In 2020, it was decided by the Japanese government to make court decisions on civil cases available to the general public. When this comes true, over 200,000 court decisions every year will become “open data”. This should be a significant change from the current situation, under which as many as 300,000cases in total, including both civil and criminal cases, are available in commercial databases. It will subject judicial decisions to closer monitoring by the public than now, just as the Supreme Court decision of 1989 that admitted taking notes in the courtroom strengthened the publicʼs monitoring of court decisions. Such monitoring by the public, in turn, shall ultimately strengthen the publicʼs trust in the judiciary. The development of judgment prediction program or other legal tech system, which is one of the motivations to make the civil case decisions open data, will benefit from the larger number of court decisions becoming available. Still, what implications it may have on the existing judicial system, including the style of legal reasoning, needs to be carefully examined.
Recent developments in information processing technology (IT), such as “AI” and “Big Data,” have provided new tools for various fields and affairs. The situation is the same in the legal field: new technologies (or services) which offer tools or solutions for various legal practices ‒ including contract review, dispute resolution, and legal enforcement ‒ continue to emerge year by year. They are called “Legal Tech”.
This paper aims to align enterprises related to “Legal Tech”. For this purpose, this paper will perform two things.
First, this paper reviews this developing technology (or service) “Legal Tech”. Due to the ambiguity of the term “Legal Tech,” the overall review of “Legal Tech” requires (1) to take into account not only its R&D trends but also its market trends, and (2) to elucidate the usage of this term to reduce the equivocation that comes from its buzzword nature.
Second, this paper tries to point out several issues to be considered for the utilization of IT in legal practice to be fruitful. For this purpose, this paper refers to what is already known as the issues that need to be considered when one tries to successfully drive their business along with IT to draw some lessons, and it concludes that the “reengineering” of various processes should be needed to utilize IT in the legal field.
Legal judgment prediction (LJP) is the task of predicting the outcome of a court case based on input facts. Predicting legal judgment makes it possible to help not only legal professionals, but also the general public who are not legal specialists. An LJP system allows everyone to predict and foresee the outcome of litigation when involved in legal disputes. This article provides a simple introduction to artificial intelligence and natural language processing research in the field of LJP, reviews the recent advances in legal judgment prediction and related topics, and discusses the challenges and possible directions to develop a smarter and more trustful LJP system.
This paper examines the content and purpose of two regulations, namely the principle of elimination of concentration of mass media in the Broadcasting Act and the regulation of corporate concentration in the Antimonopoly Act, and then links the two regulations using the concept of general concentration regulation. In doing so, it attempts to expand the traditional concept of “concentration” and find a new conception of concentration that can deal with problems in contemporary economic society, thereby attempting a normative revival of the concept of “concentration” in contemporary economic law.
Am 7. November 2020 ist der neue Medienstaatsvertrag in Deutschland in Kraft getreten. Er
enthält den neuen Rundfunkbegriff. Dabei geht es insbesondere um die Veranstaltung und Verbreitung
von „journalistisch-redaktionell ” gestalteten Angeboten „mittels Telekommunikation ”. Dahinter steht der vom Bundesverfassungsgericht klargestellte Rundfunkbegriff im verfassungsrechtlichen Sinne. Dieser Begriff liegt einer Konzeption der Rundfunkfreiheit als dienenden Freiheit für die individuelle und öffentliche Meinungsbildung zugrunde und umfasst den technologieneutralen, entwicklungsoffenen Verbreitungsweg.
Angesichts der Digitalisierung der Medien und insbesondere der Netz-und Plattformökonomie des Internet zielt der Medienstaatsvertrag auf eine medienübergreifende Sicherung der Meinungsvielfalt. Er regelt nicht nur Rundfunk und Telemedien, sondern auch „digitale Gatekeeper ”, also Medienplattformen, Benutzeroberflächen und Medienintermediäre. Digitale Gatekeeper werden in die regulatorischen Vorgaben im Medienvertrag insofern einbezogen, als sie für journalistisch-redaktionell ” gestaltete Angeboten relevant sind. Sie sind als Rundfunk im verfassungsrechtlichen Sinne zu begreifen.
