Rethinking Cultivation Theory

Abstract

Research on the cognitive influence of television has often been guided by cultivation theory proposed by Gerbner and his associates. Cultivation theory posits that the more time people spend watching television, the more likely their conceptions of social reality will reflect what is seen on television. Furthermore, the theory contends that heavy consumption of television contributes to a homogeneous view of the social reality. Thus far, several researchers have questioned or challenged Gerbner et al.'s conceptual assumptions, methodologies, and findings. The purpose of this article is to evaluate whether cultivation theory can with-stand those criticisms, and to provide some ideas so as to refine the theory. Before discussing the criticisms of cultivation theory, this article explains the basic concepts of the theory. They are the world of television and viewer's conceptions of social reality. The former refers to the most general system of messages and images on TV as revealed by content analysis. The latter means viewer's perceptions, beliefs, or attitudes about the real world. It should be noted that Gerbner et al. assume that people watch television in a relatively non-selective fashion. It is also important to make a distinction between what is called first-order and second-order cultivation when we examine the relationship between TV viewing and conceptions of social reality. First-order cultivation means perceptions of the frequency or probabilities of events, and second-order cultivation refers to beliefs that do not have any quantifiable referent in television content but that one can extrapolate from the television world. In my view, the criticisms of cultivation theory can be divided into two types: (1) those which question the basic framework or formulation of the theory and (2) those which suggest some modifications of the theoretical framework. This article addresses the issues of causation and audience interpretations among the first type of criticism. As examples of the second type of criticism, this article deals with three factors: non-selective viewing, contingent conditions and the psychological mechanism of cultivation. First, some opponents of the theory criticize that Gerbner et al. have failed to determine in what direction the relationship lies and suggest the possibility of reverse causation. This article points out that although Gerbner and his associates acknowledge that both of the causal relationships are possible, they put much more emphasis on the direction of television's contribution on viewer's conceptions of social reality. Second, other critics maintain that the theory does not take into consideration any assessment of the nature of viewers' perceptions and interpretations of program content, which might mediate television influence. They claim that cultivation theory overlooks the perspective of the active viewer, and thus in the cultivation framework, viewers are given the only passive role in receiving the mass-mediated messages. These opponents contend that meanings of the television messages are not fixed but polysemic. They argue that the reason most cultivation studies have found only low correlations between TV viewing and social reality beliefs is that those studies test only one interpretation derived from content analysis. Based on this perspective, the author points out that diverse viewers' interpretations of the "message system" on TV might be possible concerning second-order cultivation. Third, one of the basic assumptions of the theory, non-selective viewing, is critically examined. Several researchers are opposed to this assumption. Some studies found that program selectivity was linked more strongly than overall TV viewing to cultivation effects. Therefore it can be argued that using the amount of overall viewing is not the most appropriate way of explaining cultivation

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