The term *ilkum* seems to have been specifically recognized by the Old Babylonians as public service, the responsible labor service performed by individuals or groups directly assigned or contracted by the central government\(^1\), and frequently refers to the land which *ilkum* was encumbered upon in the Old Babylonian period\(^2\). *Ilkum* has often been discussed\(^3\), however, few have endeavored to provide a synthesis of the *ilkum* institution through the structural and functional analyses. The purpose of this paper is to articulate a model of the *ilkum* system and the administrative and economic structure of the *ilkum* institution in the provincial administration of Larsa under the reign of Hammurapi after he conquered the Kingdom of Larsa in his 30th year. The newly established provincial administration of Larsa has been selected for an empirical case study because the large number of royal correspondence from Hammurapi to Sin-iddinam, the chief administrator, and Šamaš-ḥāzir, the chief of the agricultural sector and field assignments\(^4\) in the provincial administration of Larsa (e.g., *AbB* 2;4;9;13), reveal the well-documented policies of the central government concerning the *ilkum* institution for the province. Hammurapi established a highly centralized regime over the province of Larsa by imposing revenues/taxes and labor forces under the name of *ilkum* upon the conquered citizens of Larsa and their confiscated resources of economy. I will discuss the labor conditions of *ilkum*: the subjects, beneficiaries, assignments, revenues/taxes and rewards of *ilkum*. Then, I will propose a theoretical structure for the administration of the *ilkum* institution in the province of Larsa. This will include a discussion of the dynamic interrelations of hierarchical and horizontal levels of administrations and public workers, and the level of central government control over the management of

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ilkum and public workers. Finally, I will present the economic structure of the ilkum institution, examining the extent to which the central government had the authority to exploit the economy of the conquered people and to impose levies on them, and the extent of economic contribution of ilkum to public and private economy. The main primary sources concerning the ilkum institution in the provincial administration of Larsa are the royal correspondence from Hammurapi to Sin-iddinam and Šamaš-ḫāzīr (e.g., AbB 2; 4; 9; 13) and the transactions of the merchants of Larsa. In addition, official and private letters (e.g., AbB 1-13), public and private contracts related to the ilkum institution from other cities, the Code of Hammurapi, the edicts and royal inscriptions supplement the theme on the ilkum institution of the central government of Babylon.

I. The Labor Conditions of Ilkum

I propose that ilkum was comprised of compulsory public service, namely unpaid forced labor, and optional public service, that is, the labor under contractual responsibility. Compulsory service was officially imposed by the central government upon all male citizens on a per family basis in the form of military service and corvée work. On the other hand, optional service was theoretically carried out by anyone who made a formal labor contract with the central government to take responsibility for personal labor service or production of public resources in return for rewards on a regular basis. In the case of the province of Larsa, the optional service was required of the conquered people in order to maintain their previous resources of economy, mainly fields and herds. It is important to note that temporary salaried workers employed by the central government on an ad hoc basis did not perform ilkum, work with regular contractual responsibility which the central government could count on.

a. Compulsory Public Service

The military service (rēdūtum) was assigned by Hammurapi through the drafting of rēdūm soldiers for ilkum (AbB 2 1; 26). The term rēdūm seems to designate both regular soldiers and compulsory soldiers who had performed ilkum but it does not seem to refer mercenaries (ṣābum; argūm) who were
temporarily hired soldiers in return for wages. This might be confirmed by the Standard Babylonian extispicy of an Old Babylonian original that “ERIM.MEŠ a-ḫu-ú la ri-du-ū ERIM.MEŠ la il-ki (other šābum are not rēdūm, šābum who have no ilkum) (CT 31 15).”

It appears that military service was officially imposed upon all male citizens on a per family basis, except for regular public workers. The citizens are, in this context, meant to be all inhabitants with the exception of slaves and foreigners, that is, both awīlum and muškēnum in the Code of Hammurapi(12). All draftees were male according to the possible conscription lists for compulsory service (VS 7 126; 164; CT 6 15-18)(13). The general mobilization carried out by Hammurapi for military campaign against Elam at Opis(14) (ARM 26 363) testifies that “the troop of merchants, all men, including released slaves (ša-bi DAM.GĀR zi-ka-ra-am šum-šu a-di SAG.ĪR wu-ús-šu-ri-im) (ARM 26 363: 12-13)” were recruited for this developing military force. Private slaves who were regarded as the property of private individuals were not recruited for military service and were not obligated to perform ilkum until they were emancipated from their owners and became released slaves(15). On the other hand, public slaves, the prisoners of war(16) or impoverished natives, might be deployed to military forces at the state’s disposal(17), although not for ilkum. The singling-out of the troop of merchants from “all men (zi-ka-ra-am šum-ši) (ARM 26 363: 12)” can be explained by the possibility that it might have consisted of the mercenaries whom the merchants hired for wages on behalf of the central government, rather than the troop of merchants themselves(18) because the merchants occasionally contracted with the central government for employing hirelings from the private sector(19). Otherwise, it would be awkward if the troop of drafted merchants, private merchants or temporarily employed public merchants who supposedly did not have any outstanding military skills made a special troop apart from that of general population. It is most likely that military service was required on a per family basis because usually the draftees were enrolled along with their substitutes (taḫḫūm)(20), frequently their family members(21) in the list of rēdūm. It is certain that regular public workers were completely exempted from military service. The regular workers, who were formally registered (AbB 2 26) with a permanent status (diurum) (AbB 2 1), were exempt from the draft of rēdūm (AbB 2 1; 3; 26; 43) probably because they were recognized by the central government to be performing a sufficient amount of ilkum in the course of their regular work.
It seems that corvée work [*tupšikkum*, “(lit.) brick-carrying basket”\(^{(22)}\)] was officially assigned by the king, as *ilkum*,\(^{(23)}\) to all male citizens on a per family basis in related provincial and local administrations where the central government initiated large-scale public works and demanded the funding for materials and labor forces for them, in addition to the aid provided by the central government. It is confirmed by a royal inscription of Hammurapi mentioning that he raised the wall of Sippar with the troops of his country (*tībūt ummān mātim*) and then released the people (*šābum*) of Sippar from corvée work (*tupšikkum*) for the sake of the city god Šamaš\(^{(24)}\). In other words, this indicates that the king usually assigned corvée work to the “citizens” of Sippar in order to reinforce their city walls. The subjects of corvée work, corvée workers (*šābum*, specifically called *šāb tupšikkim*), were, like those of military service, called from among all male citizens of a particular city where public works were assigned.

