The Innovator's Dilemma (Christensen, 1997) has been cited in many studies since Christensen published it in 1997. Some of these studies have advocated that concepts such as “dynamic capability,” “ambidexterity,” and “market orientation” can be used to overcome the environmental changes caused by the innovator's dilemma. However, these studies are categorized into two general types that are not logical refutations: (a) those which merely suggest the concept without suggesting an opposing example, and (b) those which do not demonstrate that a trajectory disruption has occurred even when suggesting an example. We must demonstrate that a trajectory disruption has occurred and then suggest a case in which the environmental changes were mitigated to suggest an example of overcoming the innovator's dilemma. However, arguments exist that doubt Christensen's concept of trajectory disruption, indicating that the arguments are not facile.
The Berry model, well known in cross-cultural psychology, categorizes acculturation patterns into four types based on yes–no questions regarding the retention of traditional culture and the relationship with the larger society. Business administration and various other research fields have attempted to use the model due to its simple clarity. However, doubts exist regarding (i) the feasibility of deculturation (marginalization); (ii) the validity of a label “integration,” and (iii) the mutual independence of the four cells. In fact, these doubts stem from the process of formulation of the Berry model. Berry originally categorized 24 question items used in the surveys of individuals belonging to minority populations according to the three labels of assimilation, integration, and rejection. Moreover, Berry used yes–no questions to summarize the characteristics of these labels and added a fourth label, that is, deculturation (marginalization). This format became the prototype for the Berry model.
Takahashi (2004) advocates the Japanese-style seniority-based system, particularly the idea of “new work in reward for work,” which is termed as the Work–Work Theory. This paper highlights the characteristics of the Work–Work Theory system in comparison with the idea of “pay in reward for work,” which is termed as the Work–Pay Theory. According to the Work–Work Theory system (i) differentiation of work accelerates differences in promotions and pay; (ii) as workers are dissatisfied with their current work situations, they may want to change their work situations by coming up with new and better ways of doing things, that is, challenging the status quo; (iii) supervisors select the right personnel for a job; (iv) implement regular changes in personnel to reward workers with their new work; (v) working together enables the company to grow; and (vi) under the Work–Work Theory, work assignments that gradually become more challenging provide intrinsic motivation, which becomes exciting (waku-waku in Japanese). If it is not exciting, it cannot be called intrinsic motivation. Thus, the Work–Work Theory drastically changes the motivational approaches derived from the self-determination theory to the honest practice of intrinsic motivation.
The technical term “organizational routine” has been broadly used in management and organizational science. The study by Nelson and Winter (1982) is considered to be the origin of this terminology. However, Nelson and Winter (1982) were not management scientists, but they were evolutionary economists. Researchers in both evolutionary economics and management science used organizational routine as a unit of analysis, but three major conceptual differences exist with the definition of organizational routine used in management science. For example, Nelson and Winter (1982) explain that (a) each company has an organizational routine; (b) organizational routines change through natural selection after random mutation; and (c) the organizational routines of one organization can be easily transplanted to other organizations. However, observation of actual firms from management science perspective reveals that (a) each company has many organizational routines that combine in a mosaic-like fashion; (b) the creation, imitation, and selection of organizational routines are intentional; and (c) transplanting an organizational routine is difficult due to needs for coordination. These points are clear from a review of the literature on these topics called as “routine dynamics.” In recent years, scholars have regarded routine dynamics as a new framework for the theory of organizational routine. However, routine dynamics tends to focus less on the need for the coordination mentioned in (c). This study employs a case study of the failure of Company A—an automaker—to implement Toyota's production methods and to indicate that future analysis for changes in organizational routines must be considered from the perspective of coordination.