Oman's political expansion into East Africa began in the middle of the 17th century. After the 19th century when the Omani Sultan established Zanzibar as the capital and also started permanently residing there, migration from Oman to East Africa accelerated. However, as the result of the Zanzibar revolution in 1964, in which many Arabs were killed, the succeeding aggravation of social and economic condition in East Africa, as well as the accession of Sultan Qabus to the throne in 1970 and his call for the return of Omanis abroad, many Omanis in East Africa returned to their homeland, Oman. These African Omanis formed one social category called "Zanjibari (Zanzibari)". This paper, based on my field data arising from interviews, explores the cultural and social aspects of the African Omani network. In chapter II, following a consideration of the historical and social relationship between Oman and East Africa, I examine how the dispersed social network of African Omanis was formed during the process of their departure from the Sharqiya region, migration to East Africa, and return to Oman. Neither connections with family in their homelands, nor the Arab identity were lost, despite the fact that they settled down in East Africa and became Swahilized. I further point out that the network of migration is crisscrossed between Muscat, the Sharqiya region and East Africa, composing of the ties of kinship and tribal relationships. In present-day Muscat, some spheres exist in which we can affirm the strong connection between Oman and East Africa. In chapter III, I examine the influence of African Omanis upon Oman since their return from East Africa from the viewpoints of culture, education and religion. African Omanis speak Swahili and eat Swahili food in Oman. Swahili is the second language spoken next to Arabic and Swahili food is widely accepted in Oman. They enter the Omani workforce as professionals. This is due to the fact that when many Omani immigrants in East Africa returned to Oman during the 1970s, higher education had not spread in Oman. Therefore, it was the educated African Omanis who contributed to Oman's nation-building, which suffered from serious shortages of manpower. African Omanis who could not find satisfactory education or jobs in Oman went abroad and expanded their networks. Lastly, as regards religion, some African Omanis provide financial assistance to develop Ibadi Islamic foundation in Zanzibar. Omani immigrants established communities in Africa, but their society disintegrated due to Zanzibar revolution, which was caused by historical contact with Britain. Omani immigrants moved to and within Africa and finally returned to Oman relying by kinship relations. The network based on kinship always reliably facilitated their migration. The networks which African Omanis built up brought Swahili culture to Oman and African Omanis now live in conjunction with both Omani Arab and Swahili cultures in Oman.

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本稿の目的は、アッバース朝カリフ・マームーンの治世末期に起こった下エジプトのバシュムール地方の反乱に焦点を当てて、アッバース朝支配下のエジプトにおけるキリスト教徒社会の情況を検討し、エジプトにおけるイスラーム化の進行とキリスト教社会の衰退の歴史的展開について一考察を行うことにある。エジプトのキリスト教徒(コプト)社会に対するムスリム政権の統制が本格的に強化され始めたのはウマイヤ朝後半のことと考えられる。その後アッバース朝時代にかけて、政府の徴税強化と徴税官の圧迫に抵抗するコプト反乱が繰り返し記録に現れるようになる。その最後で最大の武力蜂起といわれるのがバシュムール反乱である。第1章では、バシュムール反乱に至る抗租運動の軌跡を辿り、ムスリム支配の強化に伴う抗租運動におけるコプトとアラブ・ムスリムの関係を分析した。第2章ではバシュムール反乱の原因とその経緯、反乱後の状況を史料に基づいて再現し、第3章においてこの時代のコプト社会の状況に関して、コプト社会内部の情況に注目して考察を行った。結論として、この時代に表面化してくるコプト教会と一般信徒との間の軋轢や利害の不一致が、コプト社会の変化と衰退を考察するに際して非常に重要な要因となっていることを検証した。コプト社会の内部変化という観点から、バシュムール反乱はエジプトのイスラーム化において1つの重要な転機であったいうことができると考えられる。

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The purpose of this article is to describe the process of a series of lawsuits in Qajar Tehran, and to examine the legal procedure and customs of Qajar shari'a courts. Though the role of 'ulama and their relation with the state is one of the major issues in Qajar studies, studies on their activity in shari'a courts had been neglected until quite recently, since there are very few so-called "shari'a court registers" (sicillat in Ottoman context) from Qajar Iran. Also, other documentary sources are scattered, and difficult to access to them. The recent study made by Ch. Werner solved this situation. Basing on the analysis of private deeds, he indicates that what can be called the shari'a court in Qajar Iran was a kind of notary's office operated by individual 'ulama. There was no central court at all, and 'ulama accomplished their duty without any appointment to offices or ranks by the state. However, a question still remains how 'ulama played the role of judge who decided on legal cases and how was their relation with the state, which was said to have the other court of justice, "'orf court." In this article I take one legal case and analyzing the legal procedure seen in its course The case was concerned with so-called "doubled waqf". The file, which I found in the archive of Vaqf Organization in Tehran, contained two waqf deeds and fifty two other documents. They show that a village located in the west suburb of Tehran, was endowed as waqf twice by different persons for different purposes. Since waqfs must be perpetual in theory, this situation was quite exceptional and caused conflicts between two parties. Each party tried to establish its right on waqf property, and petitioned to the state and sued at court of 'ulama. The 'ulama issued hokms, and the state coped with them. The actions of the two parties and reactions of the 'ulama and the state to them are examined. The case shows that the function of shari'a court as the court of justice was very similar with that court as the notary office. It legally confirmed and documented the right of individuals by issuing hokms. Plaintiff brought the hokms to the state and petitioned to execute the hokms. There was no central court, and 'ulama issued hokms individually without any official ranks. Major element which had influence on the 'ulama's decisions is hokms issued by high ranking 'ulamas in 'Atabat. Here we can see the formation of the new religious and judicial institution: marja'-e taqlid.

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This article explores how the secularist regime in Turkey has undergone significant changes in terms of strategy of national integration and policies related to Islam since the 1980 coup. Under the new conditions of post-Cold War geopolitics, the Ozal government pursued multi-regional foreign policy which intensified political and economic relations, for example, with the Middle East and Central Asia by appealing to the Turko and/or Islamic ties, on the one hand, and political and economic liberalization policies, which provided Islamists with wider space for activities in political and economic spheres, on the other. Secularist forces including the military could not help following the Qzal's policy. For the secularists, stressing the image of a pro-western, moderate Muslim country which functions as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world seems the most feasible option for Turkey to remain a geopolitically important a country for the West. Concomitant with these new developments in the internal and external politics, Turkey in the beginning of the 1990s had witnessed the leadership of civil politicians and the rise of liberals who criticized the authoritarian characteristics of the secularist regime, which had somewhat undermined the political legitimacy of the secularist regime and the military as its self-appointed guardian.

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