Military service and corvée work were alternatives to each other because soldiers were frequently deployed as supplementary forces to public works such as boat-making (*AbB* 2 36), canal work (*AbB* 2: 147; *AbB* 8 131), construction of city walls\(^{(25)}\), and corvée workers were probably likely to be exempted from military service since the ninety soldiers at the garrison of Ur were to be removed from the list of *redūm* after they were deployed by Hammurapi to the task of boat-making industry (*AbB* 2 36)\(^{(26)}\). However, military service was administered on a state-wide basis while corvée work was carried out only within related local administration(s) where public works were required on a local basis. The alternatives of two compulsory services suggest that the regular public workers who were exempt from military service (*AbB* 2 1; 3; 26; 43) were also free from performing corvée work.

The assignments of military service and corvée work were counted by working days and the draftees were probably provided subsistence rations while on duty. Compulsory service could be replaced by paying an amount of silver or barley probably equivalent to the wage of a hired worker so that the central government could employ another worker or by directly providing a labor substitute. It did not matter to the central government, how compulsory service was performed, as long as the labor or its counterpart, the exemption money, was provided by the subjects of compulsory service. The annually collected silver or barley related to *ilkum* might be considered as exemption or compensation money, which was occasionally specified as “the silver of *ilkum* (*kasap ilkim*)”
and iginal payment, because it was often collected by the summoners (dēkūm) (e.g., VS 7 70/71) or military supervisors (ṣa ḫattātim) (e.g., VS 7 121). Despite of the prohibition of hiring a substitute for military campaigns by the military personnel in the Code of Hammurapi (CH 26; 33), hirelings for military campaigns are attested (e.g., VS 7 47; VS 8 37, 38; YOS 12 138), though it is hard to tell whether the hiring was carried out by private individuals to substitute for their military service or by officials to employ mercenaries for military campaigns. Hired substitutes for corvée work are also attested. It is reasonable to assume that wealthy private citizens paid exemption money or hired substitutes for their compulsory service.

The number of assignments and draftees was flexible on an ad hoc basis since it depended on how many labor forces the central government required for military operations or public works from provincial and local administrations and to what extent it could impose its wishes upon them. The number of assignments for compulsory service can be used as a gauge of the authority of the central government over the provincial and local administrations because the central government wanted to obtain compulsory service, which unconditionally contributed unpaid labor forces to the revenue of the central government, as much as it could. The regular length of compulsory service can be estimated to have been from one to a few months since the annual exemption money or compensation money probably provided for compulsory service (kasap ilkım; iginal) (e.g., BE 6/1 71; CT 4 15a; VS 7 70-74) frequently amounted to around 1/2 shenkel to 3 shekels, an amount equivalent to one to a few months’ salary of a hired man according to the regulations (CH 273). It might also be confirmed by the fact that a work substitute for corvée work for the palace was hired for one month under the reign of Samsuiluna (YOS 12 146).

b. Optional Public Service

Optional public service was formally provided by the central government to anyone who was willing to be contracted into personal labor service or production of public resources with the central government on a regular basis. However, occupations were by custom hereditary from fathers to sons and social mobility was rarely attested. The workers for optional service were regular workers, “registered permanent public workers,” who entered into a formal labor contract in order to perform ilkım with the central government and were
“registered in my (Hammurapi’s) certificate (ša i-na ka-ni-ki-ja ka-an-ku) (AbB 2 26: 14-15)” with a permanent status (dārum) (AbB 2 1; 43). They were officially “professional” workers with “tenured” status for life or for a regular term (30). They took responsibility for fulfilling the contracted assignments of ilkum; otherwise, they were obligated to make up for them by means of compensation money or penalty. They were eligible to be exempt from compulsory service (AbB 2 1; 3; 26; 43). They were also qualified to receive ration fields in the province of Larsa as a part of their rewards in return for their ilkum (AbB 4 24; 117; 125). It is confirmed by the fact that the public workers “whose responsibility had grown (pi-ḫa-az-zu-nu ir-ta-bi) (AbB 4 46: 9-10)” and “whose work was seen to be every day work (ša u-mi-ša-am ši-pi-ir-šu in-nam-ma-ru) (AbB 4 54: 17-18)”, were newly qualified to receive ration fields.

The contractual responsibility of personal labor service (ilkum) was performed by regular military personnel and civil servants who contracted their ilkum with the central government. The ilkum of Šamaš-ḫāzir, the surveyors (abi ašlim) and accountants (šatammūm) at the bureau of field assignments was to carry out field assignments and report them to Hammurapi (AbB 4 22). In principle, the recipients of ration fields performed ilkum for the central government (AbB 4 24; 117; 125). The recipients varied from military personnel [e.g., general (vakil Amurrīm) (AbB 11 165); captain (ša ḫattātim) (AbB 11 166); regular soldier (rēḏūm) (AbB 11 189); regular boatman (bāʾirum) (AbB 4 41)] to administrators [e.g., regional governor (šakkanaḵkum) (AbB 4 5); scribe (ṯupšarrum) (AbB 4 10); chief merchant (vakil tamkārīm) (AbB 4 3); chief shepherd (uṭullum) (AbB 9 195); chief of the female weavers (vakil išparatim) (AbB 4 10); chief of woodland (vakil qīštim) (AbB 4 111); messenger (rakbum) (AbB 4 11); runner (lāsimum) (AbB 4 64)], craftsmen [e.g., craftsman (gurgurrum) (AbB 4 31); seal cutter (purkullum) (AbB 4 1); reed worker (atkuppum) (AbB 4 55); carpenter (naggārum) (AbB 4 36)], domestics [e.g., cook (nuḥatimmum) (AbB 4 88); domestic (girseqūm) (AbB 4 22)], temple personnel [e.g., porter (uillum) and bird catcher (ušandum) of the Šamaš temple of Uruk (AbB 4 27); shepherd (rēʾūm) of the Šamaš temple (AbB 9 195)] and other public workers [e.g., ox-driver (kušum) (AbB 4 64); singer (nārum) (AbB 4 14); dancer (ḫuppūm) (AbB 9 193)].

The assignments of their ilkum were counted by working days and the types of service. For example, an individual “performed five ilkum and pays igisūm-payment of the service of chief priest and incantation priest (5 il-ki i-la-
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Ak ù IGI.SÁ SANGA-tim ù GALA-tim i-ša-aq-qá-la) (AbB 10 1: 27-29)” to a regional governor (šāpir matim) (AbB 10 1). A family performed “one public service as a runner and one public service as an ox-driver (1 KASKAL i-na LÚ KAS₃.E 1 KASKAL i-na ŠÀ.GUD) (AbB 4 64: 9-11).” The assignments of ilkum seem to have been transferable among family members and substitutes with the permission of the authorities. A chief soldier (qaggad rēdīm) performed ilkum for his brother for 20 days (U₄ 20 KAM)(31), and the chief soldier and his substitute divided their share of field, house and ilkum in the proportion of two to one(32) or in almost equal shares(33) under the jurisdiction of governor and military supervisors during the reign of Abī-ešuḫ (1711-1684 B.C.).

