people with a fragrant culture, and a people worthy to be endowed with self-administration under the British guidance ... In my personal opinion, the moslems in Egypt have a low level of wisdom and national personality just as are Koreans. But Egyptians have long been in contact with, and enlightened by European civilization for several centuries, and furthermore there have been a number of Christians in Egypt who have had a strong sense of self-reliance and autonomy. This is the reason why Egyptians have a place in history as a 'nation' of the Twentieth Century, even though they cannot yet maintain themselves as an independent state. This is the reason why the British policy has obtained satisfactory results with the lapse of time, laying aside the argument about the advantage or the reverse of her policy to present self-government to the Egyptians. The Koreans however experienced
a fate different from that of the Egyptians. As a result of the external pressures from the two forces, namely Japan from the South and China and Hokuteki (northern barbarians) from the North, as well as the internal disturbances and conflicts that occurred, their own civilizational inherence was completely destroyed. Furthermore, as a result of the maladministration of the dynasties for centuries, the means and properties of the Korean people was exhausted and their vitality was lost... Koreans are not so obstinate about an inflow of foreign civilization as Chinese. It should be attributed to the fact that the Koreans have no ability of appreciating rightly any other civilization, and are used to dealing with a superficial knowledge with regard to other civilizations. In my personal view, Koreans have no power of absorbing a civilization, or even of assimilating it.

I cannot help having a sense of uneasiness about the political situation in Korea. If we would rule the Korean Peninsula in conformity with the British way of administration in Egypt, the decayed state of administration in Korea cannot be expected to be reformed, and we could not expect the national prosperity of Korea to be attained at all, despite our employing a much more tolerant policy than the British did in Egypt. (Section 3: Our Protection and Administration in Korea, pp. 214~217.)

(c) My personal opinion as one of outsiders, would be that the Government is aiming at following the same policy as the British put into practice in Egypt, and by means of advisers to guide and supervise the Korean administration... [Is it enough if we supervise the Koreans through the appointment of Japanese advisers and a limited number of Japanese officials in the Korean Government? (addendum by the author)] I say 'No'. We should select a lot of Japanese officials, as many as possible, who are to be dispatched to Korea as colonial authorities. I remind the readers that the British ambassador [sic, read Consular-General] in Cairo has skillfully taken the helm of state in Egypt. Is it not necessary for us to make a Lord Cromer reside in Seoul?... Above all the Koreans have a habit of tending to admire very much a great man, being fascinated with a gorgeous court dress, and of thirsting for the high order of merit. With regard to this habit, it may be an expedient means for us to create an ambassador with a brilliant personality and court rank, to reside in Seoul, in order to handle Koreans as we
desire. In addition to this habit of the Koreans, the Japanese people who are staying in China and Korea without the distinction of officials or non-officials, used to dispute by aligning in different factions, and not compromising with each other in order to gain an influential position. What a vicious habit! It is indispensable for us to dispatch the selected great man as an ambassador to Korea, with the purpose of making a general supervision of all the Japanese there, and of deploying a consistent policy with regard to Korea. According to the present provisions based on our policy, it is stipulated that the competence of Japanese advisers to Korea is placed in a much more inferior position to that of British advisers to Egypt. The British advisers are enjoying real power as the under-secretaries [sic] in the ministries concerned. They are not only advisers, but also executives in the Egyptian Government. Egyptian ministers are occupying high positions without any meaning. On the contrary, Japanese advisers in Korea are still limited to the authoritative function of giving mere advice... One should conclude from the above-mentioned observation, that the position of Japanese advisers in Korea is far behind than that of British advisers in Egypt. As far as the armed forces are concerned however, the Japanese army dispatched to Korea, is in its scale and organization, becoming far greater than the British occupation army in Egypt. (Section 3: Our Protection and Administration in Korea, pp. 218-219.)

We can deduce the conclusion from the above-mentioned quotation that Fusazō advocated a hard-line policy with regard to Korea, though not through militaristic measures but through civilian measures, which was implicitly or explicitly driven by the Bunchi Ha. Fusazō decorated his argument by citing the experience of British rule in Egypt to support his theory. It is safe to say that Fusazō played an important role as a sounding balloon of the Bunchi Ha in arousing public sentiment, in order to realize the conclusion of the Second Japan-Korean Convention and Itō Hirobumi's inauguration as a Tōkan (Resident-General). The last paragraph of his book is as follows:

As we have seen from the above, the state of affairs in Korea has been far behind that of Egypt. It is obviously reasonable that we should strengthen our intervention policy with regard to Korea, because the political organization of Korea is much inferior to that of Egypt. The Government policy now in execution is liable to be content with taking
a more tolerant policy than that of the British, and of occupying a position barely that of adviser. That sort of policy employed by the Government does not go down with me...

