SOME PROBLEMS IN D. DE SMET'S UNDERSTANDING
OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISMĀ'ĪLISM
— A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE FALLEN EXISTENT
IN AL-KIRMĀNĪ'S COSMOLOGY —

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Introduction

It has been difficult to understand the development of Ismā'īlī thought in the 10-12th century, for Ismā'īlī people have hidden their doctrine from outsiders for a long time. Since in the 19th century Stanislas Guyard thought the essence of Ismā'īlism lay in Greek philosophy, many scholars have been emphasizing connection between Ismā'īlism and Greek philosophy.

It is true that there are many common characteristics between Neoplatonism like Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', and Ismā'īlī thinkers, for example, Abū Ya'qūb al-Sijistānī (d. around 353/971-393/1002-3)⁽¹⁾. But Heinz Halm and Samuel M. Stern argued against such a viewpoint. They maintain that Neoplatonic doctrine was not the essence of Ismā'īlism but a byproduct of the development of Ismā'īlism in the 10-11th century, and that its original doctrine, before Neoplatonism had an influence on it, had been a gnostic cosmology one can see in the writing of a dā'ī in the time of al-Mu'izz, namely, Abū 'Īsā al-Murshid's text which was edited by S. M. Stern⁽²⁾. In the text's cosmology, mythical and personified existents like *Kūnī* and *Qadar* appear and the myth of Iblīs's rebellion is narrated. According to H. Halm, who also defines Abū 'Īsā's mythical and gnostic cosmology as early Ismā'īlī doctrine, this gnostic myth had gradually been replaced with Neoplatonic doctrine by Persian dā'īs like al-Sijistānī, so that such a tendency came to a climax in the writings of Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. after 411/1021) who served as a leader of Ismā'īlī da'wa in Iraq in Imām al-Ḥākim's era. In his cosmological system, greatly influenced from Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 339/950)'s theory on Ten Intellects, mythical and

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personified existents do not show up and mythical elements are considerably excluded⁽³⁾.

I think H. Halm and S. M. Stern's understanding is to the point with regard to Ismā'īlism in 10-11th century. But in the case of Yemenite Ṭayyibīs since 12th century there has been the doctrine which should be called myth rather than philosophy. Many dā'īs of Ṭayyibīs after Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Hāmidī (d.557/1162) adopted al-Kirmānī's theory on Ten Intellects, yet in their cosmology the Third Intellect wants to have a superiority over the Second Intellect preceding it due to its overestimation of its own abilities. As an effect of this sin, the Third Intellect falls to the rank of the Tenth Intellect⁽⁴⁾. The fallen Third Intellect ascends toward a higher rank step by step by the help of activities of Ismā'īlī da'was in seven cycles (dawr) until it returns to its former rank on the day of *Qiyāma*. The shift from myth to Neoplatonism can be seen only in the period from the time of Abū 'Īsā to that of al-Kirmānī in 10-11th century, because in 12th century Yemen renewed myth called *le drame dans le ciel* came to life again⁽⁵⁾.

We can conclude, referring to Halm and Stern's study, that there was the shift from myth to Neoplatonism, and that the revival of myth occurred after that in the history of Ismā'īlism in 10-12th century. D. De Smet, who published a wideranging study on al-Kirmānī's thought for the first time in 1995, gave an interesting explanation for this view. He agrees that the process of Neoplatonization happened from the time of Abū 'Īsā's time to that of al-Kirmānī⁽⁶⁾. He does not assert, however, that almost all mythical elements were eliminated in al-Kirmānī's thought which is thought of as the culmination in the process of the exclusion of myth. His explanation is as follows: Al-Kirmānī excluded mythical concepts from his main book *Rāḥat al-'aql*, so old myth superficially disappeared in it. But it secretly continued to exist in his thought. In fact al-Kirmānī took over it orally, not making it clear in his book. Mythical doctrine handed down by al-Kirmānī in secret was transferred to Yemen and changed into the myth of the fallen Third Intellect. al-Ḥāmidī interpreted al-Kirmānī's philosophical doctrine gnostically, so he constructed his mythical doctrine combined with it⁽⁷⁾.

In this paper I will investigate whether mythical doctrine was hidden in al-Kirmānī's thought by re-examining De Smet's view critically. I will summarize the process of the development of Ismā'īlism in 10-12th century in the end.

1. Some Problems in De Smet's view

How does De Smet explain a view of history of Ismā'īlism which is not necessarily reflected in texts? On which kind of theory does he think that such a view is based? What does he think was the core of Ismā'īlism which directed the process of this history?