The responsibility of regular military personnel and civil servants to satisfy their assignments of ilkum included the regular report of their duty and the compensation for the negligence of ilkum by the payment of compensation money or penalty, if necessary. Two farmers and a diviner (bārūm) among palace workers (AbB 2 17), eight workers (šābum) under Sin-iddinam of Larsa (AbB 2 42) “who did not go to their duty (ša a-na ma-az-za-āš-ti-šu-nu la il-li-ku-nim) (AbB 2 17: 16-17; AbB 2 42: 27-28)” were sent to Hammurapi for punishment, and some palace workers “who abandoned (their) duty (ša i-na ma-az-za-az-tim pa-at-ru) (AbB 13 10: 6)” were sent by Hammurapi to Sin-iddinam for a trial. The igisūm-payment which was paid by a temple personnel in relation to his ilkum was probably compensation money for his ilkum (AbB 10 1).

Regular military personnel and civil servants were salaried workers and were paid by regular wages and/or ration fields according to the amount of their ilkum. The amount of wages and/or ration fields was tied to the rank and types of ilkum. The division of the fields of a father to his sons, military personnel of Babylon, shows a clear distinction in the size of fields according to their military rank: 8 bur each for two captains, 4 bur for a sergeant, and 2 bur each for three regular soldiers (AbB 4 89). This division of the fields was probably the assignment of ration fields by Hammurapi from their paternal fields. Moreover, high officials such as chief shepherd (AbB 9 195), a regional governor (šakkanakkum) of Bad-Tibira (AbB 4 5) were granted ration fields according to their choices.

The production of public resources, mainly fields and herds, which the central government exploited from the conquered people of Larsa, was
conducted by farmers and shepherds who made a formal contract with the central government on a regular basis against contracted revenues, consisting of a fixed amount or a share of products. The assignments of ilkum accorded with the amount of public resources and the expected contracted revenues from them. The responsibility of submitting contracted revenues from public resources was their ilkum. Public resources were assigned to public workers for production according to the assignments of ilkum, so that they were obligated to pay arrears and/or compensation money in order to balance the contracted revenues. The silver, igisūm-payment and tāmartum-gift pertaining to old status of ilkum (ilik labīrtim) of a muškēnum, which were paid to the merchant in Sippar (AbB 5 275) were probably compensation money for the arrears of contracted revenues.

Shepherds were also required by Hammurapi to compensate for arrears in their contracted revenues in either barley or silver (AbB 2 21; 37).

Public workers for production were in most cases contracted entrepreneurs who had the autonomy to manage resources, hire subordinate workers and make some profits through their ilkum as long as they produced the required revenues for the central government. The contractors were rewarded by the products after the subtraction of the contracted revenues. However, some of public workers for production might have been salaried workers who paid all the products for regular wages. The payment for public workers for production was occasionally added by ration fields.

The conquered people of Larsa were liable to perform optional service in order to keep their previous resources, fields and herds, and their paternal fields, probably previous ration fields from the Kingdom of Larsa. Hammurapi confiscated the fields of the Kingdom of Larsa and used them for the revenue (biltum) fields which were basically rented to farmers (iššakku) against revenues, and the ration (šukussu) fields which were granted to public workers as a part of their reward in the return for their ilkum. It appears that he attempted to keep the economic structure of Larsa, reassigning the revenue fields of the Kingdom of Larsa to previous farmers of Larsa and the herds of Larsa to previous shepherds of Larsa in order to obtain revenues for Babylon from them, and reconfirming their paternal fields (eqel bit abīm, eqel labīrtim, eqūm ištu pānānuma), some of which were previous ration fields from Larsa, as ration fields of Babylon as long as they performed optional service for Babylon. In this way, the central government gained revenues from the fields and herds of Larsa by contracting farmers and shepherds against contracted...
revenues without losing any resources for Babylon, and saved the cost of rations/wages, transportation and the number of bureaucrats by granting ration fields to public workers instead of distributing rations/wages to them.

The public fields, both revenue and ration fields, were ilkum (fields), the fields which public service (ilkum) was incumbent on. The contractual responsibility of satisfying revenues for the central government (ilkum) was imposed on the revenue fields while the contractual responsibility of personal labor service for the central government (ilkum) was required upon ration fields. I propose that the assigned field to a redūm or a bāʿīrum in exchange for an encumbrance (ilkum) in the Code of Hammurapi (CH 27-41) was not only a ration field but also a revenue field. His ilkum field was the ration field which was granted in return for his military service and the revenue field which was rented for farming against revenue as a part-time farmer while he was off duty since his military service was on ad hoc basis. It is suggested by the Edict of Ammišaduqa where a redūm or bāʿīrum was remitted from the collection of revenues (biltum) of fields together with a nāši biltim, [...] rabi, a muškēnum, or the holder of ilkum aḫūm (Edikt A IV 36-V 4) and was excused from old status of ilkum of fields (Edikt A V 17-24) because of a mēšarum-act.

The revenue fields were rented to public workers who took the responsibility of fulfilling contracted revenues (ilkum) from the palace fields (AbB 4 18), that is, expropriated fields from previous revenue fields of the Kingdom of Larsa or fallow fields (AbB 4 17). The lessees of revenue fields were 1. farmers or supervisors of farmers; 2. wealthy individuals; 3. other regular public workers, usually military personnel. The farmers were main revenue-producers of fields and were directly controlled by the central government (e.g., AbB 4 17; 18). The supervisors of farmers coordinated the management of farming and took charge of collecting revenues from farmers for the central government (e.g., AbB 4 23). The wealthy individuals such as high officials or merchants (tamkārum) or nadiṭum-women could borrow revenue fields from the central government with a special contractual responsibility (ilkum aḫūm) with more autonomy and less interruption from the central government (CH 40). I suppose that private individuals such as merchants or nadiṭum-women, could make a contract with the central government to deal with public resources in business-like relations, and this kind of work for the central government was regarded as ilkum aḫūm. The practice of renting large-scale revenue fields to wealthy individuals was much more common during the Late
Old Babylonian period, under the break-down of the centralization and the rise of the influence of local administration\(^{(43)}\). The regular public workers who had time to work in fields in addition to their regular non-agricultural work, mostly military personnel, engaged in revenue fields during peace time or off-seasons as part-time public farmers. Regular soldiers and boatmen worked in revenue fields (\textit{Edikt} A IV 36-V 4; \textit{Edikt} V 17-24) and “the soldiers of the garrison cultivated the field (\textit{A.ŠA bi-ir-tum-ma i-ru-[u] š}) (\textit{AbB} 9 118: 15-16)” near Kish.

