This paper argues on the following two points by focusing on the financial instruments used in contemporary Islamic finance. First, I attempt to evaluate the practice of Islamic financial institutions with respect to various related theories and clarify that such an evaluation is based on their reality. Second, from such a realistic view of Islamic financial institutions, I attempt to clarify the theoretical characteristic of contemporary Islamic finance. Contemporary Islamic finance suspends the removal of riba(interest) that is prohibited by Islam. This financial system is based on the factors that lead to the reconstruction of the pre-modern financial instruments in the Islamic world. Further, it conducts theoretical innovations as per contemporary demands. Since the 1970s, the practice of contemporary Islamic finance has proliferated as an Islamic financial institution, and presently, its operation continues to extend both qualitatively and quantitatively. With the rapid growth of contemporary Islamic finance, many arguments have been made in both theory and practice, particularly on murabahah contract. On the one hand, this contract plays a big role in many Islamic financial institutions, and on the other, it is indicated that the process involved in murabahah contract resembles that involved in an interest-based loan contract, which is in conflict with the concept of ribd. To address this problem, theoretical opinions are given from two different schools: these two schools are distinguished by a difference of an opinion with regard to the implications of concept of riba in the modern context. In this paper, I attempt to evaluate the practice of Islamic financial institutions with respect to these schools by focusing on the argument regarding murabahah contract. My brief conclusion on this issue is as follows: Islamic financial institutions are placed in a "saddle point" that balances the legitimacy of Islamic law with economic rationality, while taking account of various theoretical arguments and criticism. In such a case, the practice of murabahah contract in Islamic financial institutions is concretely embodied in Islamicity and impacts conventional financial systems in a way that makes them compatible with economic rationality while intentionally aiming at success in practicing contemporary Islamic finance. With regard to my second argument, I also focus on murabahah contract in particular because of the necessity of a theoretical construction based on practice. Then, with regard to the research of the theoretical characteristic of contemporary Islamic finance, I extend my consideration to enable the clarification of the theoretical characteristic of murabahah contract; not only can this clarify the difference between murabahah contract and interestbased loan but also a commonality with other financial instruments in Islamic financial institutions, for instance, mudarabah contract and musharakah contract. From this viewpoint, I conclude that the theoretical characteristic of contemporary Islamic finance is the direct relations between finance and the real(market) economy. This characteristic can effectively clarify the difference between interest-based loans and murabahah contract. Furthermore, it is clarified that this characteristic is considerably more convincing than that in conventional studies.

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At the beginning of the 19th century, corsairs of the regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli of the Ottoman Empire, also called the "Barbary corsairs," were terminated by the military and diplomatic pressure of Western countries. The Barbary corsairs were abolished partly because modern Europe had an inclination to consider Barbary corsairs inadmissible and illegal on the grounds of doctrines such as humanitarianism, free trade, and prohibition of private war. Until the 18th century, European countries signed peace treaties with the regencies in exchange for the payment of tribute. In other words, they passively admitted the existence of Barbary corsairs in order to ensure the safety of domestic vessels. Britain and France had also condoned activities of Barbary corsairs for the exclusion of other European states from the Mediterranean trade. However, such coexistence collapsed dramatically at the beginning of the 19th century. The United States and subsequently Britain commenced military actions against the regencies in 1815 after the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812 between these two countries ended. They absolutely denied the system of Barbary corsairs on the grounds of humanitarianism, free trade, and prohibition of private war. This entailed the release of European and American slaves and the refusal of the tribute system. European powers discussed a project for a league against the regencies in the Congress of London and decided on the abolition of Barbary corsairs in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. In 1819, an English-French combined fleet informed the regencies of the resolution of the European powers and demanded the abolition of the corsairs. Algiers and Tunis refused the European demand, asserting that they maintained friendly relations with European powers, the treaties with European powers were strictly observed, and the abandonment of corsairs signified the one-sided renunciation of war against European countries. Although this negotiation did not result in an explicit conclusion, Barbary corsairs were thereafter strongly restricted under the European military and diplomatic pressure. Finally, in 1830, the French invasion of Algiers and the conclusion of a treaty between Tunis and France put an end to Barbary corsairs. The abolition of Barbary corsairs is an example of the beginning of the international system based on the values of modern Europe. Although realized by means of military force, also called gunboat diplomacy, the doctrine of modern Europe such as humanitarianism, free trade, and prohibition of private war, became a universal norm in the area of international relations. The end of Barbary corsairs was a process in which European powers tried to abolish them on the basis of a dualistic view of good and evil. Certainly, the system of modern Europe is "good" and that of Barbary corsairs is "evil." At the beginning of the 19th century, European powers adopted a dualistic view and endeavored to eradicate the evil and to extend the good in the practice of international relations. Consequently, Barbary corsairs were abolished and the international system was westernized. In addition, the European dualistic view became universal as the international system was based on the values of modern Europe, or westernized. In conclusion, the modern European dualistic view of good and evil and the Westernization of the international system were closely related because the former morally urges the latter and the latter establishes the universality of the former.

