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行為の因果説と心の非法則性

抄録

The crisis of Davidson's anomalous monism means a turning point for theories of actions because it is supposed to show that we have a strong incompatibility when we insist both the causal efficacy of mental properties and the anomalism of the mental. Therefore it seems that we can take only one of the following two ways ; (a) a causal theory of actions in view of reduction of rationality to causality or (b) interpretivism of rationalization of actions at the cost of giving up belief/desire action explanations as causal ones.
This paper tries to show that the two elements irreducibly reside in our folk psychology, which have to be treated as a kind of data by philosophy and science of actions. In order to secure a space for both causality and rationality in action explanations, I rebut Nobuhara's comprehensive rationalization thesis as a new brand of radically anti-causalist theory.
On the other hand, the usual causalist strategy to appeal to supervenience (following Kim), which aims to endow mental properties with the causal power, is hopeless because, as Baker pointed out, the supervenience relation is neither sufficient nor necessary to the causal efficacy of the mental. I suggest that we should dismiss the idea of reducing every kinds of explanation to the ultimate physical one and find a proper account of causal explanation as our everyday practice if we want to have a deeper understanding of human actions and action explanations.