The ration fields were leased to regular public workers as a part of their payment as long as they worked for ilkum (\textit{AbB} 4 24; 117; 125). Therefore, the assignees enjoyed all the income from it without any taxes and could lease it out to the others\(^{(44)}\) as long as they kept it arable and returned it to the central government when they no longer worked for ilkum\(^{(45)}\). It is certain that many regular public workers of Larsa were granted ration fields from their own paternal fields\(^{(46)}\). This indicates that the conquered people of Larsa were required to perform ilkum for Babylon in order to keep their paternal fields\(^{(47)}\), some of which were originally ration fields from the Kingdom of Larsa\(^{(48)}\). It must be remembered that in general most ilkum was hereditary so that the ration fields were most likely inherited from father to son with little social mobility, which eventually caused difficulty in distinguishing them from their paternal fields after many generations.

Temporary workers were employed by the central government from the private sector for wages on an \textit{ad hoc} basis in order to supplement work forces of ilkum in the military, public works, civil administration and production of public resources. The central government occasionally entrusted regular public workers for production to subcontract their subordinates, and commissioned merchants to hire temporary salaried workers. The temporary workers hired by them at their disposal were also engaged in public farming and herding. In addition, public slaves were deployed to the operation of ilkum, especially public works, as unskilled labor forces at the state’s disposal on a statewide basis.

II. The Administration of the \textit{Ilkum} Institution in the Provincial Administration of Larsa

A theoretical structure of the administration of the ilkum institution is...
proposed from the analysis of the kinds of ilkum and the tasks of administrators and public workers in the ilkum institution. The top of the administration of the ilkum institution consisted of a body of policy makers in the central government. At the second level, the planning and management of implementation of ilkum policies were directed by the chief administrators of the main sectors of the ilkum institution: military and public works, agricultural and herding sectors, with the support of technical staffs [scribes (tupšarrum; mār É.DUB.BA), messengers (rakbūm), accountants (šatammūm)] of the bureau of archives in the central, provincial and local administrations. At the third level, ilkum policies were carried out by hierarchically structured public workers who were actually engaged in the operation of ilkum. In addition, the bureau of commerce (kārum) and the judiciary played an important role in supplementing the enforcement of ilkum policies.

The provincial and local administrations became virtually agencies for the implementation of ilkum policies handed down by the central government under the highly centralized regime of Hammurapi. The newly established provincial administration of Larsa supervised local administrations as a mediator of the central government, and coordinated the management of ilkum and public workers in the province under the direct control of Hammurapi. The chief administrators, the supervisors and even public workers themselves made regular administrative trips to see the king in person (e.g., AbB 2 29; AbB 4 22) and contacted the king directly in matters of ilkum. On the other hand, the local administration which developed from the conventional municipal administration of a city was administered by the members of the assembly (puhrum; ālum) and the elders of the city (šībūt ālim) from among the wealthy and influential citizens under the supervision of a governor (rabiānum). The local administration had some autonomy to decide the local private matters under its own jurisdiction.

Policy decisions pertaining to ilkum were generally made by the central government of Babylon and were handed down to the individual sectors of the ilkum institution at the central, provincial, and local administrations for implementation. The central government consisted of policy makers and the administrators with various degrees of enforcement authority. The policy makers of the central government were appointed by the king probably from the royal families, the assembly and elders of the municipal administration of City Babylon, and the upper class of the city. The chief administrators of the
individual sectors were most likely selected by the king from among the policy makers. The chief administrators of the individual sectors supervised and coordinated the enforcement of ilkum policies at the provincial and local levels.

The individual sectors seem to have been specialized for the administration of the ilkum institution as follows: military and public works for compulsory service, and agriculture and herding for main optional public service for production. However, in the local administration of a smaller city, the individual sectors were less specialized and the legislators of the city, themselves tended to take care of the implementation of ilkum policies as a whole. Each sector had a chief administrator, who could be in charge of some (or all) sectors at the same time. The chief administrator of the sector took responsibility for: 1. overseeing the management of each project; 2. supervising public workers; 3. bookkeeping for related contracts. Each sector had a bureau of archives where the technical support staff such as scribes, accountants and messengers maintained up-to-date record of ilkum, for example, census lists, labor contracts, budget reports, and revenue/tax receipts. They were responsible for bookkeeping, sending messages, making of transactions, and helping with the technical work of the archives of the lower administrations. The chief administrator of the agricultural sector in the provincial administration of Larsa, Šamaš-ḫāẓir was also in charge of the bureau of field assignments where a technical support staff of one hundred sixty-two public workers worked (AbB 4 21)51). The central government maintained a copy of all the archives of ilkum from the provincial and local administrations so that the policy makers could check them at any time(52). The bookkeeping system was well-established in the state of Babylon where all records were filed at public place(53).

The public workers of each sector were hierarchically structured from the supervisor to regular public workers, temporary public workers for compulsory service or for wages and public slaves. In addition, the workers subcontracted by regular public workers for the production of public resources were also engaged in the operation of ilkum.

The military sector which took responsibility for military campaigns, defense, public security, and public works was directly administered by the central government. The military personnel were composed of military supervisors: general (wakil Amurrīm); captain (ša ḫattātim); sergeant (laputtūm)(54); chief soldier (šāpir rēdīm); chief boatman (wakil bā’irīm), regular soldiers (rēdūm; bā’irum; šābum), compulsory soldiers (rēdūm, bā’irum;
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Šābum, mercenaries (šābum; argūm)(55) and public slaves (wardūm). Conscription for military campaigns was conducted by the central government, and regular soldiers, compulsory soldiers, mercenaries, and public slaves were deployed to the military supervisors on a state-wide basis. A large number of soldiers, 30,000 to 40,000, might be drafted by the martial king, Hammurapi(56) according to the figures for military campaigns in relation to Hammurapi mentioned in the Mari Letters (ARM 2 67; ARM 26 379). The garrisons were sent to the cities and fortifications from the central government in order to defend its territory from internal revolts andoutside enemies(57). Furthermore, the military personnel worked for public security as policemen or guardians(58) and were deployed to public works as supplementary forces from the central government(59). The military tasks were required to regular military personnel on an ad hoc basis so that they occasionally worked in public fields and/or took care of public herds as part-time public farmers and/or shepherds in peace time (e.g., AbB 1 1; AbB 6 165; AbB 8 132; AbB 9 118).

