This paper estimates the 1960 real present discounted values of postwar Japan’s total real resource transfers to the East and Southeast Asian victims of its colonial and imperial aggression by summing up the values of the assets left behind, formal reparations, what is called quasi-reparations (economic assistance provided in the spirt of reparations), and the grant portion of the official development assistance provided through 2000. Applying the social discount rate of 5 percent and the grant element of 25 percent uniformly, converting local currency values into U.S. dollars by market exchange rates, and using the U.S. consumer price index to deflate nominal dollar values, the paper finds that Japan’s real resource transfers, measured in 1960 U.S. dollars, amounted to 151-334 percent of Japan’s 1960 U.S. dollar GNP. Moreover, 95-98 percent of the transfers took place through the confiscation of the assets Japanese nationals had left behind. The large share of the confiscated assets reflects not only their sheer volume (reflecting years of investment by Japan) but also the fact that the confiscation took place immediately after the conclusion of the war (hence their 1960 present “discounted” value roughly doubled) whereas the reparation and other payments, made over many future years, were heavily discounted at 5 percent.

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Taiwan’s direct investment in Japan can be divided into five periods: (1) the embryonic stage in the 1980s, (2) the period of gradual expansion in the 1990s, (3) the period of stagnation in the 2000s, (4) the period of expansion in the 2010s, and (5) the period of rapid growth in the 2020s. In terms of the industrial structure of Taiwan’s direct investment in Japan, investment in the 1980s was centered on trading businesses and light industries, while investment in IT-related industries expanded in the 1990s. In the 2000s, as Taiwanese firms shifted their outward direct investment toward Mainland China, both the amount of direct investment in Japan and the share of manufacturing investment declined. However, in the 2010s, investment in manufacturing sectors aimed at technological collaboration and related purposes increased. In the 2020s, against the backdrop of intensifying tensions in U.S.–China and Mainland–Taiwan relations as well as the restructuring of supply chains, the share of investment in the electronic components manufacturing industry, particularly in advanced semiconductors, has risen rapidly. Regarding regional distribution, Taiwan’s direct investment in Japan was concentrated in the two major metropolitan areas of Tokyo and Osaka in the 1980s and 1990s, while investment became increasingly concentrated in the Tokyo metropolitan area in the 2000s. Since the 2010s, however, investment has expanded to the three major metropolitan areas as well as cities with significant research and development functions, and in the 2020s the Kyushu region has become one of the most important investment destinations. Looking ahead, Taiwan’s direct investment in Japan is likely to remain on an upward trend over the medium to long term, despite short-term fluctuations. In terms of industrial structure, investment is expected to become increasingly concentrated in AI-related industries, including the electronic components manufacturing industry. In terms of regional distribution, the importance of the Kyushu region is expected to rise further. At the same time, Taiwan’s recent direct investment in Japan has increasingly taken on the character of “economic security-oriented FDI.” Accordingly, the future scale, industrial structure, and regional distribution of such investment are expected to be influenced by a wide range of factors, including developments in U.S.–China and Mainland–Taiwan relations, global semiconductor demand, the Japanese government’s policies for attracting foreign investment, and the investment-receiving environment in each region.

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In recent years, time-saving technologies that reduce the burden of housework, such as dishwashers and robot vacuums, have become increasingly widespread. These technologies may reduce housework time and increase disposable time. At the same time, they may also affect overall household time use through rising cleanliness standards and the reallocation of time to other in-home activities. Moreover, if the time saved is reallocated to market work, such technologies may also influence labor force participation. However, few studies have examined the relationship between the use of time-saving technologies, in-home time, and labor force participation using the same dataset. In particular, empirical evidence on new time-saving technologies such as robot vacuums remains limited. This study uses data from the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS) to examine the effects of robot vacuums use on in-home time and labor force participation. The baseline analysis employs a two-way fixed effects model, and a complementary analysis combining matching with fixed effects models is also conducted as a robustness check. The results show that the use of robot vacuums significantly reduces housework time, while it has no statistically significant effect on sleep time. Heterogeneity analysis further indicates that the reduction in housework time is mainly observed among married women. Furthermore, the results indicate a positive association between robotic vacuum cleaner use and labor force participation among married women. These findings suggest that time-saving technologies may ease married women’s time constraints by reducing the burden of housework and thereby encourage their participation in market work.

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