De Smet thinks that its core was a gnostic myth in which the drama of the fall of a celestial existent plays a central role. According to him, al-Kirmānī constructed his own philosophical doctrine, digesting this myth. The myth was transferred to Yemen orally through al-Kirmānī, while mythical elements is hardly seen in his thought⁽⁸⁾.

Founded on the presupposition that the core of Ismā'īlism was mythical, De Smet maintains that this myth was *bāṭin*, while philosophical doctrine was *ẓāhir* and that mythical doctrine as *bāṭin* was made a secret only within da'wa, so it was made obvious in the initiation inside da'wa by oral tradition. On the other hand da'wa is thought to have revealed only *ẓāhir* doctrine to outsiders and beginners in da'wa. Though al-Kirmānī, a high dignitary of Fāṭimid dynasty, naturally understood the mythical doctrine, he concealed it in his book⁽⁹⁾.

De Smet presumes that al-Kirmānī practiced *taqīya* with regard to the myth, saying as follows: He was active in Iraq, the center of 'Abbāsīd dynasty, and Cairo, the Fatimid capital, where Sunnīs were a majority, so he was obliged to tread cautiously and practice *taqīya* toward non-Ismā'īlīs. On the other hand, in Ṭayyibī da'wa, which was active in the remote region of Islamic world, doctrinal texts were circulating only in the closed circle and its doctrine was unapproachable to outsiders, so that Ṭayyibī da'wa revived mystical elements in their texts and intended to unify the myth as *bāṭin* and the philosophy as *ẓāhir*⁽¹⁰⁾.

De Smet wants to reinforce Halm's theory by adding a new opinion to it, but in fact there are many problems in his opinion. I will show four problems in it here.

(1) There is no necessity for the myth to be *bāṭin* or for the philosophy to be *ẓāhir*. In Abū 'Īsā's myth *Kūnī* and *Qadar* as Demiurges produce the world on behalf of God. Such an idea does not belong to orthodox Islam, in which God must be an absolute creator. Meanwhile, philosophy must have never been easily received by Islamic theologians. Among Ismā'īlīs some thinkers like Qāḍī Nu'mān (d.360/970) objected to the introduction of philosophy. Outside

Ismā'īlīs big controversy happened between philosophers like Ibn Sīnā (d.428/1037), who was a contemporary of al-Kirmānī, and theologians, because some elements of Islamic philosophy contradicted orthodox Islam. Therefore Ismā'īlīs must not have needed to introduce philosophy, which all people could not accept, as *ẓāhir*. In Khurasan, where Ismā'īlī Persian School received philosophy for the first time, many people were hostile to Ismā'īlīs. In fact many dā'īs, for example, al-Nasafī (d.332/943), a teacher of al-Sijistānī, were massacred there. There is no evidence that philosophy which was *ẓāhir* for Ismā'īlīs functioned as a buffer against outsiders.

(2) There is also no evidence that Ismā'īlīs made myth *bāṭin* and philosophy *ẓāhir* at least in the 10-11th century. According to Fāṭimid dā'īs like Qādī al-Nu'mān and al-Kirmānī, *bāṭin* means allegorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of Qur'ān and the internal knowledge of '*ibādāt* regulated by *Sharī'a*, while *ẓāhir* means the literal meanings of Qur'ān and the practice of '*ibādāt*. We can not recognize in texts written in 10-11th century that *bāṭin* meant mythical doctrine and that *ẓāhir* meant philosophical doctrine.

In the middle of 10th century Abū 'Īsā's mythical cosmology was the official doctrine which was given approval by Imām al-Zamān Mu'izz and published officially. If mythical doctrine would have been *bāṭin*, how could we explain the fact that once it was made public? We can not find reason why Ismā'īlīs hid mythical doctrine, which had been made public once, and made philosophical doctrine *ẓāhir*.

(3) We can not find the clear reason why al-Kirmānī practiced *taqīya* in Cairo. Surely he was active in Iraq and Cairo, where Sunnīs were a majority. De Smet and other scholars recognize the fact that al-Kirmānī wrote some texts in Cairo⁽¹¹⁾, where Ismā'īlīs were a part of the ruling class, so this city is not thought to have been a dangerous place for him. On the contrary, it would have been exceptionally safe city for Ismā'īlīs who have been a minority throughout their history. He wrote texts of Ismā'īlī orthodoxy in the similar circumstance in which Abū 'Īsā revealed mythical doctrine. There is no necessity that the former's doctrine became *ẓāhir* and that the latter's one became *bāṭin*. Iraq was also ruled by Shī'ī dynasty (Būyid). Though it can not be said to have been safe, Iraq, where Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' and many Ithnā 'Asharī thinkers were active, can not be considered by far more dangerous than Yemen. In Yemen Ismā'īlīs were a minority surrounded by many enemies.