In concluding my theory, I would like to suggest that there are three elements indispensable for producing excellent results in colonial administration: good emigrants, good laws and good officials. This book does not intend to comment on the colonial policy with regard to Korea in general, but exclusively to discuss administration affairs in connection with Korea. Therefore I would like to confine myself to proposing a piece of advice, namely that the Government should invite and employ good Japanese officials. Upon reflection on this issue, the Government encountered a blunder in Taiwan. We should not commit once again the same kind of blunder in Korea. We have every reason to believe that the prosperity of French colonies has been far behind that of the British colonies. Many of French emigrants and officials in her colonies were strugglers or social failures in their own homeland. The reverse is the case with regard to British emigrants and colonial officials. The difference between the British and French colonial rule is to be attributed to this fact. We should take the British way as our model. (Section 3: Our Protection and Administration in Korea, p. 220.)

II. Yoshimura Gentarō's theory regarding Lord Cromer's rule in Egypt

——A criticism by the dismissed official——

On September 1921, Yoshimura Gentarō, who as a part-time job had been entrusted a certain research work by the Colonial Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior, published his research report entitled Ejiputo Mondai (The Egyptian Question) from the Colonial Bureau. In October 1922, a year later, the Egyptian Question was supplemented by his own other research entitled Airurando Oyobi Ejiputo Mondai-ni-tsute (On the Irish and Egyptian Question). This includes an Appendix entitled Ejiputo Mondai Yoroku (The Supplementary Information on the Egyptian Question), which is an epitomised translation from Valentine Chirol's work, in order to furnish the readers with further information concerned. The most important report of Yoshimura in relation to the subject under discussion is the first report of 1921.

Yoshimura was born on December 20, 1875 as a Heimin (Commoner) in
the Tokyo Prefecture. He graduated from the Law School of the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1899, and was immediately employed as a civil servant at the Ministry of the Interior. He was a promising elite individual with a certificate of having passed the Higher Civil Service examination. According to the personal history of Yoshimura which is preserved in the Prime Minister's office, he was appointed as the Counsellor of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau in March 1902 at the age of twenty-seven. Later he was appointed as the Counsellor at Kantō Totoku Fu (The Governor-General's Government of the Kwantung Leased Territory), as a holder of the Fourth Rank in the Higher Civil Service. It was when he was of the age of thirty-two. In May 1910 he was promoted to the Head of the Civil Administration Office of Talien City, the metropolis of the Kwantung Leased Territory, as a holder of the Third Rank in the Higher Civil Service, and then again in May 1911 he was again promoted to the Director of Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Governor-General's Government, as a holder of the Second Rank in the Higher Civil Service, when he was at the age of thirty-five. Judging from his personal career, we can say that Yoshimura was not only an elite-bureaucrat at the Ministry of the Interior, but also an expert on colonial administration. In 1911, when Yoshimura was appointed to the Director of Foreign Affairs Bureau, which was in charge of foreign affairs as well as police administration for foreigners, the Governor-General was General Ōshima Yoshimasa and the Director of the Civil Administration Bureau was Shirahito Takeshi. The position of Director of Foreign Affairs Bureau ranked next to the Director of Civil Administration Bureau.

The Governor-General's Government was established in 1906 after a short-term military administration of the Leased Territory, of which control was transferred from Russia to Japan in 1905. From the beginning of its establishment, the civilian faction and the militarist faction lived together in that Government. The Government itself had two bureaus: Civil Administration and Army. As a result of a compromise between the two factions, the Governor-General was to be appointed from among the Generals or Lieutenant-Generals at active service, and thus appeared a civilian administration of colony under a General or Lieutenant-General. The successive Governor-Generals up to 1919 were General Ōshima Yoshimasa, General Fuku-shima Yasumasa, Lieutenant-General Nakamura Satoru (later promoted to General) and Lieutenant-General Nakamura Yūjiro (later appointed to be
the President of the South Manchurian Railways Co.). In April 1919 however, as a result of the reform of the Government organization, the Governor-General's Government transformed itself to Kantō Chō (the Kwantung Province Agency), of which the President was to be selected from either a military officer or a civil servant, although it was selected from a civil servant up to 1932. In accordance with this reform, the Army Bureau under the Governor-General was reorganized into the Kantō Gun Shirei Bu (the Kwantung Army Command) as an independent body, of which the first commander was Lieutenant-General Tachibana Koichirō (later promoted to General). Yoshimura was a Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau under the two Governor-Generals, namely General Ōshima and General Fukushima, and under the Director of the Civil Administration Bureau, Shirahito.

