This study examines how cattle traders in the cattle markets of Ngaoundéré, northern Cameroon, continue to conduct business despite the uncertainties and frequent defaults associated with credit-based transactions. It investigates two forms of credit relationships (nyamaande in Fulfulde) that sustain everyday market transactions.
While previous studies often portray credit as a one-directional loan carrying a high risk of default, this study highlights a mutual and flexible system of credit transactions. The article identifies two major forms of credit: the first is linked to commercial transactions, while the second is based on personal monetary assistance. In both forms, traders are simultaneously creditors and debtors, thus forming interlocking cycles of debt and credit within the markets.
These arrangements not only allow deferral of payments but also enable traders’ temporary mobilization of others’ capital as if it were their own. This system generates profit even in saturated markets and frames the cattle markets as an economic safety net. By maintaining these credit ties, traders engage in jonglage (strategic juggling of debts), in which full repayment is less of a concern. This study argues that the sustainability of these credit ties lies not in collectively built systems of mutual aid to mitigate risk, but in traders’ tactical know-how in negotiating and adjusting relationships, which in turn shapes the everyday functioning of the markets.
View full abstract