(4) According to Ibn Ḥawshab Maṣṣūr al-Yaman (d.302/914), Ismā'īlī

personal propaganda was started by a dā‘ī who concealed his identity and asked non-Ismā‘īlī person a question about Imām⁽¹²⁾. Even if he was permitted to enter da‘wa, he was not admitted to read doctrinal texts. He was not disclosed secret teachings from the beginning, either. As he grew up intellectually and experienced some initiations, he was gradually revealed secret knowledges. In Ismā‘īlī tradition books which outsiders or beginners were allowed to read were distinguished from high texts. For example, *Kitāb al-Zīna*⁽¹³⁾ written by Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d.322/934) clearly belongs to the former and there Ismā‘īlī elements are hidden in order to invite non-Ismā‘īlī people to da‘wa. Al-Sijistānī or al-Kirmānī’s texts which deal with complex philosophical doctrine are thought to belong to the latter, for their texts can not have been easily understood by ordinary people who were not much familiar with Shī‘ī ideas and philosophy. Moreover, in Yemen their texts were monopolized by a few leaders like a dā‘ī muṭlaq. Al-Kirmānī’s complex texts like *Rāḥat al-‘aql* must have been circulated only inside da‘wa and read only by elite.

Philosophical and complex texts written by al-Sijistānī or al-Kirmānī are thought to have included ideas only for elite of da‘wa. I think it is difficult to regard ideas included in such texts as *ẓāhir* and it is necessary to analyze many texts in detail in order to be able to reach this conclusion. But De Smet does not do a thorough examination and he does not show a persuasive argument to us.

2. The Emanation from the First Intellect

De Smet’s idea on Ismā‘īlī myth and philosophy is related to the myth of the fallen existent. He thinks that it exists as hidden myth in al-Kirmānī’s cosmology. I will outline the first half of his cosmology for a better understanding at first⁽¹⁵⁾. After that I will examine whether the theme of the fallen existent is present or not.

al-Kirmānī’s God is transcendent beyond any definition, neither being an existent nor non-existent⁽¹⁶⁾. The God is called the Originator (Mubdi‘), but the name is only figurative and human beings can not point the God in itself⁽¹⁷⁾. The God originates *ex nihilo* the First Intellect (al-‘Aql al-Awwal), which is both the First Cause (‘Illah Ūlā) and the First Existent (al-Mawjūd al-Awwal), acting on all the existents as the ultimate actor⁽¹⁸⁾. It is also the end for all the moving things as the First Mover (al-Muḥarrrik al-Awwal)⁽¹⁹⁾.

The origination (ibdā') happens only once, while all existents emanate from the First Intellect by the emanation (inbi'āth). The First Intellect is both the intellect and the intellectualized (ma'qūl) by itself at the same time. Consequently, one relation (nisba) is necessiated to it by its being the intellect, while the other relation which is not higher than the former is necessiated to it by its being the intellectualized. The First Intellect has two relations, by which two things emanate from it. Regarding higher relation the First Intellect is single in itself, but regarding lower relation it gets dualized by being both the intellect and the intellectualized. Therefore what emanates by higher relation is single and what emanates by lower one is dualized⁽²⁰⁾.

What emanates from the First Intellect by higher relation is the Second Intellect (al-'Aql al-Thānī), which is the pure intellect in actuality (bil-fi'l) and also called the Second Existent (al-Mawjūd al-Thānī) and the First Emanated (al-Munba'ith al-Awwal)⁽²¹⁾. It is as perfect as the First Intellect and separated from matter⁽²²⁾.

What emanates from the First Intellect by lower relation is called the Potential Intellect (al-'Aql bil-qūwa), which is divided into form (ṣūra) and matter (hayūlā). It is also called the Second Emanated and First Thing in potentiality (al-Munba'ith al-Thānī al-Awwal al-Qā'im bil-qūwa) and the Third Existent (al-Mawjūd al-Thālith), being the third after the First Intellect and the Second Intellect⁽²³⁾. It is the origin of all the bodies in this world and forms the Highest Sphere (al-falak al-a'lā)⁽²⁴⁾. Though al-Kirmānī declares that this Potential Intellect emanates from the First Intellect, he says that they do not resemble each other any more than the sun and the mirror reflecting it do⁽²⁵⁾. Such a definition of the Potential Intellect differs from that of Fārābian philosophy, from which al-Kirmānī learned a great deal.

The world of origination ('ālam al-ibdā') where ten Intellects exist and the physical world ('ālam al-jism) where ten spheres exist are formed after the emanation of two things from the First Intellect. Corresponding to these two worlds, the religious world ('ālam al-dīn) which means Ismā'īlī da'wa is formed⁽²⁶⁾.

