This study analyzes the first amendment to the Iranian Constitution (1925) and the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925–1979), focusing on the legal arguments and their political background. This not only was the first amendment in the constitutional history of Iran but also established conventions regarding the amendment procedures for the Constitution of 1906-07, which had no such provisions at the time of its establishment. An analysis of parliamentary and other contemporary sources reveals that Reza Khan and his aides, including Ali Davar, followed precedents set during the Constitutional Revolution when they undertook the first constitutional amendment to enthrone Reza Khan as the first Shah of the Pahlavi Dynasty. Based on this strategy, they succeeded in weakening the legitimacy of their opponents, who had gathered together under the slogan of protecting the Constitution, thereby facilitating the suppression of opposition against Reza Khan. However, the complicated procedures developed through the first constitutional amendment process made it more difficult to further amend the Constitution. This contributed to the creation of a huge discrepancy between the royal authorities ordained by the Constitution and the actual political power of the Shah.

In a growing number of authoritarian regimes, power is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of individual leaders. This trend toward the personalization of power is often linked to increased societal repression and the escalation of international conflicts, raising concerns both domestically and internationally. However, the manifestations of such personalization are remarkably diverse, and this has led to extensive debates regarding its interpretation and explanation. This paper examines recent research in comparative politics, focusing on the conceptualization and measurement of personalization of power, as well as the conditions and mechanisms under which it occurs. Furthermore, this paper evaluates the validity and applicability of these insights by focusing on the Xi Jinping administration in China, where the rapid concentration of power in the leader has attracted considerable attention. Through this analysis, the paper makes the following arguments: (1) that efforts have been made to conceptualize personalist dictatorships as a pervasive feature of authoritarian politics and to quantify their dynamics; (2) that personalization of power arises under specific institutional or contextual conditions that determine the structure and nature of power-sharing arrangements among elites; and (3) that the emergence of a personalist dictatorship in China reflects a complex interplay among institutional, structural, and situational factors.