Modernization of medicine and sanitation in Japanese society began in the colonial era. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan became an imperialist power and acquired colonies in the surrounding Asian countries. In these colonies, Japan implemented medical and sanitation policies tailored to the local circumstances of medicine, sanitation, and society, and in so doing, introduced modern knowledge of medicine and sanitation to these regions. The Mongolian autonomy movement began in the western region of Inner Mongolia in the early 1930s. At almost the same time, Japan sent clinical teams from Zenrin Kyōkai, a semi-official Japanese organization, to the area to provide medical assistance and educational opportunities to the Mongols. Meanwhile, the Mongols in this region, influenced by modernization and modern thought forced upon them by Japanese colonialist forces, tried to spread modern medicine and sanitation by themselves with the aid of exotic scientific knowledge. By examining the social circumstances at the time as well as the development of modern medical and sanitation enterprises in Japanese colonies, this paper will clarify the process whereby medicine and sanitation were modernized in the western region of Inner Mongolia through the consideration of medical and sanitation policies implemented by the Mō-Kyō Government, the development of health and sanitation projects by the government’s Kōmō Committee, and the experiences of the Chyū-ō Medical School established by the government.

Oversized coalitions are not unusual in Brazil, but little attention has been given to explaining the causal mechanisms of this government pattern in the context of Latin American politics. Case studies of Brazilian coalitional presidentialism often lack an integrative perspective with coalition research based on European parliamentary democracies. In contrast, theoretically informed studies of Latin American countries add limited value to causal complexity and contextual mechanisms of oversized coalitions. This paper aims to fill this research gap by combining cross-case and within-case analyses. First, our statistical analysis shows that an established model, which consists of bicameral and multiparty systems, is difficult to apply to 18 Latin American countries. However, in parallel with the presidential power effect, we cannot reject an interactional effect of the bicameral multi-party systems on oversized coalitions. Second, the causal mechanism is assessed by a process tracing of Brazilian coalition politics using cases from Fernando Collor de Mello to Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva. From the results of these case studies, a causal mechanism of the bicameral multi-party systems cannot be rejected, although it should be noted that a contextual mechanism for oversized coalitions existed in the Brazilian presidential regime. Specifically, a rationale for broader consensus under the bicameral multi-party system worked with the portfolio allocation strategies of Brazilian presidents.