Al-Kirmānī's cosmology, where ten things in each of three worlds correspond to each other, is magnificent and harmonized. But the problem is how we place the Potential Intellect emanating from the First Intellect in his cosmology. De Smet wants to solve this problem by finding the shadow of Ismā'īlī myth there. We will examine how to think of the Potential Intellect in

the next chapter.

3. Potential Intellect as the Fallen Existent

Many scholars who study Ismā‘īlism have been thinking of the Potential Intellect as the Third Intellect. In fact in the Yemenite tradition after 12th century, which H. Corbin used as sources, the Potential Intellect seems to have been treated as the Third Intellect. Lately I. Richard Netton placed it as the Third Intellect after two preceding Intellects, but only with hesitation⁽²⁷⁾.

The model of the hidden myth in al-Kirmānī’s theory on Intellect, advocated by De Smet, is *le drame dans le ciel* of Yemenite Ṭayyibīs. In Ḥāmidī’s cosmology based on al-Kirmānī’s cosmology the Second Emanated by lower relation, which De Smet thinks is the Third Intellect, approves of the precedence of the First Intellect over it, rejecting the one of the First Emanated (the Second Intellect)⁽²⁸⁾. It mistakes the First Intellect, which is supposed to be only the veil of God, for God itself⁽²⁹⁾. That is the Second Emanated’s primordial sin. As a result it falls to the rank of the Tenth Intellect. The fallen Second Intellect gradually rises up to the former third rank through the activity of Ismā‘īlī da‘wa in seven cycles⁽³⁰⁾. In *Qiyāma*, meaning apperance of Qā’im who starts the seventh cycle, it returns to the former rank and the myth of the fallen existents ends there.

H. Corbin argued that al-Kirmānī’s Third Intellect fell, without referring to the original description that can confirm it⁽³¹⁾. He seemed to depend on the text of Idrīs ‘Imād al-Dīn (d.872/1468)⁽³²⁾, and use the sentences of al-Kirmānī quoted there. *Le drame dans le ciel*, which H. Corbin and Bernard Lewis talk about, comes from texts in the second half of 13th century at the earliest. So there are about one hundred years between Ḥāmidī and these texts. We can not deny the possibility that al-Kirmānī’s thought has received various interpretation, as is the case with Ismā‘īlīs, in Ṭayyibī context in the interpretation of this term and been metamorphosed into *le drame dans le ciel*. I think that the context of al-Kirmānī is different from that of Ṭayyibīs in 13th century, so it is not appropriate to identify al-Kirmānī’s original thought with the interpretations of it afterwards.

Al-Kirmānī does not refer to the sin and the fall of the Potential Intellect, as De Smet admits. He applies Yemenite *le drame dans le ciel* to al-Kirmānī’s

system as a hypothesis. According to him, other seven separated Intellects emanate from the Potential Intellect identified with the Third Intellect, which falls to the rank of the Tenth Intellect. The Tenth Intellect corresponds to the world under the moon, as other Intellects do to spheres respectively. That description gives the impression that the Tenth Intellect is in lack of perfection, because that world is farthest from the First Intellect, the end for all the existents, and defined as the world of generation and extinction (*'ālam al-kawn wa-al-fasād*), differing from the eternal world of spheres. The imperfect Potential Intellect, which is regarded as the Third Intellect by De Smet and is inferior to preceding two Intellects, is similar in imperfection to the Tenth Intellect, the mediator between the intellectual world and the sensible one at the bottom of ten Intellects. De Smet supposes that the Potential Intellect which he thinks is the Third Intellect changes into the Tenth Intellect, though al-Kirmānī does not say that the former is the same as the latter⁽³³⁾. He points out a diagram in *Rāḥat al-'aql* as the authority of his opinion⁽³⁴⁾. In this diagram the Tenth Intellect corresponding to the physical world is called the Tenth in potentiality (*al-'āshir al-qā'im bil-qūwa*) and he thinks that this results from the fall of the Potential Intellect.

De Smet admits that there are some problems in his opinion⁽³⁵⁾. The Separated Intellects have the same perfection as the First Intellect has, so these perfect Intellects are not different from it in essence at all. If so, in al-Kirmānī's system a contradiction will occur in the sense that a perfect Intellect emanates from the imperfect Third Intellect.

As I mentioned previously in chapter1, I think it is dangerous to read and deduce a thought hardly seen in the texts by arguing that this doctrine was hidden by *taqīya* according to the unique view of the development of Ismā'īlī thought. Moreover, nowhere in *Rāḥat al-'aql*, the Potential Intellect is said to be the Third Intellect, though De Smet premises that both are the same. First of all We must examine whether the two are one and the same or not.

