Originally, Japanese Crop Insurance was established as a mutual relief system. Then after the high economic growth era, in the 1950's and 1960's through the improvements of the scheme, it has been gradually changed to become a pure insurance. But according to this survey, it has become clear that rationality as an insurance is difficult to realize itself in mutual relief business operation at the village level. Since the insurance units are based on a great many scattering small scale plots, Japanese Crop Insurance has been executed by making the most of the rural community for the smooth operation. As a part of agricultural policies, it is also executed as a compulsory system and subsidized for the premium and the administration expense by the government. According to the survey, above-mentioned facts has been causing the differentiation of the roles of the system in each district. That is to say, on the one hand, the damage compensating role is appreciated in the unstable (caused by climatic factors) district, and on the other hand, the damage preventing against pest and disease role is appreciated in the stable district. Consequently farmers in the unstable district positively require the institution as a pure insurance, while farmers in the stable district don't need it so positively. But at the same time, farmers in a stable district tend to recognize mutual relief business as a village common activity since its business is based on the rural community.
Historically, Californians have accomodated to scarce water through a series of strategies that focused on the development and augumentation of new supplies. But this tradition does not seem suitably adapted to meet the intensifing competition for water supplies in future. How to efficiently use existing developed water resources is the most important problem. The key solution for the problem is establishing water markets. However, this situation is apparently not being achieved in California at the present time. To establish orderly water markets, it is necessary to solve the following problems: 1) Legal uncertainties sorrounding the current system of non-quantified water rights. To encourage water rights' holders to quantify their water rights, quantification costs should be decreased. 2) Water pricing policy problems originating in the management of Federal Water Projects and the State Water Projects. (a) Water tolls should be charged on the basis of each contractor's actual water use. (b) Water pricing policies should be improved so that individuals possessing water rights can make profits through water transfers. 3) Problems originating in water districts' water pricing policies. When a district transfers water to outside, the allocation rule forgwater transfer revenues should be clearly defined so that transferors can get rewards depending on how much water they transfer. 4) Lack of institutional arrangements associated with water transfers in dry years. Water institutions should be improved so that transferors and transferees can expect economic merits even in dry years.
The aim of this paper is to clarify the significance of collective land management and collective water use in the dune land agriculture. Collective land use in this paper has such a characteristic that the control of land use to establish the rotation system including cleaning crops is combined with centralization of the land use rights to the farm households engaging in the dune land agriculture. It aims mainly to avoid the defects caused by continuous cropping. These defects derive from the contradiction of monoculture and obstruct the stable reproduction of agricultural management, as observed in many cases of commercial upland farming like the dune land agriculture. Therefore, the change to rotation farming becomes necessary. When the farm size is not expanded, agricultural income declines because of the low prices of the other crops which are combined with the main crop. It is difficult that each of small-scale households adopts rotation system and expands its farm size at the same time. Collective land management sugggests the way to remove this difficulty. By the way, an intensive land use in upland farming requires the irrigation facilities. Farm households who operate the lease farmland can pay the initial cost of it because of the stability of the landlease based on the collective land management. On the contrary, collective water use forms the foundation of collective land management by standardization of land rent level.
It is often said that due to under-developed stage of secondary industry and stagnation of primary industry in LLDCs, many people are left unemployed, and those migrating from rural region to urban region in search of jobs end up in the slums. This, along with high growth of population creates an absolute poverty in these countries. But this is only a part and a biased view, and doesn't necessarily reflect the whole occupation structure of the LLDCs, which, needless to say, varys from country to country, region to region and development stage of occupation structure within a country. In the empirical analysis of Bangladesh it was found that, its occupation structure is changing vigorously with rapid increase of sales workers, service workers, production and transport workers. Further, it was clear that nearly half of the employees ware employed in various non-agricultural works in urban and rural regions in the village study. Those employed within rural (Upazila and nearby places within District) region were commuting, while those employed in urban region were mostly living in the respective employed places, most of the times alone, maintaining a good relation with the village, by making regular visits and remittances to the remaining family members. But, non of them were living in the slums. Though, most of them belonged to younger generations from landless and marginal farm households and were engaged in sales, production, transport and service works, there were many employees from larger farm households, too. In addition, the high ranking jobs like professional and clerical works were not exclusive to employees from larger farm households as generally regarded. Instead, even employees from landless and marginal farm households with higher education get employed in these high ranking jobs, directly or in two steps, at first getting employed in more unstable jobs. This indicates the openness of orthodox two tiered occupation structure.