抄録
In this paper, I consider contemporary analytic/Anglo-American/ontological metaphysics and non-analytic/Continental/theological metaphysics from an Aristotelian point of view.
In the first chapter, I examine E. J. Lowe's ontological conception of metaphysics as “modal knowledge”. According to Lowe, the subject of metaphysics is the possible. The possible is, he insists, the ontological category that is knowable a priori. In the Aristotelian theory of category, however, being knowable a priori is not a concept that is associated with the idea of category.
In the second chapter, I discuss M. Heidegger's idea of a weak divinity as in the Aristotelian theology and H. Jonas' reflection on the use of speculative “mythos” in metaphysics. Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle reveals an important dimension of Aristotle's theology. Likewise, Jonas' view about the metaphysical use of “mythos” agrees with Aristotle's ideas regarding the status of metaphysical or theological statements.
In the third chapter, I consider the problem of the relation between ontology and theology in an Aristotelian conception of metaphysics. I suggest that Aristotle's metaphysics is ontology precisely because of its being theology. On the one hand, most analytic types of metaphysics do not have theology as an essential part; on the other hand, most non-analytic types of metaphysics do not have the same formal ontology that analytic ones have. Neither type of metaphysics is adequate to constitute metaphysics proper. For the future of metaphysics, dialogue between analytic and non-analytic metaphysicians will be essential.