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本稿では、「テロterror」と「ジハードjihad」という2つの言葉がいかに誤った用いられ方をしているかを示し、そこでのレトリックが、異なる立場の人々の間の意思疎通の形成を阻害している事実を明らかにする。ここでの「レトリック」の意味は、主に政治的な目的に資するために、言葉を恣意的に用いることをいう。そもそも「権力」は、言葉の使い方を規程することを通じて、その力を行使する。そのゆえ、ここでは、言葉の使い方に現れるこの現象を、哲学的な観点から考察する。戦争に対するコーランの考え方については、倫理的な観点から考察する。コーランからえられるいくつかの重要な原則を提示する。また、同じく、個人的利益、誤解、伝統の影響、政治的な必要性などが、コーランを誤解させ、誤った解釈に導く原因となってきたこと、また、ハディースやファタワーによって覆されてきたことを示す。加えて、世界平和のために哲学が果たすべき役割についても、言及する。

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Turkey's relations with the European Union(EU) ever since its early application for associate membership of the European Economic Community in 1959, resembles a roller coaster ride especially when one focuses on the mass electoral support for membership on both sides of the relationship over the last few years. This relationship has long been shaped around elite rather than mass concerns. However, in the years leading to the start of the EU's negotiations with Turkey for eventual membership, mutual concern of mass support for the ultimate realization of this project came to dominate public agendas on both sides. On the European side, it soon became evident that there simply was not much of popular support for Turkey's definitive membership. On the Turkish side, once comfortable majorities in support of membership were slowly transformed into solid opposition and scepticism concerning the very basis of the European ideals. While the development of public opinion in the EU concerning the Turkish membership may not be of much practical consequence in the short run, the daily tracing of the Turkish public opinion forms the very basis of the legitimacy for the ongoing reforms in the country. As such, an accurate diagnosis of their bases is critical in steering the country in the high seas leading up to membership. Despite the fact that mass support for EU membership forms the legitimacy basis of the reform process in Turkey, critical and in-depth analyses of this support base has not attracted much academic attention. I aim here to give a short overview of the historical development of the public opinion support for EU membership and then give a summary evaluation of the most recent state of affairs by using the results of a recent poll taken in April-May 2006.

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This work aims to reveal the changes in the perception of national minorities by the Turkish state after the European Union Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The main premise of this paper is that Turkey has been undertaking an essential process of democratization ever since she has been given a substantial European perspective. After the Helsinki Summit Turkey has been through a remarkable process in which the way national minorities have been perceived by the state has significantly changed. Their claims are no longer being conceived by the state as a security challenge to the national unity, but rather as a quest for justice and equality.

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In our earlier works on cross-cultural surveys in Hawaii in the 1970s, the late Chikio Hayashi questioned the validity of the standard translation procedure used in public opinion surveys while we were doing a sampling of Japanese Americans in Hawaii. He used English, Japanese and marbles to demonstrate his point, that led to our work on English and Japanese language surveys as represented in an earlier article [Kuroda, Hayashi and Suzuki 19861. We found that the use of a middle response category presents a serious problem in the validity and reliability of cross-cultural surveys. Subjects, regardless of nationality, in this case be they Americans or Japanese, who were asked questions in Japanese are nearly twice as likely to select the middle response category from a selection of possible answers than when they were asked the same question in English. Kuroda proposed to test the same hypothesis by including Arabic, since the English alphabet is derived from the written Syropalestinian alphabet, which is most closely related to Arabic today [Albright 19561. We reported the results of our pilot study that included Arabic [Kuroda and Suzuki 19891, showing that Arabic speakers are even less likely to choose the middle response category in relation to English speakers. Our findings coincide with those who claim the word "Arab" is derived from a word meaning speak clearly so as for their compatriots to understand exactly what they are addressing through the use of explicit meanings in communication. This is diametrically opposed to the typical Japanese way of communication, which tends to be indirect and which frequently relies upon the use of implied meanings and non-verbal behavior in the process of communication - ishin denshin [以心伝心] or "telepathy". Is there any other aspect of the basic characteristics of Arab culture as represented by its language that we can learn? We reexamined our cross-language data to present our findings in this report. Our focus is on main component of Arab culture. What characterizes the Arab mind? Such authors as Raphael Patai[1976] have attempted to answer this question in the past, largely by observation and generalizations. The objective of this study is to characterize major components of Arab culture by looking into the deep attitudinal structure of Arabs through the use of cross-language survey data in Arabic and English.

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