The Potential Intellect consists of matter and form. al-Kirmānī says, "The matter (*hayūlā*) existetialized from the First Being (*al-Awwal*=the First Intellect) becomes the material (*mādda*) acted by the Separated Intellects"⁽³⁶⁾. and "Matter is the origin of heavens, planets, natures, and the generated (*mawālīd*)"⁽³⁷⁾. Al-Kirmānī's matter does not exist in a body as a result of connection with form, but it is a spiritual substance distinguished from the material (*mādda*) which composes bodies in the world⁽³⁸⁾. Al-Kirmānī's Separated Intellects act on

spheres corresponding to them respectively as in the case of Fārābī. Materials, which are acted on by Intellects and composes physical existents like spheres, ultimately come from the matter which emanates from the First Intellect. Al-Kirmānī says, “Materials do not exist as existence apart from forms outside a soul. In this way the existence of it lies only in the idea (dhihn). It can not be grasped in the isolation from a soul, unless it is connected with forms.”⁽³⁹⁾ Al-Kirmānī basically understands material and form in conformity with the tradition of Aristotle and defines a soul as the form of what exists naturally. Differing from such a material, the matter emanating from the First Intellect, the ultimate origin of all materials, is what is called prime matter and a spiritual substance presumed as fundamental matter before connection with form. Offering forms to all existents as the First Cause, the First Intellect is not only the material cause but also the formal cause for them.

As mentioned, the Potential Intellect should be thought of as the origin of the materials and forms for all bodies in the physical world. Though this has the name of the Potential Intellect, the condition of it is quite different from that of Separated Intellects. In a diagram in *Rāḥat al-‘aql*, the First Intellect is described as the origin of the two worlds existing side by side, physical world and the intellectual world⁽⁴⁰⁾. The emanation of two things from the First Intellect means the duality of the First Intellect. It contains two sides, for example, the oneness (waḥda) and the multitude (kathra)⁽⁴¹⁾, which are related to the duality of the cosmos. The two worlds paralleling to each other come from the First Intellect on account of its duality. I think that the emanation of the two signifies the direct connection of it not only with the intellectual world but also with the physical world. From the First Intellect, the origin of two worlds, come both the spiritual existents and the physical existents. In Fārābī’s cosmology only the First Intellect emanates from the God by its intellection of itself and the Second Intellect and the Highest Heaven (its form/soul and its matter) emanate from the First Intellect. Al-Kirmānī’s First Intellect, from which the Second Intellect and the Potential Intellect (forms and prime matter of all bodies) emanate, varies from both Fārābī’s God and First Intellect. Al-Kirmānī’s Potential Intellect forms the Highest Sphere at first, but it is not confined to it and all materials and forms come from it.

Why are the matter and the form emanating from the First Intellect called the Potential Intellect? What has a soul and is composed of the matter (material) and the form, whether spheres or human beings, moves towards the Second

Perfection (al-kamāl al-thānī), of which the obtainment means having the same ten attributes that the First Intellect has and being actualized as an intellect equal to Separated Intellects⁽⁴²⁾. The matter and the form (the Potential Intellect) emanating from the First Intellect are united with each other and compose bodies in worlds. All existents which come from the two, like spheres and human beings, occupy the position of the potential intellect, whose intellect has not been actualized yet and wish to get to the Second Perfection which means the actualization of their intellects. I suppose this is why al-Kirmānī calls the matter and the form the Potential Intellect.

The emanated Intellects separate from materials and never remain in the position of the potential intellect. So I think it is a problem to think that these Separated Intellects emanate from the matter and the form, that is, Potential Intellect. We can not easily argue that the doctrine not written is actually hidden in *Rāḥat al-'aql*, based on only later Ṭayyibī texts. We should rather read the context of the text, and not regard the Potential Intellect as the Third Intellect.

How does the Third Intellect emanate? Al-Kirmānī mentions that “the Third Existent structured (mutarattab) under the Second Existent in the manner of the emanation”⁽⁴³⁾. The Second Existent clearly means the Second Intellect in *Rāḥat al-'aql*. The Third Existents means the Potential Intellect or the Third Intellect there. But, as the Potential Intellect emanates from the First Intellect, the Third Existent mentioned here will mean the Third Intellect, which is also placed in the rank of the Third Existent in a diagram in *Rāḥat al-'aql*⁽⁴⁴⁾. So the Third Intellect emanates from the Second Intellect as the same actual intellect as preceding two Intellects.

