パーソンズの行為理論における諸問題

秩序問題は社会学の根本問題か

抄録

　The problem of order has been conceived of as a fundamental problem in sociology since Parsons posed it in his The Structure of Social Action. Parsons' "solution" to it, however, has been criticized by many theorists such as ethnomethodologists and Giddens, who emphasize the acvtive doings of subjects.But it seems that this kind of critique of Parsons is an "external" one, not an internal one. So this paper aims to criticize Parsons' solution to the order problem in an internalway.
　What I try to show here are as follows: first, that since Parsons doesn't put on a main theme the common or ultimate value as the emergent property in a system of action, he virtually commits petitio principii; second, that his core idea that the internalization of values is the prerequisite to stabilize interaction suffers from the "paradox of mutual knowledge" and thus it cannot be theoretically upholded; consequently, that any theory in which it is the agreement among constituents of society that is regarded as the ultimate ground for social order is destined to break down.