The public works sector was administered by the central government with the collaboration of the related provincial and local administrations. The public works sector supervised large-scale public works: the construction of public buildings(60), canals(61) and boats(62), shearing sheep(63), and weaving(64), and so on. The crew of public works sectors were a large number of unskilled labor forces: corvée workers (šāb tupšikkim)(65), temporary hired workers (agrūm), supplementary forces of soldiers (rēdūm) and public slaves (wardūm), in addition to the specialists(66). The corvée workers (šāb tupšikkim) were organized under provincial administrators and supervisors.(67) It is difficult to know whether or not the unskilled workers in public works were corvée workers unless they were specifically designated as šāb tupšikkim, because šābum, can be “people” in general(68) and therefore, šābum can be applied to all workers.

The central government directly intervened in the management of the agriculture of the province of Larsa because the agricultural revenue from a huge mount of irrigated public fields of the province of Larsa contributed largely to the economy of the central government. The agricultural sector took charge of: 1. assigning revenue fields to farmers and revenue gardens to horticulturists (nukaribbum); 2. supervising the management of revenue fields and gardens; 3. collecting contracted revenues. The surveyors and accountants at the bureau of field assignments carried out the demarcation of fields and gardens as well as the recording of their assignments. The central government provided revenue fields,
plow oxen, seeds and fodder, and wages for harvesters to farmers or the supervisors of farmers (e.g., *AbB* 4 17; 18) by lot (*AbB* 2 38; *AbB* 4 23; 138), and revenue gardens to horticulturists (*AbB* 4 26). The supervisors of farmers and chief horticulturists (*šandanakkūm*) were more like salaried administrators because the central government directly intervened in the management of agriculture (*AbB* 4 23) and horticulture (*AbB* 4 26). On the other hand, the farmers and horticulturists who cultivated public fields and gardens were probably contracted entrepreneurs who borrowed public resources from the central government against contracted revenues and managed them at their disposal, renting them out to subcontracted farmers (*errešūm*) and/or hiring temporary workers (*agrūm*), as long as they fulfilled their obligation to the central government. The rate of contracted revenues seems to have been one half of yields because the central government supplied seeds, fodder, oxen and harvesters and took care of irrigation, though another common rate of shares was one-third for the landowner and two-thirds for the tenant according to private contracts (*CH* 46, *Edikt* A V 17-24). However, the fact that some farmers received ration fields (*AbB* 4 65) suggests that some might be salaried workers with regular wages and/or ration fields. The regional governors (*šāpir mātim*) collected revenues in their jurisdiction under the supervision of Šamaš-hāzīr, a chief of the agricultural sector (*AbB* 9 192). Moreover, the horticulturists who borrowed public gardens against contracted revenues, a 2/3 share of the yield like that of private contracts (*CH* 64) or fixed amount were able to gain a profit from the surplus. The revenues from public gardens (dates, garlic, onions and sesame) were brought by chief horticulturists to the bureau of commerce (*kārum*) of Larsa where the merchants borrowed them for business on a long term basis and converted them into silver to be sent to Babylon under the supervision of the chief merchant. Also, the dates and sesame were directly sent from Sin-iddinam (*AbB* 2 22).

The public herds of the cities and temples in the province of Larsa were integrated into the economy of Babylon and their shepherds were directly supervised by the central government. Hammurapi summoned the individual shepherds of the temples and cities in the province of Larsa to Babylon in order to settle accounts (*AbB* 2 29; 39), and organized sheep shearing (*AbB* 2 25; *AbB* 4 86; *TCL* 17 63). The herding sector supervised assigning public herds to chief shepherds or shepherds, organizing the shearing of sheep and collecting contracted revenue to the central government. From the analysis of public and
contracted herding contracts, and the regulation of herding (CH 57-58; 261-267), the shepherds seem to have been private entrepreneurs who shared in profits from new births and products after the deduction of a fixed amount to cover revenue (76), probably in addition to rations and/or ration fields (77), and had the autonomous authority to make out a hiring contract with a young shepherd (78), a field rental contract for grazing with farmers (CH 57-58) and a commercial contract with private individuals (79), under their jurisdiction. They were responsible for reporting the accounts of herding (AbB 2 29; 39) and compensating for shortages in the products (AbB 2 21; 37). Sheep were brought to the shearing place where the annual contracts were settled and renewed (80), and wool was sold to private individuals (TCL 10; TCL 11 208; 210), was lent to the bureau of commerce for commercialization (81), and was transferred to a weaving factory under the supervision of the central government. In addition to regular shepherds, military personnel at the garrisons were entrusted public herds to care for as part-time shepherds during peace time (82).

The bureau of commerce (kārum) and the judiciary played an important role as supplementary institutions for the operation of ilkum. The merchants’ association of harbor district (kārum) was integrated into the provincial administration as the bureau of commerce and took charge of public enterprise and the collection of revenues/taxes on behalf of the central government (83). However, it remained an independent private enterprise of merchants (84) under the supervision of the chief merchant because it had the authority to decide the alloy rate of copper and tin for bronze (AbB 11 153), controlled its own investments for business (Edikt A III 21-31), and maintained a granary for private transactions (AbB 9 143). The chief merchant who contracted with the central government was given revenues: dates, garlic, onions, sesame, fish, and wool. These commodities were used commercially and were converted into silver on a long-term basis. A fixed amount of silver was paid back to the central government. Therefore, they had the possibility of gaining healthy profit in the process of these transactions (85). It seems that the central government let the bureau of commerce enjoy a profit-making business with requests of only fixed amount of silver or barley to encourage private commerce and reduce transportation fees and the number of administrators. The merchants who were actually engaged in the transactions on behalf of the central government under the chief merchant were subcontracted entrepreneurs who contracted with the chief merchant, and not the central government (86).
The judiciary of the provincial administration of Larsa took care of all administrative reviews and disputes with respect to *ilkum* and public workers in the province under the direct supervision of Hammurapi, the highest judge of the state. Administrative reviews: the negligence of *ilkum* (*AbB* 2 17; 42; *AbB* 13 10); the misbehavior of administrators (*AbB* 2 6; *AbB* 4 24; 93), and disputes on the usufruct of public fields (e.g., *AbB* 4 14; 15; 66; 79), were, in principle, handled by the hierarchically structured administrators of the *ilkum* from a supervisor of public workers, chief of an individual sector of the *ilkum* institution like Šamaš-ḫāzîr, chief administrator of the agricultural sector and the bureau of field assignments, Sin-iddinam, chief administrator of the provincial administration of Larsa to the king, Hammurapi. The judiciary of the local administration which usually took charge of most local private cases collaborated to solve administrative disputes with provincial administrators (*AbB* 2 15; *AbB* 4 40; 118).

