ゲーム理論的リアルオプションアプローチによる中小企業と大企業の特許権取得競争分析

抄録

When a company invests in a R&D project and tries to acquire patents under uncertainty, it is important for the company to have many real options to respond flexibly. However, when the other company entered into the same R&D project early with preemption, the company might not earn enough profit. Under such competition, it is critical to determine the timing in starting the investment. This paper analyzes the optimal investment strategy for two asymmetric firms in getting a patent in the presence of uncertainty and competition. Based on trade-off between a small and a big companies' success rates of getting a patent and initial investment costs, we consider a competitive situation where two asymmetric firms might face. The numerical result shows that a small company can be competitive with a big company by reducing its initial investment cost and that this model can describe a small company's market positionings in the real world.