Scan-Based Side-Channel Attack on the Camellia Block Cipher Using Scan Signatures

Abstract

Camellia is a block cipher jointly developed by Mitsubishi and NTT of Japan. It is designed suitable for both software and hardware implementations. One of the design-for-test techniques using scan chains is called scan-path test, in which testers can observe and control the registers inside the LSI chip directly in order to check if the LSI chip correctly operates or not. Recently, a scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information from the cryptosystem using scan chains. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method on the Camellia cipher using scan signatures. Our proposed method is based on the equivalent transformation of the Camellia algorithm and the possible key candidate reduction in order to retrieve the secret key. Experimental results show that our proposed method sucessfully retrieved its 128-bit secret key using 960 plaintexts even if the scan chain includes the Camellia cipher and other circuits and also sucessfully retrieves its secret key on the SASEBO-GII board, which is a side-channel attack standard evaluation board.