### III. The Economic Structure of the *Ilkum* Institution in the Provincial Administration of Larsa

The public economy was monopolized by the palace which integrated the temple economy into its own sphere, especially under the highly centralized regime of Hammurapi. The private economy based on a market-oriented system is evidenced through private transactions, the fluctuation of prices, the existence of market prices and market place. However, it is hard to determine whether the market was a “free” market, based on a supply-demand price mechanism for definite goods or service, or a “restricted” market based on redistribution and reciprocity at a local level. The central government controlled private economy by regulations to some degree, however, it much interacted with the private economy when it entrusted private entrepreneurs with business and public resources for production, and employed temporary salaried workers from the private sector.

The superstructure of the economy of *ilkum* was primarily based on a redistribution system while the substructure was founded on a market-oriented system. Compulsory labor forces from all male citizens except for regular public workers, the labor forces from salaried regular civil and military personnel, and the revenues from the contractors for the production of public
resources were collected and disbursed for investment in a state-wide operation of ilkum, such as military campaigns and public works, and the rations/wages for regular and temporary salaried workers\(^\text{(94)}\). The central government confiscated public resources for production and ration fields from the conquered people of Larsa so that it unconditionally obtained revenues and personal labor service from them in return for the maintenance of their previous resources probably from the Kingdom of Larsa. The soldiers in compulsory military service were deployed into the military sector while corvée workers were assigned to public works as unskilled labor forces. The regular salaried workers for personal labor service worked in military and civil administration as military personnel and civil servants. Temporary salaried workers and public slaves were also engaged in the operation of ilkum as supplementary labor forces. The grains and wool, the revenues from the contractors who were entrusted with public resource, mainly fields and herds, in the province of Larsa were utilized as rations for compulsory workers, wages for regular and temporary salaried workers in the operation of ilkum, and funds for necessary materials such as equipment for the operation of ilkum. The redistribution of labor forces and funds for ilkum was generally left to the provincial and local administrations under the supervision of the central government in order to save transportation fees and the number of administrators. Only a portion of revenues was sent to the central government for their consumption in Babylon or other places, especially frontier military fortress.

The substructure of labor forces of the ilkum institution consisted of contracted entrepreneurs and salaried workers who interacted with private sector in the operation of ilkum\(^\text{(95)}\). The central government involved itself in the labor market when it employed temporary salaried workers. Furthermore, the central government might entrust a contractor of public resources to subcontract his own subordinates, or contract a merchant to hire temporary salaried workers. This would assist in the development of the public as well as the private economy because the central government saved the labor cost of administration from hiring workers. The workers were motivated to work for rewards which were bargained on a supply-demand basis. In addition, the contracted entrepreneurs for production had the autonomy to manage the public resources at their disposal as long as they satisfied contracted revenues. Therefore, they had a chance to profit from it. The interaction and flexibility between the public and private workers cannot be emphasized enough. The public workers could be
hired by private individuals simultaneously and the private workers could be hired as temporary public workers at any time.

Conclusion

The central government obtained unpaid compulsory labor forces (ilkum) from all male citizens, with the exception of regular public workers by means of military service and corvée work while providing them with rations of subsistence and equipment. The period of compulsory service was flexible, although it usually seems to have lasted from one to a few months. The assignments for compulsory service were reckoned by the duration of the service or could be fulfilled by the payment of exemption money or by hiring a substitute worker. Furthermore, the central government unconditionally procured optional labor service from the conquered people of Larsa by requiring personal labor service in order to maintain their own paternal fields as ration fields as long as they worked for Babylon, and collected contracted revenues from the confiscated public resources of Larsa. Contractual responsibility of personal labor service (ilkum) was performed by salaried military personnel and civil servants who contracted their duties with the central government on a regular basis in return for wages and/or ration fields. Their ilkum was compensated according to the kind and duration of the service provided and had to be made up for by the payment of compensation money or a penalty if it was not fulfilled. The production of public resources, mainly fields and herds, was usually carried out by contractors who entered into a formal contract with the central government to lease public resources against contracted revenues. Their contractual obligation (ilkum) was to meet contracted revenues of the central government and was supplemented by the payment of compensation money or penalty if it was not satisfied. It seems quite likely that they were contracted entrepreneurs who received the remainder of the products after paying a fixed amount or a share of them to the central government, sometimes added by wages and/or ration fields, though some might be salaried workers who paid all products in return for a fixed wage and/or ration fields. It also seems certain that they had the autonomy to administer the assigned public resources at their disposal.

The central government directly controlled ilkum by appointing administrators and public workers, maintaining direct communication with
administrators and public workers, and intervening in the management of *ilkum* and settling disputes and claims brought by public workers under the highly centralized regime of Hammurapi. The provincial and local administrations essentially became agencies for the implementation of *ilkum* policies for the central government. The planning and management of *ilkum* policies were carried out under the direction of the chief administrators of the individual sectors of the *ilkum* institution: military, public works, agricultural and herding sectors, with supplementary institutions: the bureau of commerce for the collection and commercialization of revenues, the judiciary for administrative reviews and the settlement of administrative disputes, and the bureau of archives where all relevant documents were recorded and filed. The operation of *ilkum* was carried out by hierarchically structured workers: supervisors, regular salaried or contracted public workers, compulsory workers, temporary salaried or subcontracted workers and public slave.

