Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Discrete Choice Model and Innovator's dilemma under the Consumers' Preference Uncertainty

Abstract

This paper investigates the equilibrium investment policies of two different firms under consumers’ preference uncertainty. The incumbent firm, which owns a superior old technology, produces merchandise that can satisfy current consumers at the beginning of the investment game. The startup firm, which possesses an inferior old technology, does not capture the consumers satisfaction but it has a possibility to cultivate a new technology that can attract the consumers in the future if the customers’ preference is changed. We consider two types of equilibria in our valuation model. The first one is a price equilibrium at each time derived from the Bertrand competition. To represent customers’ diversity and products differentiation we use a discrete choice model. The other one is a Markov perfect equilibrium where each firm can invest either in the old technology or in the new technology depending on customers’ preference, which is modeled as a Markov process.