Suddenly in August 1914, however, Yoshimura was dismissed from his post and was in October 5, “suspended from duty and placed on the half pay list, under the provision of the Status Law of Civil Servants, Article 11, Sub-section 1, Paragraph 4.” After the expiration of his two years suspension from duty, in November 1916 he received an honorable appointment: “Your court rank shall be raised by one degree as a special mark of favour. You shall be raised to the Junior Grade of the Fourth Court Rank,” and then he received a letter of appointment: “You shall be entrusted with research works of the Colonial Bureau.” At that time, Shirahito, an official superior to Yoshimura, was receiving the Senior Grade of the Fifth Rank, namely one rank lower than Yoshimura himself. This fact suggests that Yoshimura was warmly received and given special treatment, in spite of the suspension of his duty under the provision of the Status Law of Civil Servants. After that, Yoshimura’s living was secure, though not enough, by being entrusted research works of the Colonial Bureau. We should recall another fact, namely that it rarely occurred that higher officials were disposed of by the provision of the Status Law of Civil Servants. This particularly was brought about by a very vague provision such as Paragraph 4: “when the Government requires it for reasons of administrative matters.” Still we cannot understand the reason why he was punished in such a way.

Judging from the political situation at that time however there was no other cause for it, we can only guess the real reason as being due to the political struggle for power between the military faction and civilian faction in Tokyo and among the overseas authorities. As we mentioned above,
we can trace a persistent difference between the philosophy and the means concerning Japan's colonial rule, which was frequently overlapped with a jurisdictional dispute or a factional conflict, among the colonial authorities in particular and the Japanese political circles in general. Such a difference or conflict clearly corresponded with the conflict between the Bunchi Ha and the Budan Ha, and to some extent between the civilians and army officers. Leading figures of the Bunchi Ha such as Ito, Saionji, Katō and Gotō criticized severely the militaristic speeches and action of the army stationed in the Kwantung Leased Territory. We should not overlook the fact however that the policy of the Bunsō-teki Bubi, the fundamental philosophy of Gotō concerning colonial rule, was aimed at restraining direct action by the militarist group up to the last moment, for they were eager to resort to arms from the beginning, and maintain public peace and order in the colonial society by means of the reinforced police force, as a substitute for the army.\textsuperscript{10} This idea was represented by the Ministry of the Interior, whose members were the competent authorities for police activities. Gotō's idea of colonial rule was conspicuous among the ideas of the contemporary Japanese colonialists, because he attached a great deal of importance to the basic surveys on history, geography, and customs, of the colonial society. Gotō himself reviewed the question of civil administration at Lushun and Talien, two major cities in the Kwantung Leased Territory, as a focus of the conflict between the civil servants and the army officers of the Governor-General's Government, while Yoshimura was at that time in charge of the Director of Foreign Affairs Department (1911~1914) as well as the Superintendent of Civil Administration at Talien City (1912~1913). It is safe to say that Yoshimura was involved in the conflict between the two factions and was forced to resign, but we cannot say whether someone sacrificed Yoshimura as a scape-goat or Yoshimura himself was responsible for throwing himself into the fire.