Referring to the Third Intellect, al-Kirmānī deals with it like other Separated Intellects and does not pay special attention to it. It is only one of the emanated Intellects lacking individuality. He says that the Fourth Intellect emanates from the Third Intellect, not mentioning much more about it. On the other hand the Potential Intellect composes physical world as the matter and the form. The First Intellect is the single origin of two parallel worlds, so the Second Intellect is placed on the top of the intellectual world and the Potential Intellect is on the top of the physical world.

De Smet supposes that the Potential Intellect as the Third Intellect falls to the rank of the Tenth in the phase of *bāṭin* / myth. But the Tenth Intellect or Active Intellect ('Aql Fa'āl) is not much distinguished from other Intellects⁽⁴⁵⁾. In conclusion I think it is not appropriate to attribute doctrines not written to al-

Kirmānī, based on Ṭayyibī texts a long time after and a diagram in *Rāḥat al-‘aql*. As the content of this diagram deviates from the context, we can not deny the possibility that it was inserted there not by al-Kirmānī but by other Ismā‘īlī thinkers after him⁽⁴⁶⁾.

If we re-examine the context of *Rāḥat al-‘aql*, we will find that the Potential Intellect is not the Third Intellect and that the Third Intellect emanates from the Second Intellect. Consequently we should not think that there is hidden myth of the fallen existent there.

4. Correspondence (muṭābaqa) between the Intellectual World and the Religious World

If we do not identify the Potential Intellect with the Third Intellect and do not think that there is the fallen existent, we will be able to explain the point of which De Smet can not give an account successfully. In *Rāḥat al-‘aql* the Speaking-Prophet (Nāṭiq) and the Executor (Waṣī) are said to correspond to the First Intellect and the Second respectively. Seven Imams correspond to seven Separated Intellects⁽⁴⁷⁾. Here we must think what seven Intellects mean. De Smet faces the difficulty owing to his identification of the Potential Intellect with the Third Intellect. He regards the First Intellect, the Second Intellect and the Potential Intellect as special Intellects different from other seven Intellects and similarly specifies the Speaking-Prophet, the Executor, and Qā’im. So he says that Intellects from the Fourth to the Tenth under the Potential Intellect, which he thinks is the Third Intellect, correspond to seven Imams and that the Potential Intellect does to Qā’im⁽⁴⁸⁾.

But al-Kirmānī says:

Intellects which act on themselves for themselves are ten, existentialized by the origination and the emanation. By the number of ten the world of the origination and the emanation (intellectual world) or noble principles has been accomplished. The Tenth of Intellects plays the same role to the physical world [under the moon] as the one the First Originated (First Intellect) does to the world of the aforementioned origination and the aforementioned emanation. Similarly the existents in a cycle (dawr) belong to ten ranks. The first of them is the Speaking-Prophet and [after him follow] the Founder

(Asās=Waṣī), seven Imams who finish small cycles⁽⁴⁹⁾ and the tenth who plays the same role as the one the Speaking-Prophet does and will appear with new commandment (amr) with regard to new cycle⁽⁵⁰⁾.

Al-Kirmānī repeats that Speaking-Prophet and the Executor correspond to the First Intellect and the Second respectively. Here the problem is whether Qā'im corresponds to the Third or the Tenth. We can recognize in this quotation that the tenth in religious world is Qā'im, because on the one hand the tenth in the quotation brings new commandment and begins new cycle, and on the other hand Qā'im in Ismā'īlism is thought to abrogate the previous law, bring new one and begin new cycle⁽⁵¹⁾. As Qā'im plays the same role as the Speaking-Prophet's, so the Tenth Intellect plays the same role as the one of the First Intellect corresponding to the Speaking-Prophet. So Qā'im clearly corresponds to the Tenth Intellect in the quotation. If so, seven Imams will correspond to Intellects from the Third to the Ninth. I think that the Speaking-Prophet, the Executor, seven Imams, and Qā'im correspond to the First Intellect, the Second, Intellects from the Third to Ninth, and the Tenth. H. Corbin seems to have the same opinion⁽⁵²⁾.

As mentioned, the Potential Intellect is not the Third Intellect and plays its role as prime matter. In al-Kirmānī's theory on cosmology and religion the Second Intellect correspond to the Executor, while the Potential Intellect does to Qur'ān⁽⁵³⁾. As Separated Intellects act on the matter and the form composing the Potential Intellect and produce the spheres corresponding to themselves respectively, so the Executor who received the guidance (ta'yīd) from the Speaking-Prophet acts on Qur'ān and extracts both meanings of *ẓāhir* and the ones of *bāṭin* from it⁽⁵⁴⁾. Each Intellect gives the form to a sphere corresponding to it, actualizes and controls it. Equally the Speaking-Prophet, the Executor and Imams actualize Qur'ān and Sharī'a which are in potentiality in themselves and extract knowledges of guidance from them.

