Since the 1990s, armed conflicts have frequently erupted across African countries. Resolving these conflicts politically requires signing and implementing a peace agreement. However, peace agreements are often violated during the implementation phase, and there are only a few cases in which a conflict has ended with the completion of implementing the agreement. Based on this reality, this paper aims to clarify the reasons why peace agreements are not successfully implemented. Toward this end, it examines the Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991–2002). The paper analyzes the implementation processes of three peace agreements signed during this conflict—of which, the first two failed and the third was successfully implemented—and investigates the conditions for the successful implementation of peace agreements. The paper compares the implementation processes of the three peace agreements, focusing on the organizational changes within the main parties to the conflict, namely, the Sierra Leonean government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). It then analyzes the relationship between the progress of the agreements’ implementation and the internal organizational control within each party. Through this analysis, the paper reveals that one of the critical factors in the implementation of peace agreements is the ability of the leaders who negotiated and signed the agreements to maintain control over their organizations.

Japan is one of the major destinations for international labor migration from developing countries in Asia. This study focuses on the agricultural sector, which is highly dependent on foreign labor, in order to clarify the role of domestic migration intermediary organizations and skill development for foreign workers in Japan, and to draw implications for the design for sustainable migration policies. Analysis of primary data from interviews with domestic migration intermediary organizations, agricultural corporations, and foreign workers, in addition to official statistics and survey data from industry associations of agricultural corporations, reveals the following three points. First, agricultural corporations that employ foreigners tend to be larger in terms of business size and more proactive in establishing rules regarding wages and personnel evaluation. Second, while migration intermediary organizations play a significant role in reducing transaction costs for both employers and foreign workers, some of them have weak monitoring functions for employers. Third, some agricultural corporations emphasize human resource development, which is influenced by the characteristics of traditional employment practices and the immigration policy of Japan. The above suggests that the key to make Japanese agricultural sector a more attractive labor market for foreign workers is to improve the profitability of agriculture and at the same time to make the labor conditions more closely aligned with international standards.

In Iran today, two “public” business associations—the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture and the Iran Traders Chamber—are linked to ordinary private business entities (including corporations and individual business owners) through the issuance of import/export business certificates and business licenses, respectively. There is a structure such that the government controls and supervises these businesses by having business operators organize these associations by themselves, and the business representatives placed in the middle are tasked with adjusting the interests of both parties. In Iran, these business associations ultimately play an important role in helping the government grasp business trends of private sector where cooperation between business entities is weak in major areas of economic activity such as production and distribution and where it has been historically difficult for autonomous business organizations to develop.