Im Rechtsrahmen vom Medienstaatsvertrag, der den Schwerpunkt auf die Erfüllung der demokratischen, sozialen und kulturellen Bedürfnisse der Gesellschaft legt, spielt das Merkmal „journalistisch-redaktionell ” eine große Rolle sowohl bei Rundfunk und Telemedien als auch bei digitalen Gatekeeper. Dieses Merkmal beruht auf den journalistischen Grundsätzen, die allerdings den Rechtsrahmen sprengen würden. Der Rundfunkbegriff in Grundgesetz und Medienstaatsvertrag befindet sich auf dieser Schnittstelle. Über eine Art „Schnittstellenmanagement ” hält er Kontakt zu den Entwicklungen des Journalismus und der für ihn geeigneten Technologien, reflektiert und prüft sie auf
ihre Übertragbarkeit auf die Rechtspraxis (vgl. Thomas Vesting, Rechtstheorie, 2.Aufl., 2015, S.11).
Consent fatigue is one of the major problems for privacy protection. Why is consent to provide personal information necessary, then? Instrumentalists regard consent as an instrument to secure the interests of the consenter. The autonomy-based theory rgues respect for autonomy requires consent. This paper aims to show how instrumentalist explanation is justified, whilst the autonomy-based theory is not. Instrumentalism can obtain plausible justifications and guide practice sufficiently based on utilitarianism. On the contrary, the autonomy-based theory cannot propose any guidance for practice because of the problem of the incommensurability of value.
The Conseil dʼEtat, the French Administrative Supreme Court, rendered a decision on the 20th of June 2020 about the legality of the use of automatic thermographic cameras at the entrance of public elementary schools of the City of Lisses, near Versailles. The Conseil dʼEtat ruled that taking body temperatures with an automatic thermographic camera showing the outline of the body and the difference between the normal temperature and the temperature of the person shall be considered as treatment of health data, which can only be authorized by a European or a National law. The Conseil dʼEtat therefore concluded that taking body temperatures with only the consent of the students' parents violates the provisions of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This decision, which strengthens the fact that even measures tendered to the protection of health during the Covid-19 pandemic should not ignore the European requirement for the protection of personal data, is in line with not only other decisions of administrative courts in France which have been protective of freedom even during the pandemic, but also the attitude of the CNIL (French independent administrative authority for data protection) which seeks to protect personal data against uncontrolled use of smart cameras.
This paper examines the moral and legal issues of nudges. First, we review the definition of nudge and argue that it is important to view nudges as a matter of degree. This will also allow us to evaluate non-coercive and messaging kinds of laws in the light of nudging ethics. Next, we discuss the ethics of manipulation with respect to the moral issues of nudging. In order to consider the pros and cons of manipulation, it is necessary to examine conceptions such as liberty, welfare, rationality, autonomy, and legitimacy. In particular, transparency is important in nudging ethics, and we will investigate a contextualist approach that specifically identifies what aspects of nudges should be transparent.
The discussions made in the revision of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information in 2015 revealed the issues that could not be achieved with the amendment, and highlighted that a number of unresolved problems remain in current legislation. One of the issues that could not be achieved is that it was not realized despite being understood that it was necessary to include individual behavioral data recorded with device identifier as the subject of protection under the Act. And the unresolved problem with current legislation is, for example, that the interpretation of the sentence “can be easily matched with other information” in the definition of personal information has not been clarified.
This series of papers attempts to propose a direction to solve the remaining issues for the next revision of the Act. Specifically, by focusing on the difference between “personal information” and “personal data”, by clarifying the difference in interpretation between the sentence “can be easily matched with” and “can be matched with”, we aim to unify only the provision on “personal informat.
The Contract Guidelines on Utilization of AI and Data by METI assume that appropriate negotiations are conducted in advance between the parties concerned regarding the licensing of data, etc. that do not fall under the category of copyrighted works. However, in practice, OSS licenses are often used to distribute training datasets and trained models that are not copyrighted works. It is understood that a license using an OSS license is valid when it is not immediately clear whether the object of the license is a copyrighted work. It is reasonable to interpret “use” in the license terms as equivalent to the “use” under the Copyright Act, even for data that is not a copyrighted work. The issues of commercial and for-profit use and so-called ShareAlike can also be considered on the premise of such an interpretation. It may be necessary to discuss the clause concerning the distribution of data that does not fall under the category of copyrighted works in an international data protection forum.