In order to understand correspondence among worlds consistently, it is better not to consider the Potential Intellect the Third Intellect. Qā'im, who finishes all cycles, corresponds to the Tenth Intellect, which is the end of the world which is composed of ten Intellects. Considering what was mentioned, I conclude that it is a mistake for De Smet to think that seven Imams and Qā'im correspond to Intellects from the Fourth to the Tenth, and the Third and that his error results from his mistake of the Potential Intellect for the Third Intellect.

Conclusion

If we understand al-Kirmānī's doctrine based on his text, we will find that the Potential Intellect is the origin of all bodies and not the Third Intellect. Then we will find that there is not the fallen existent seen in Yemenite *le drame dans le ciel* in his system and that, from the viewpoint of the criticism of texts, there are problems in the opinion of De Smet who applies Ṭayyibī doctrine to al-Kirmānī's thought. Moreover, there are problems in his view that *ẓāhir* is philosophy and that *bāṭin* is myth, as mentioned in chapter 1. So I conclude that there is no hidden gnostic myth in al-Kirmānī's doctrine.

Al-Kirmānī does not construct mythical and dynamic cosmology like many Ismā'īlī thinkers before and after him, in which the heavenly existents fall downstairs because of their primordial sin. His cosmology, composed of ten Intellects and ten spheres, is very static and stable. Ten ranks of Ismā'īlī da'wa correspond to ten Intellects and ten spheres, as mentioned in chapter 4. Fāṭimid da'wa will be guaranteed its correctness and stability, by being made to correspond to static and harmonized cosmos. We should understand al-Kirmānī's thought as the doctrine for the protection of Fāṭimid dynasty, not thinking that he practiced *taqīya* and hid his real opinion. Here we should reconfirm Halm's view that Neoplatonization in the 10-11th century came to a climax in the writings of al-Kirmānī and that afterwards Ismā'īlism was mythicized again in Yemenite Ṭayyibīs.

Notes

(1) Yves Marquet, "Iḥwān al-Safā', Ismailiens et Qarmates," *Arabica* 24(1977), pp. 233-257 ; "La révélation par l'astrologie selon Abu Ya'qub as-Sijistani et les Iḥwān aṣ-Ṣafā'," *Studia Islamica* 80(1994), pp.5-28.

(2) H. Halm, "Cosmology of the pre-Fatimid Ismā'īliyya," *Mediaeval Ismā'īli History & Thought*, ed. by Farhad Daftary (Cambridge, 1996), pp.75-83 ; S. M. Stern, "The Earliest Cosmological Doctrines of Ismā'īlism," *Studies in Early Ismā'īlism* (Jerusalem / Leiden, 1983), pp.3-29.

(3) H. Halm, *Kosmologie und Heilslehre der frühen Ismā'īliya* (Wiesbaden, 1978), pp.83-85; Tatsuya Kikuchi, "Ḥamid al-Dīn al-Kirmānī's Theory on Intellect," *Bulletin of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan (Nippon Oriento Gakkai)* 38-1(1995), pp.55-58.

(4) Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Ḥāmīdī, *Kanz al-walad*, ed. by Muṣṭafā Ghālib (Wiesbaden, 1971), pp.63-64,69.

(5) Henry Corbin, *Temps cyclique et gonose ismaélienne* (Paris, 1982), pp.47-57.

(6) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude de l'Intellect; Néoplatonisme et gnose ismaélienne dans l'oeuvre de Ḥamid ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī* (Xe/XIe s.) (Leuven, 1995), p.385.

(7) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, pp.249-250,394-395.

