リアルオプション研究
Online ISSN : 1884-1635
Print ISSN : 1881-5774
応用研究
医療保険加入者に健康改善への行動変容を促すウェルネス・プログラムの最適インセンティブ設計
海野 大シュウ ファ
著者情報
ジャーナル フリー

9 巻 (2017) p. 1-22

詳細
PDFをダウンロード (846K) 発行機関連絡先
抄録

In recent years, a number of health insurers have introduced a reward gain type of wellness programs that can reduce the medical costs by encouraging the behavior change of health insurance subscribers to improve health. In the programs, insurers have to determine a reward strategy in order to strive the insurance subscribers. In this paper, we study the insurer's incentive designing problem of wellness programs. We formulate the insurer's incentive designing problem as a dynamic principal-agent problem. We derive the sufficient conditions for the existences of the optimal reward strategy, the optimal health-support service strategy, and the incentive compatible effort recommended to the insurance subscribers. We also discuss the effects of the insurer's risk-sensitivity on the optimal strategies. We use a numerical example to show the computation aspects of the problem.

著者関連情報
© 2016 日本リアルオプション学会
次の記事

閲覧履歴
feedback
Top