Yoshimura's report, \textit{The Egyptian Question}, reviews the question of direct British rule of Egypt, from the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 just after the 'Urabi Revolution of 1879~1882, to the dispatch of the Milner Mission to Egypt which aimed at studying and negotiating in order to cope with the situation just after the 1919 Revolution of Egypt. The main theme of his argument is, needless to say, focussed on Lord Cromer's rule. At the opening paragraph he presented the official title of Lord Cromer in Egypt
as the Consul-General, and then he replaced the official title of Consul-General with a de facto title of Tōkan (Resident-General), which was Itō Hirobumi’s title in Korea. Thus he asserted that Egypt under Lord Cromer’s rule was “a masked protectorate.” Then he referred to the Milner Mission, criticizing them over the fact that the Mission “aimed at giving Egypt a nominal independence, by holding the real power of control in British hands, and aimed at returning to the previous regime of the so-called masked protectorate, even though the Proclamation of Protectorate [of December 1914] might be abolished.” Yoshimura discussed at first the merits and demerits of Lord Cromer’s rule in Egypt as follows:

If British rule in Egypt... was able to boast of the achievement of reforming Egypt, the credit should be attributed to the competence of Lord Cromer himself as a Tōkan... The priority of Lord Cromer’s policy was placed on stabilizing the Egyptian financial situation, and not providing to any of the other Powers an opportunity of interfering in the British rule of Egypt. Furthermore, Lord Cromer intended to provide prosperity to Egypt by forwarding reforms of the domestic administration, and to confer a benefit to foreigners, for the purpose of reducing political pressures to Egypt from the Powers... And he tried to persuade the other Powers to believe that Britain should be free of any time limit for the British occupation of Egypt, in order to secure their interests in Egypt. Although Lord Cromer’s rule in Egypt enjoyed a good reputation owing to its merits, he was criticized because he contributed exclusively to material prosperity and treated the matter of spiritual and moral advance lightly... Verily Lord Cromer’s rule lasted for twenty-five years. During those years however he disregarded the question of education for young Egyptians, who should be the support and driving force of future Egypt, and did not cultivate the capability of the young Egyptians, who might make the question of freedom, equality and democracy of their own. As a result of such disregard and neglect, Lord Cromer’s rule failed to establish British influence purposefully over the younger generations in Egypt, and caused them to fall an easy prey to violent and rude demagogues. It would not be too bitter a criticism for us to conclude that such demerit was a substantial and irreparable fault in Lord Cromer’s rule. (pp. 19～22)
Yoshimura continues to unfold his criticism concerning the lack of un-
derstanding or sympathy for the Egyptian people as follows:

The number of the British people coming to Egypt has been growing year after year, but they have not yet tried to understand the Egyptian way of thinking and feeling. For that reason, they were inclined to engage in conflicts with the Egyptians... By force of circumstances, Egyptian people also were apt to look upon British rule with suspicious eyes ... The insurmountable obstacle to British rule has come not from the outside, but from the inside. The obstacle has been caused not by diplomatic maneuvers but by the attitude of the British towards the Egyptian people. The obstacle lies in the British attitude to the Egyptian Government as well as to the Egyptian people. In my opinion, it was nothing but nationalism which formed the basic core of the thought of the Egyptian people, tacitly changing at that time. Has the British Government tried to understand the new tendency or to frame a new policy adaptable to altering conditions?... (pp. 26~29)

Yoshimura asserts that the suspicion of the Egyptian people towards the British policy could not disappear, as long as the British decided its policy by utterly excluding the Egyptians. Thereupon he continues his criticism as follows:

From the beginning of the British occupation, Egypt ... has barely secured a nominal sovereignty, while the real power has been assumed in the hands of the Tōkan ... Any recommendation offered by the Tōkan and the British adviser to the Egyptian Government was nothing but an order to be obeyed ... For that reason, the British could not appease at all the political disaffection and detestation of the Nationalist Party [al-ḥizb al-watani] concerning foreigners’ dominance, while the Tōkan of Egypt has declared several times that the real purpose of the British Government was not to rule Egypt but to educate Egyptians to self-government. I dare to say that such a declaration is no more than false sweet words, unless Egyptian people are given an opportunity of enjoying real political power and responsibility. One cannot expect that the suspicion of the Egyptian people concerning the motive of the British would disappear in the final analysis. (pp. 30~31)

Yoshimura proceeds with his argument and exposes the evil effect caused by the inefficiency of the British outpost officials and the predominant position of the British officers after Lord Cromer, as follows:
It was a misfortune for Britain that she was suffering from a dearth of talent in the position of the Tōkan at that time. After Kitchner left his position [as Consul-General in 1914], ... Sir Henry Macmahon assumed the position of Tōkan (High Commissioner [sic]) [at first Consul-General and then Governor after December 1914], and then two years later, he was replaced by Sir Reginald Wingate ... None of them were well posted up concerning the present state of Egypt, and their political opinions were not held in high esteem at the Foreign Office. Moreover, the British civil servants had their freedom of action restrained under the proclamation of martial law, and were forced to follow the military directives, so that civil servants could not exercise their ability of ruling Egypt. (p. 45)