- (8) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, p.250.
- (9) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, pp.250,394-395.
- (10) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, pp.250-251,395.
- (11) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, pp.9-11.
- (12) W. Ivanow, *Studies in Early Persian Ismailism* (Leiden, 1948), pp.87-113.
- (13) Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Zīna* in 'Abd Allāh Salūm al-Sāmīlā'i's *al-Ghulūw wa-al-farq al-ghāliya fī al-ḥaḍāra al-islāmīya* (Baghdad, 1972), pp.227-312.
- (14) On the other hand, we can easily read *al-Maṣābīḥ fī ithbāt al-imāma*, ed. by Muṣṭafā Ghālib (Beirut, 1969) which deals with Imāma for ordinary believers and "Wā'izah", *Majmū'at rasā'il al-Kirmānī*, ed. by Muṣṭafā Ghālib (Beirut, 1983), polemic text against Durūz and do not find complex ideas we can see in *Rāḥat al-'aql* or *Kitāb al-Riyāḍ*, ed. by 'Ārif Tāmīr (Beirut, 1960). So introductory or polemic texts are thought to have been for the lay readers and philosophical and complex texts should have been for elite. I think the former texts were *ẓāhir* and that the latter one were *bāṭin* in a sense.
- (15) See the following articles: Daniel Carl Perterson, *Cosmogony and the Ten Separated Intellects in the "Rāḥat al-'Aql"* of Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī, Ph.D.Dissertation (University of California, 1990), pp.409-432, 461-482, 538-563 ; D.De Smet, *La Quiétude*, pp.35-398 ; J.T.P. De Bruijn, "Ḥamīd al-Dīn Aḥmad b. 'Abd Allāh al-Kirmānī," EI2, vol.V, pp.166-167 ; Simonetta Calderini, *Studies in Ismaili Cosmology : The Role of Intermediary Worlds*, Ph.D.Dissertation (University of London, 1991), pp.77-85 ; T. Kikuchi, *Mythology and Philosophy of Ismā'īliya*, Ph.D.Dissertation (Tokyo University,1998), pp.145-213; Paul E. Walker, *Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī* (London, 1999), pp.80-103.
- (16) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat al-'aql*, ed. by Muḥammad Kāmil Ḥusayn & Muḥammad Ḥilmī (Leiden/Cairo, 1952), pp.37-56.
- (17) Al-Kirmānī, "al-Rawḍa," *Majmū'at rasā'il al-Kirmānī*, pp.84-85; F.M. Hunzai, *The Concept of Tawḥīd in the Thought of Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī* (d.after 411/1021), Ph.D. Dissertation (McGill University, 1986), pp.140-141.
- (18) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, pp.59-60.
- (19) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.90.
- (20) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, pp.101-102.
- (21) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.101.
- (22) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, pp.105-106.
- (23) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, pp.108-110.
- (24) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, pp.171-172.
- (25) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.109.
- (26) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.138.
- (27) I. R.Netton, *Allah Transcendent* (Richmond, 1994), pp.226-228.
- (28) Ḥamīdī does not designate the First Emanated and the Second Emanated as the Second Intellect and the Third Intellect in his text. Such designation seems to have been established much later after him. Al-Ḥamīdī, *Kanz al-walad*, pp.67-68.
- (29) Al-Ḥamīdī, *Kanz al-walad*, p.79.
- (30) Al-Ḥamīdī, *Kanz al-walad*, p.249.
- (31) H.Corbin, *Cyclical Time and Ismaili Gnosis*, transl. by R. Manheim and J.W. Morris (London, 1983), p.91.
- (32) H. Corbin, *Cyclical Time and Ismaili Gnosis*, pp.30-58.
- (33) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, pp.245-246.
- (34) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, p.247; al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.128.
- (35) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, pp.245-248.
- (36) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.111.

- (37) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.112.
- (38) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude*, p.245.
- (39) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.115.
- (40) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.67.
- (41) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.75, 83 ; “Rawḍa,” pp.86-90.
- (42) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.82.
- (43) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.136.
- (44) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.138.
- (45) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, pp.136-137.
- (46) I confirmed this diagram in several manuscripts preserved in Mumbai University and The Institute of Ismaili Studies in London and found there were some variations of it and its omission from the text. We can not totally confide in the diagram in *Rāḥat al-‘aql* edited by M.K. Ḥusayn & M. Ḥilmī or ‘A. Tāmīr.
- (47) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, pp.124-126.
- (48) D. De Smet, *La Quiétude de l’Intellect*, pp.364-365.
- (49) In Ismā‘īlism one cycle is composed of the Speaking-Prophet, the Executor, and seven Imams. Sometimes each era of them is called small cycle (dawr ṣaghīr).
- (50) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.126.
- (51) In Ismā‘īlism Qā’im has two meanings, one of which is Qā’im who will appear on the day of Qiyāmat al-Qiyāmāt and accomplish the history of human beings. That Qā’im is both the eschatological Savior and the seventh Speaking-Prophet. On the other hand Qā’im sometimes means the seventh Imām in each cycle who abrogates the previous law, and begins new cycle. Probably Qā’im in quoted sentence means both of two meanings. If you want to know the eschatology of al-Kirmānī, see T. Kikuchi, “The Transformation of Ismā‘īlī Eschatology in the Fāṭimid Period: The Role and Meaning of Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī,” *Bulletin of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan* 41-1(1998), pp.95-109.
- (52) H. Corbin, *Cyclical Time and Ismaili Gnosis*, pp.95-96.
- (53) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.65.
- (54) Al-Kirmānī, *Rāḥat*, p.66.
- (55) See T. Kikuchi, Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī’s Theory on Intellect,” pp. 45-60; S. Calderini, *Studies in Ismaili Cosmology*, pp.75-85.