The Washington Conference and the Far Eastern Questions, 1921-1922

Abstract

Many scholars in the United States and Japan have related the East Asian international politics of the 1920's to a concept called "the Washington System." In short, they regard this system as an international order depending on cooperative diplomacy between America, Japan, and Britain; while China was subordinate under the system, and Soviet was excluded from the system. Needless to say, they assume the starting point of the system to be the Washinston Conference held from 1921 to 1922. Though there are a wealth of studies on the Washington Conference, some questions still need to be addressed. First of all, to what extent was the consensus among the three powers established, which should have been the base for the cooperative diplomacy ? In particular, did the American government accept Japanese "special interests" in Manchuria ? Or did America's East Asian policy compel Japan to change her "sphere-of-influence diplomacy"? Secondly, what, if any, transitions took place in America's East Asian policies during the period of the Washington Conference ? Relatively few works have examined the Harding administration's East Asian policies from within the administration and their relation to those of the former Wilson administration. It is not widely known that there were serious disparities between American policy makers on the framework of East Asian policies during the conference itself. Specifically, the role of John Van Antwerp MacMurray, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, has not been evaluated sufficiently. Thirdly, if the Chinese position was subordinate in the Washington System, why the Chinese government accepted such a position must be analyzed. However, again, there have not been many works which fully utilized Chinese diplomatic documents. The fourth question addresses foreign policies towards Soviet. Considering the fact that Soviet was not invited to attend the conference and U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations were not established until 1933, one can conclude that Soviet was excluded from the Washington System. The question, therefore, is why the powers could not agree about their foreign policy towards Soviet, though they deliberated on an agenda which could have laid the foundations for diplomacy towards Soviet. In order to answer these questions, after surveying the conflict between America, Japan, and China before the conference, the author attempts to approach the reality of the "agreement" reached at the conference between the three powers, focusing on "the Hughes amendment proposal," which followed the Root Principals. Next, the role of MacMurray in the negotiations of the Shantung question is discussed, comparing the lines of the Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and Elihu Root, plenipotentiary of the American government. Further, U.S.-Japanese-Chinese negotia Lions on the Chinese Eastern Railway, which ltad a significant influence on their respective foreign policies towards Soviet, and the failure of these negotiations are scrutinized. In addition, it is one of the objectives here to analyze Chinese activities during the conference, using Chinese diplomatic documents which are almost completely available now.