The superstructure of the economy of *ilkum* was founded on a redistribution system while the substructure was based on a market-oriented system. The compulsory labor forces from all male citizens, salaried labor forces from regular military personnel and civil servants as well as the revenues from the contractors of public resources were circulated for the investment of labor forces and funds in the operation of *ilkum* and for the rations/wages for regular and temporary salaried workers. On the other hand, the substructure of the economy of *ilkum* was interactive with the private sector because regular public workers for optional public service and temporary salaried workers were theoretically employed from the private sector on a supply-demand mechanism and contractors were mostly contracted entrepreneurs who gained a profit from the management of public resources as long as they satisfied their contracted revenues.
<table>
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Chart II Administration of *Ilkum* Institution

King

- Chief of Military
  - Scribes
  - Accountants
  - Messengers
  - Generals
  - Captains
  - Sergeants
  - Chief soldiers
- Chief of Public Works
  - Scribes
  - Accountants
  - Messengers
  - Supervisors
  - Specialists
- Chief of Agriculture
  - Scribes
  - Accountants
  - Messengers
  - Surveyors
  - Regular farmers
  - Regular shepherds
- Chief of Herding
  - Scribes
  - Accountants
  - Messengers
  - Supervisors
  - Chief shepherds

- Mercenaries
- Hired workers
- Hired farmers
- Hired shepherds

- Public slaves

- Salaried workers
- Contractors
- Compulsory workers
- Subcontractors
Chart III Economic Structure of the Ilkum Institution

Central Government

- Rations
- Wages

Provincial Administration

- Rations
- Fields
- Public Resources

Bureau of Commerce

- Contracted Revenues
- Silver

Compulsory Workers/Marchants

- Labor
- Rations

Regular Salaried Workers

- Labor
- Wages

Temporary Salaried Workers

- Labor
- Wages

Contractors for Production

- Labor
- Wages

Temporary Subcontracted Workers

Private Individuals

- Rations
- Silver
Notes

Author’s note*


(1) Ilkum is a neutral word for any kind of work and service for both public and private sectors. In this paper, ilkum without any specific comments refers to ilkum with respect to the public sector. Harrânum is probably a synonym of ilkum concerning public service and refers not only to military campaigns but also to civil public services such as those of runners (lāsimûm) and ox-drivers (kullizûm) (AbB 4 64). *CAD H*, pp. 106-113. Moreover, dikâtum seems to mean public service, specially compulsory service, however, the evidence is not enough to determine if dikâtum is also a synonym for ilkum. *CAD D*, p.141.

(2) In the Old Babylonian period, ilkum was closely related to the fields. *CAD I/J*, pp. 73-81.


(4) Šamaš-ḫâzîr was designated as a scribe of the field (ṭupšar eqlîm) (TCL 11 154), registrar (šassukkûm) (AbB 13 43) and a supervisor of the office (šâpiṭ bitîm) (VAS 18 96).


(9) See Chart 1 The Conditions of Ilkum.

(10) I suppose that redûm and bâ’îrum mentioned in the Code of Hammurapi (CH 26-41) were considered regular and not compulsory soldiers, since their granted fields were inheritable and tenured for life as long as they performed ilkum (CH 28; 29).

(11) The term šâbum refers people in general so that redûm are also šâbum but not all šâbum are redûm. *CAD S*, pp. 46-55.

(12) There has been much discussion concerning the social status of the awîlûm, muškênum, and wardûm in the Old Babylonian society. The debate of this matter is summarized and reviewed by F. R. Kraus. I do not go into any detail on this subject here, although I tend to favor Kraus' view that awîlûm included muškênum and vice-versa, unless muškênum is designated as an inferior class in contrast to awîlûm, such as in some sections of Code of Hammurapi (CH 139-140; 196-223), because this study of the ilkum institution also proves that the conditions of ilkum seems to have been officially applied indiscriminately to all inhabitants except for slaves and foreigners and that the integration between public and private workers was remarkably high. F. R. Kraus, *Vom Mesopotamischen Menschen der altbabylonischen Zeit und seiner Welt*. Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde 36/6 (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1973), 92-125.


(14) Opis (yu-pi-iXû) was located near the mouth of the Diyala river. B. Groneberg, *Répertoire Géographique des Textes Cunéiformes*, vol. III (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1980), 246.

(15) A released slave was required to perform ilkum and Harrânum like other sons (BIN 2 76), ilkum and dikâtum (TCL 1 194) or ilkum of his father’s estate unless going for redûtûm (CT 6 29).

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In general, under the highly developed state organization, prisoners of war might be utilized as the king’s bodyguard, mercenaries and a movable soldier/work force. I.J. Gelb, “Prisoners of War in Early Mesopotamia,” JNES 32 (1973): 91.

It is evidenced by the fact that a slave bought from a merchant was assigned by the king as a guard (AbB 7 128).

Cf., D. Charpin, ARM 26/2, p.145.

The merchants seem to have received money to hire agricultural labors (AbB 4 23). Cf., the canal contractors, possibly merchants, who were contracted to arrange and complete the canal work with the central administration could bargain and procure labor for their own benefit. S.D. Walters, Water for Larsa: An Old Babylonian Archive Dealing with Irrigation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970), 149-150.

A new regular cook was wrongly recruited as rēdām along with his substitute (AbB 2 1).

According to the conscription list possibly for a military campaign in Larsa in the 31st year of Hammurapi, most of draftees had their substitutes who were their brothers or sons. Bonechi, MARI 7 (1993): 142-158.

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administratives d’époque babylonienne ancienne conservés au Musée d’art et d’histoire de Genève (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1969), 22-35, Nos. 5; 6; 7; 9; 10; 11.

(37) The term bitlum designates the yields of fields in general. Therefore, the bitlum fields could be the bitlum fields of private individuals. In this paper the revenue fields refer particularly to those from the public sector. CAD B, pp. 229-236.

(38) The logogram, A.ŠA ŠUKU, designates “the field of ration (ŠUKU).” F.R. Kraus proposed the Akkadian reading “šukussum” for ŠUKU, instead of “kurummatum.” F.R. Kraus, AbB 4, p.xv.

(39) Field assignments to the public workers were well-documented in the royal letters from Hammurapi to Šamaš-ḫāzir, the chief of the agricultural sector as well as the bureau of field assignments in the provincial administration of Larsa (e.g., AbB 4, 9).

(40) A paternal field was the field which was owned by a family over generations. It was recognized by the customary laws and was protected by the regulations of the state. The central government attempted to restore the paternal fields which were mistakenly removed by the administration or illegal claims (e.g., AbB 4 16; 40; 81; 106; 115).

(41) The classification of the public fields has been studied by many scholars. For example, M. deJ. Ellis regards sukussu- and šibu-fields as ilkum lands and distinguishes them from bitlum-land. M. deJ. Ellis, Agriculture and the State in Ancient Mesopotamia: An Introduction to Problems of Land Tenure (Philadelphia: Occasional Publications of the Babylonian Fund, 1976), 12-13.

(42) F. R. Kraus proposed the reconstruction, [i-li-ik la-bi-ir-t]im. Kraus, Edikt, p.164.

(43) Ellis, Agriculture, pp. 34-39.

(44) The public workers who worked in Babylon (e.g., AbB 4 31; 41; 103) had to lease their ration fields to the tenant farmers who lived in the province of Larsa unless they came from there and their family were there.

(45) The ration field of a public worker who passed away was given to another public worker (AbB 4 67).