The image of the British military directives described in the above-quoted paragraph coincides with the image of despotic militarists at the Kwantung Leased Territory, which was troublesome to the civilian faction. Yoshimura concludes the last four pages of his report by saying that the gospel of administrative efficiency is bound to go bankrupt when confronted with a people with a national awakening and a political organization of their own. He expanded his conclusion further by saying that the origin of such a bankruptcy will be traced to racism or a sense of superiority on the part of the rulers, and that such a bankruptcy will not fail to appear so long as racism is existing. In 1910, just after the end of Lord Cromer’s rule in Egypt, Yoshimura as the Counsellor of the Governor-General’s Government of the Kwantung Leased Territory, paid a short visit to Egypt on his way to Europe and Africa. He could observe the British rule for himself. We cannot discover any single phrase in his report which compared the British rule in Egypt with Japan’s rule in the Kwantung Leased Territory. However we can easily imagine that Yoshimura’s experience in the Governor-General’s Government was recalled in his mind, when he was writing his report on Egypt. It can readily be imagined that he tried to present a word of criticism concerning Japanese colonial rule, under the guise of the Egyptian question. Following is an extract from his conclusion:

The British policy of ruling Egypt had been based not on the policy of granting self-government, but that of looking upon administrative efficiency as something important. Such a policy was caused by the contemptuous misunderstanding of Asian people, which was prevalent
among European politicians. They believed that the idea of self-govern-
ment could not be understood by anyone except Europeans. Moreover
Britain's major concern was not placed within Egypt but on the outside of
Egypt. In order to avoid a harlot-like jealousy of the Powers towards
British exclusive interests in Egypt and also to make the Powers
approve British supremacy in Egypt, Britain tried to govern well, by
keeping order and maintaining people's security in Egypt. Through those
policies, Britain tried to make the Powers aware that British rule would
not ignore but rather protect their existing interests. For that reason,
the most urgent task for the British politicians was first to rule Egypt
as efficiently as possible, while the issue of whether they should main-
tain an autocracy in Egypt or grant suffrage to Egyptian people was a
secondary concern. Lord Cromer's administration was conducted so
efficiently, that the great Powers as a necessary consequence recognized
the British position in Egypt. Particularly by the 1914 Entente [De-
claration on Egypt and Morocco: France and Great Britain], Britain
succeeded in making France, the toughest opponent of hers, recognize
the British right of protecting Egypt. The British Foreign Minister
spiritedly declared that Britain should not necessarily fix the date of
her withdrawal from Egypt, and by that declaration, the British inten-
tion of joining Egypt to her territory was finally revealed. Simultane-
ously with that declaration, Britain came to lose the position of res-
ponsibility as a protector of Egypt which was entrusted to her, and a
bureaucratism which had gradually become very familiar under Lord
Cromer's autocracy, had grown stronger to an added extent. Britain
disregarded the question of expanding the people's freedom and giving
them an educative exercise in politics, and then strengthened the tendency
of power-centralization. Consequently British officials scarcely found
an opportunity of getting closer to the Egyptian people, and were about
to lose the flexibility of adapting themselves to changes in the Egyptian
situation and the conditions concerning the Egyptian people. Under
those circumstances, young Egyptians who experienced at least out-
wardly the idea of freedom, nation, and democratic government, had
at length grown up into becoming a social force. They had a grievance
against British control, and some of them had a deep sympathy
for the Pan-Islamic movement originated in Turkey. They had at
least come to oppose foreign political control, under the flag of nationalism. Besides that, one can well imagine that Japan's victory over Russia called forth a great deal of emotion, concerning national awakening throughout Asia. Furthermore, a proposal concerning the self-determination of peoples and protection of small states, which was proclaimed by a politician of the Allied Powers at the time of the First World War, gave a greater impetus to the national movements. (pp. 66~67)

...[The reason why the British Protectorate was forced into its abolition], if we are permitted to describe it in a single word, we would ascribe it to the fact that British rule lost popularity among the Egyptian people. Their religious or racial antipathy towards the Egyptians did not create this situation, but only promoted the growth of a trend of affairs. If it be so, then why did British rule lose popularity? Someone ascribed its cause to the fact that British rule did not allow Egyptians to take part sufficiently in political affairs. This sounds reasonable to be sure, but it is still not sufficient to discover the real state of affairs, concerning the reason why the British rule lost popularity.

