倫理学における認知主義とその帰結 パティキュラリストの動機付けの理論

田村 圭一

doi:10.11439/philosophy1952.2004.206

倫理学における認知主義とその帰結

パティキュラリストの動機付けの理論

田村圭一

著者情報

ジャーナルフリー

2004 年 2004 巻 55 号 p. 206-217,30

DOI https://doi.org/10.11439/philosophy1952.2004.206

詳細

発行日: 2004/04/01 受付日: - J-STAGE公開日: 2009/07/23 受理日: - 早期公開日: - 改訂日: -
訂正情報
訂正日: 2009/07/23 訂正理由: - 訂正箇所: 論文抄録訂正内容: Wrong : Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent.
Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.
Right : Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent.
Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.

訂正日: 2009/07/23 訂正理由: - 訂正箇所: 引用文献情報訂正内容: Wrong : Dancy, J., 1991 Intuitionism, in Singer, P., ed., A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers; Wxford UK & Malden, Mass., pp. 411-420.
Dancy, J., 1993, Moral Reasons, Blackwell Publishers; Oxford UK & Malden, Mass..
Dancy, J., 1995, Why There Is Really No Such Things As the Theory of Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95, pp.1-18.
Dancy, J., 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford UP; Oxford UK & New York.
Davidson, D., 1980, Mental Event, in his Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press; Oxford, pp. 207-227.
Little, M., 1994, Recent Work: Moral Realism Philosophical Books, 35, 3, pp. 145-153, Philosophical Books, 35, 4, pp. 225-233.
McDowell, J., 1998, Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Im-peratives?, in his Mind, Value, and Reality, Harvard UP; Cambridge, Mass. & London, pp. 77-94 (originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 52, 1978, pp. 13-29).
McNaughton, D., 1988, Moral Vision; An Introduction to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers; Oxford UK & Cambridge US.
Nagel, T., 1970, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton UP; Prince-ton, New Jersey.
Williams, B., 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Harvard UP; Cambridge, Mass..

Right : Dancy, J., 1991 Intuitionism, in Singer, P., ed., A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers; Wxford UK & Malden, Mass., pp. 411-420.
Dancy, J., 1993, Moral Reasons, Blackwell Publishers; Oxford UK & Malden, Mass..
Dancy, J., 1995, 'Why There Is Really No Such Things As the Theory of Motivation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95, pp.1-18.
Dancy, J., 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford UP; Oxford UK & New York.
Davidson, D., 1980, Mental Event, in his Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press; Oxford, pp. 207-227.
Little, M., 1994, Recent Work: Moral Realism Philosophical Books, 35, 3, pp. 145-153, Philosophical Books, 35, 4, pp. 225-233.
McDowell, J., 1998, Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Im-peratives?, in his Mind, Value, and Reality, Harvard UP; Cambridge, Mass. & London, pp. 77-94 (originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 52, 1978, pp. 13-29).
McNaughton, D., 1988, Moral Vision; An Introduction to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers; Oxford UK & Cambridge US.
Nagel, T., 1970, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton UP; Prince-ton, New Jersey.
Williams, B., 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Harvard UP; Cambridge, Mass..

訂正日: 2009/07/23 訂正理由: - 訂正箇所: PDFファイル訂正内容: -

抄録

Cognitivism in ethics can be divided into two branches. One is naturalism and the other is intuitionism. Intuitionism is cognitivist internalism, that is, the claim that cognitive states, i. e., beliefs, can motivate an agent to action without the assistance of desires. But cognitivist internalism faces two kinds of problems, i. e., weakness of will and accidie. In order to clear cognitivist internalism of these difficulties, we have to revise Humean motivational theory. Humeanism is the claim that beliefs cannot motivate an agent without the assistance of relevant desires. Only desires can motivate in their own right and their motivation is necessary. T. Nagel's cognitiv-ist internalism and J. McDowell's are partially committed to Humeanism, because they tacitly admit that cognitive states should necessarily motivate. J. Dancy tries to revise Humeanism. According to him, cognitive states can motivate in their own right, but their motivation is contingent.
Dancy's cognitivist internalism accepts particularism, which adopts a holistic un-derstanding of the behaviour of moral reasons.Particularists reject the generalist as-sumption that a cognitive state which behaves in a given case in favour of an action should behave similarly in every case. Cognitivist internalists, therefore, can escape their traditional difficulties when they adopt particularism.

責任著者(Corresponding author)

訂正情報

J-STAGEへの登録はこちら（無料）