(46) The grantees of ration fields from their own paternal fields were a diviner (AbB 4 43), a messenger (rakbum) (AbB 2 24), captains, a sergeant, and regular soldiers (AbB 4 89; 94), a house-builder (itinnum) (AbB 4 54), a runner and ox-driver (AbB 4 64), a singer (AbB 9 188), various individuals (AbB 4 112; 121; AbB 9 189).

(47) M. deJ. Ellis suggests that this practice took place “more usually.” Ellis, Agriculture, p.20.

(48) A young shepherd (kaparrum), the servant of the palace, claimed the field which was registered in the old tablet of ilkum of his father, a regular soldier (rödûm), as his field of his father, the paternal field (AbB 4 118).

(49) See Chart II The Administration of the Ilkum Institution.

(50) See the royal letters from Hammurapi to Sin-iddinam and Šamaš-ḫāzir (e.g., AbB 2; 3; 9; 11; 13).

(51) The technical support staff was hierarchically structured. The two chief administrators under Šamaš-ḫāzir had the six or the eight surveyors, who were in charge of a team of field surveyors with the eight to twelve accountants (AbB 4 21).

(52) Hammurapi frequently ordered provincial administrators and public workers to take the documents in relation to ilkum to him (e.g., AbB 2 29; 39; AbB 4 22). The king checked the document concerning a šāb tupškûm at the accounting office (AbB 10 13).

(53) E.g., Šamaš-ḫāzir was told to deposit the register and tâmartum-payment list of ilkum which he performed in last three years in Maškan-sâpir after he reported to Hammurapi (AbB 4 22). The old tablet of ilkum was filed in the temple of Nidaba (AbB 4 118).

(55) In most cases, the mercenaries were foreigners or fugitives who did not have a civil duty for military service. R. Harris, “On Foreigners in Old Babylonian Sippar,” RA 70 (1976): 145.


(57) More than 90 soldiers from the central administration were stationed in Ur (AbB 2 36).

(58) A wakil Amurrim was ordered by Hammurapi to remove the guards from the field under litigation (AbB 4 36). Also, the granary was protected by ređum (AbB 2 147).

(59) The ređum were ordered to join canal work (AbB 2 147) and the troops of the country were sent by Hammurapi to reinforce the city wall of Sippar. Frayne, Old Babylonian Period, pp. 333-336.

(60) A large number of construction works were commemorated in the year names and the royal inscriptions. Ungnad, RIA 2 (1938): 178-182. Frayne, Old Babylonian Period, pp. 332-371.

(61) The provincial administration of Larsa cooperated with the elders of the city and community of the irrigation district (mārū ugārim) to conduct the canal works under the direction of the central government (AbB 9 194). The local canal works were usually assigned to the landowners who benefited from the canal (e.g., AbB 2 55; 70; AbB 4 19; AbB 10 179).

(62) The central government organized the boat-making industry in the province of Larsa, by sending specialists from the central government (AbB 2 8), paying wages for hired workers (AbB 2 59) and supplying labor force from the garrison (AbB 2 36) under the supervision of Hammurapi.

(63) Hammurapi directly administered sheep shearing in the province of Larsa (TCL 17 63; AbB 2 25; AbB 4 86). One thousand workers were deployed for shearing by Sin-iddinam under Hammurapi (AbB 2 25).

(64) Cf., the texts from Mari attest to a large scale weaving factory within the palace of Mari manned by groups of workers, men, women and children (ARM 13 1; ARM 21 403).

(65) For example, ſābū tupšikkim worked on the construction of the walls of Dur Sinnuballit (AbB 9 2).

(66) Some specialists, carpenters (naggārum), sailors (malāhūm), and reed makers (atkūppūm), were sent by Hammurapi to Sin-iddinam to make a cargo boat (AbB 2 8).

(67) The corvée workers (ṣāb tupšikkim) under Sin-iddinam, chief administrator of the provincial administration of Larsa, the regional governors (ṣāpir matīm) and a domestic (girseqūm) (AbB 2 27), and 50 corvée workers who were grouped as a work unit of ten men (AbB 13 30), were called to work by Hammurapi (AbB 2 27; AbB 13 30).

(68) CAD § pp.46-55.


(72) M. Birot, Tabletes, pp. 25-33, Nos. 5; 6; 7; 9; 10; 11.

(73) It seems that the merchants of the bureau of commerce received a fixed amount of dates from chief horticulturists. M. Stol, “State and Private Business in the Land of Larsa,” JCS 34
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(76) Cf., the ideal birth rate was 80 lambs per 100 ewes and the public shepherd of Larsa had the right to take any surplus beyond this rate in the Kingdom of Larsa. F.R. Kraus, Staatliche Viehaltung im altbabylonischen Lande Larsa. Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 29, No. 5 (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1966), 18-19 and 24-26.

(77) The wage for a shepherd who tended oxen or small cattle was 8 kur barley per year (CH 261). The chief shepherds (AbB 4 13; AbB 9 195) and shepherds (AbB 4 79; AbB 9 195) received ration fields and/or orchards from Hammurapi.


(81) Stol, JCS (1982): 143-144.

(82) Military officers were ordered to pay arrears on delivered animals by Hammurapi (AbB 1 1).


(84) The merchants pledged an important role in the private economy as traders, brokers, and money lenders according to the regulations of the commercial contracts (CH 99-107) and the loan contracts (CH 49-52). W. F. Leemans, Foreign Trade in the Old Babylonian Period: As Revealed by Texts From Southern Mesopotamia. Studia et Documenta ad Iura Orientis Antiqui Pertinentia 6 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), 36. M. van de Mieroop, Society and Enterprise in Old Babylonian Ur. Berliner Beiträge zum Vorderen Orient Band 12 (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1992), 202-203.


(88) The property of the temple, mainly fields and herds, belonged to the palace and the temple employees were formally employed by the central government (AbB 10 1) because they were obligated to pay revenue/taxes to the central government (AbB 2 29; 39) and were rewarded by the central government like other public workers (AbB 4 27; AbB 9 195).

(89) E.g., Jean, Contrats de Larsa.


The Code of Hammurapi regulates rental and labor conditions of private transactions (e.g., CH 42-48; 59-65; 357; 261; 273; 274). The bureau of silver (bit Kittim) played a role as a "central bank" which had authority to authenticate and store silver. M. Stol, *JCS* 34 (1982): 150-151. The merchants were required to have the tablet of the king for traveling abroad (*AbB* 2 84).

See Chart III Economic Structure of the Ilkum institution.

See Chart II The Administration of the Ilkum Institution.