Colonial rule based on a principle of the good administration is not able to maintain itself, and is destined to fall into bankruptcy, in the case where a state intends to rule another nation which has its own civilization and political organization. This is a lesson which we have learned from the history of colonial rule. Even if a ruling country finds itself in the wrong and gives colonial peoples an opportunity of taking part in political affairs, the mind of the people in the ruled country shall be not sincerely but only outwardly obedient to the ruling power, in which case the rulers cannot discern the oppressed mood of the ruled, and consequently tend to deal with that country with an attitude of arrogance, which is something well-known to all the ruled peoples, as if the ruler is provided with a racial, civilizational, and institutional superiority, so that by their ruling they will provide the ruled with a self-government as a favor, in order to secure development, peace, and order, in the ruled country. Britain lost the goodwill of the Egyptians because of its own superiority complex, and not because of its inefficiency in granting them self-government. (pp. 68~
Notes

(1) During six years from 1904 to 1910, nearly one hundred editorial articles on Japan's rule in Korea appeared in the Tokyo Daily Newspaper. About three-fourths of them appeared in 1907, 1909, and 1910, that is to say thirty-two, eighteen, and twenty-seven articles respectively. In those days, Honda Seiichi and Tanaka Hozumi wrote editorials on the financial and economic state of affairs, and Takagi Ishin (Takenobu) wrote on domestic affairs. Katō Taka-aki himself wrote on diplomatic issues as well as matters of national importance. A biography of Katō Taka-aki declares as follows.

Ninety of his editorial articles were based on his oral statements, but after his resignation from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Saionji Cabinet in 1906, his opinion was seldom reflected in the editorial articles, because he felt weary about managing a newspaper. As regards matters of importance however, he made occasionally a special request to the board concerning the writing of the editorial articles by himself, such as Kantō Totoku (Governor-General of the Kwantung Leased Territory, June 26, 1906), Kantō Totoku Fu-no Soshiki (The Organization of Governor-General's Government of the Kwantung Leased Territory, August 2, 1906) and some others, in order to admonish army officers for their militaristic politics. But his editorial article which appeared in December 6, 1906... became the final article based on his oral statement. Apart from the articles mentioned above, Count Katō wrote about fifty editorial articles, all of which were concerned with Japan's diplomacy during the Russo-Japanese War and the post-war diplomacy. (Katō Haku Denki Hensan Inkkai, Katō Taka-aki The Editorial Committee for the Compilation of Count Katō's Biography, Katō Taka-aki, Vol. 1, 1929, pp. 530~532)

Therefore it is reasonable for us to assume that some though not many of the editorial articles on Korea which suddenly increased after 1907, might have been written by Katō Fusazo. For further information on various views on Korean affairs at that time, among Japanese press and writers, see Kang Dong Jin, Nihon Genron-Kai to Chōsen (The Japanese Press and Korea) —1910~1945, Hōsei University Press, 1987, Chapter 1, Section 1 and 2.

(2) During the period from the end of the Russo-Japanese War to the out-break of the First World War, a lot of books and articles were published in Japan concerning British rule in Egypt including comparative theories of Japan's rule in Korea and the British rule in Egypt. Among them, two articles written by Tomizu Hirodo, Professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo, were distinguished for the advocation of a drastic attitude towards Korea. He asserted in his article, Ejiputo to Chōsen (Egypt and Korea) in Gaihō-Jihō (The Diplomatic Review), Vol. 7, No. 77, 1904, that Japan should rule Korea in the nature of a complete colony, by sending out many Japanese officials and emigrants. Tomizu was counted as an opinion leader opposing to the Tokyo Daily Newspaper at that time. We cannot see however a clear difference of opinion between Katō Fusazo and Tomizu as far as their hard-line attitude to Korea is concerned. As regards Ōkuma Shigenobu's theory, see Note (3).

(3) Ōkuma Shigenobu, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs who became later Prime Minister (1914~16), contributed the following Preface to the Japanese text of Lord
Cromer's *Modern Egypt*, which was translated into Japanese by Yasuda Katsuyoshi and Furuya Yoritsuna, and published in 1911 by Dai-Nihon Bunmei Kyōkai (Japan's Association of Civilization), under the title of *Saikin Ejiputo* (Modern Egypt). Ōkuma was a President of Dai-Nihon Bunmei Kyōkai.

The fundamental policy of the British concerning the question of ruling Egypt has been decided irrespectively of the political lines of the two Parties in the homeland, and has aimed at exclusively carrying out a good administration of the Egyptians... The British policy has been decided so as to rule Egypt until a state of self-government or independence might be realized... Egypt is bound either to realize self-government or independence, or to be incorporated into the British Empire as a portion of it......Some years ago I was presented a collection of Lord Cromer's speeches [sic, read Lord Cromer's *Modern Egypt*] from the British Embassy in Tokyo. I immediately sent it to Duke Itō, Tōkan of Korea, because I believed that Lord Cromer's way of administration in Egypt would furnish us with a good deal of information as to how we should rule a Protectorate......In spite of the drastic change in the situation of Korea during these few years, this book I believe will be of much benefit to our people, if they peruse it carefully. And finally I would like to express my cordial thanks to Lord Cromer who was kind enough to give us permission to translate his book into Japanese...

(4) Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shinbun Sha Hen, Tonichi Nanajū Nen Shi (Seventy Years History of the Tokyo Daily Newspaper, edited by the Tokyo Daily Newspaper Co.), 1941, p. 144.

(5) See Note (1)

(6) The Bunchi, the supporters of civilian control in Japan's colonial territories, tried to restrain the Budan, the supporters of militarist control or despotic violence on the part of the army officers, in relation to the administration of Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and the South-Manchurian Railways Co. However, Katō Fusazō insisted that there was no essential difference between the Bunchi and the Budan (Katō Fusazō, Chōsen Sōjō-no Shinshō, op. cit., Ch. 9: Iwayuru Budan to Bunchi, *The so-called Budan and Bunchi*).

(7) The term Hokuteki has its origin in the ancient Chinese view of foreigners or foreign barbarians around China as a civilized center. Hokuteki means in this case uncivilized foreigners living outside the northern periphery of China, that is, Russia.

(8) See Rireki Sho (the Personal History) of Yoshimura Gentarō, which is preserved in the Prime Minister's Office. Heimin means a descendent of a peasant, artisan, or merchant, as distinguished from Kazoku (peer) and Shizoku (a descendent of a Samurai or Bushi). The Meiji Government introduced such a caste-like system with a certain amount of modification of the feudal one.

(9) Nakamura Zehō, a predecessor of Shirahito as Director of the Civil Administration Bureau, was appointed to the post of Vice-President of the South-Manchurian Railways Co. (1906~1908) under President Gōto, and then promoted to President after Gōto. Observe a close personal connection between Gōto and civilians for colonial rule.

(10) In May 1905, a meeting of the Council for the Manchurian Affairs in the Saionji Government was held at the initiative of Itō Hirobumi. It was decided in this meeting that Kantō Totoku Fu should be changed from war organization to peace organization, and that the South-Manchurian Railways Co. should replace the military administration as a center of the governing organization. Gōto was appointed to the post of President
of the South-Manchurian Railways Co., under supervision of Kantō Totoku and also as Adviser of the Kantō Totoku Fu under the supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as an extra post. Furthermore Gōto contrived a stratagem in order to assume the post of Kantō Totoku for himself. Gōto's persistent theory of colonial rule can be compressed into his well-known word, which is, Bunsō-tekki Bubi which does not mean a negation of the militaristic maneuvers but only an affirmation of the civilian administration for proceeding with the military actions. Gōto says as follows:

It is decided that the principal body for administering South-Manchuria should be the South-Manchurian Railways Co., even though the Totoku Fu was invested with full power as a branch office under the supervision of the Tokyo Government. As a result of Prime Minister Marquis Saionji's as well as the other fellow officials' acceptance of my theory of Bunsō-tekki Bubi, such a decision was made. The theory of Bunsō-tekki Bubi implies at first thought, that we should provide against invasion from the outside, first by setting up facilities necessary for civilian rule, and then by setting up facilities necessary to support military action in case of an emergency.

As regards a colonial policy, it should be carried out in accordance with the theory of Bunsō-tekki Bubi, and we should enforce the rule of might under the flag of the right. This is the colonial policy of the present. (Tsurumi Yusuke, Gōto Shinpei, Society of Compiling Count Gōto's Biography, 1937, Vol. 2, p. 815)