This study investigates factors associated with the continuity of educational demands by employing an agricultural and socioeconomic survey in Bukidnon, rural Mindanao. Educational demand is more continuous when individuals pursue higher levels of education, while it is less continuous when they stop schooling at lower levels of education. We present this behavior as a decision tree with five choices for schooling: elementary entry, elementary graduation, secondary entry, secondary graduation, and tertiary entry. Bukidnon is an area with low schooling achievement and seriously challenged educational attainment in the Philippines. Using information on contemporary and retrospective schooling attainment and the socioeconomic characteristics of children and adults, this study employs a sequential logit regression analysis to understand the continuous move from lower to higher levels of education in terms of individual, household, and region-specific characteristics. The gender dimension, a characteristic of Philippines’ education, is particularly interesting. In addition, regarding gender relations, we study the association between the parents’ and childrens’ levels of education.
We find that boys’ education is more favorably associated with their fathers’ level of education at the elementary school level. However, the association between the levels of mothers’ and children’s education is more robust than that between fathers and children, regardless of the children’s gender. At the secondary and tertiary levels, the association between the levels of education of mothers and daughters is stronger than that between mothers and sons. This implies that the more educated the mothers are, the higher is the level of education attained by the daughters; this association tends to be stronger at higher levels of education. As a possible background to this finding, this study contemplates roles of nonagricultural sources of rural livelihood and bilateral descent prevailing in the Philippines.
We also find that the continuity of educational demands may be interrupted at the entry to each subsequent level of education rather than only at the graduation level. However, income could be influencing entry to a higher level of education. This is consistent with the existing literature that emphasizes the importance of alleviating credit and asset constraints among rural households. Although endogeneity bias arising from omitted variables may pose a challenge to future studies in analyzing the income effect, this study proposes that the heterogeneity of income-related obstacles to educational demands exists across educational stages.
The structure of this article is as follows: Section I reviews the literature. Section II provides general and basic information about education in Bukidnon, Philippines and an explanation for its selection. Sections III explains the survey data and econometric models and Section IV enumerates the variables used in them. Section V exhibits the results and Section VI provides a conclusion and discusses future possibilities.
The massive anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat state in 2002 gathered considerable attention both in India and internationally. This paper demonstrates that the incident was caused by the locally spread riot systems (Brass, 2003) and challenges the theories that attribute the violence to ‘fragmented civil society’ (Varshney, 2002). It is argued that the ‘riot systems’ supported by the daily patronage networks (Berenschot, 2011) played a significant role, not only in the 2002 event but also in the past riots in Ahmedabad, the core city of the state.
Varshney (2002) argues the Hindu–Muslim violence is a city-specific phenomenon related to the anonymous relationships in the urban society. This is why ‘associational civic engagement’ connecting unknown people are needed there. However, in the Gujarat state in 2002, the urban–rural division based on different levels of anonymity was not valid, if one considers how perpetrators were well organised logistically, regardless of cities like Ahmedabad or villages in Panchmahal district. It was evident from the victims’ remarks that the attackers were not necessarily unknown to them, even in the cities.
The problem with Varshney’s (2002) hypothesis leads to his insufficient account of the post-independence history of the state. He regards it as the process of the decline of the ‘civic structures of peace’, with very limited references to the top-down mobilisation of the violence. It is this point that Brass’s (2003) theory of ‘institutionalised riot systems’ surpasses as an explanation, spelling out the ‘trigger’ (Kondo, 2015) of the events directly. He argues that party politics repeatedly motivate the dynamics of the riot systems in which people play various roles to prepare, activate and explain the brutality.
Certainly Brass (2003) shares the weakness of the institutionalist perspective, which dismisses the agencies of the mobilised individuals by emphasising the roles of the elites producing the violence. However, if one considers the patronage networks spread in the poor areas, one can obtain some clues on the background situation of the participants. Their patronage connections with state officials, politicians and criminals were the solid basis of the riot systems that worked in the 2002 event. The official reports, the latest interviews and the existent literature on the 1969 and 1985 violence show the riot systems based on patronage relations developed historically in the city of Ahmedabad. This paper argues that it is the crucial context of the 2002 violence and that the fragmentation of civil society is a by-product of it.
The aim of this paper is to raise a new concept; namely, the “China Rise Syndrome”, which is based on the concentric spreading characteristics for analyzing the phenomena of the conflicts in four different levels due to the rise of China.
The paper emphasizes the steadfast rejection of democratization under the circumstances of rapid growth of power is the origin of the syndrome. Before the rise of China, the negative influence exercised by the authoritarian CCP was only limited in mainland China. However, it has been spreading quickly to other territories outside the country while corresponding with the growth of China’s power; firstly, Hong Kong; secondly, Taiwan; thirdly, the neighboring countries with which China has sovereignty disputes over the nearby islands, and lastly, the rest of the world. In this period, CCP‘s China backed by her exponential growth of political, economic and military power tends to press severely her ideology against the challenges from the outside world, thus inducing varied conflicts.
There are three major findings in this paper:
Firstly, Hong Kong and Taiwan, China’s “closest peripheries”, experience interferences and threats from China much more directly and fiercely than others, and on the other hand, were also driven to the most intense rebellions.
Secondly, although China claims her territorial sovereignty on both Hong Kong and Taiwan simultaneously, the speed of Chinization in Hong Kong is faster than Taiwan which is still cherishing her independence from China.
Thirdly, with the Chinization phenomena in Hong Kong and Taiwan and the anti-democracy virus of China Rise running alongside, the people’s local identity and the centrifugal force away from China in both societies have been staying at the strongest in history.
This paper lays stress upon the phenomena of Chinization and the rebellions against China in both Hong Kong and Taiwan are the paramount observation points in understanding how the Chinese Value, the Chinese Model, and the Chinese System in the era of China Rise spread externally, and how do they induce misgivings, tension, threats, panic and collision with the outside world and how do they influence the world order.
The 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong succeeded in mobilizing large number of people by demanding democracy which meets “international standards” and by deteriorating “Hong Kong–China conflict”.
However, there is a difference of nature between “international standards” and “Hong Kong–China conflict”. The former represents elitist value and the supporters of the international standards prefer liberal and peaceful activities, while the latter is an issue particular to Hong Kong, and people demanding to solve the issue tends to criticize those westernized elites who are apart from the Hong Kong society. They are Hong Kong nationalists and they accept violent resistance to a certain extent. During the prolonged Umbrella Movement, nationalists criticized liberal leaders of the movement and the dispute split the movement.
After the movement, Liberal members formed “Self-determination groups” who insists that Hong Kong people should determine their own political future through referendum. And nationalists formed “Localist groups” who see Hong Kong people as a nation and expel mainlanders.
Although there exists conflict between the Self-determination groups and the Localist groups, both of them rely on political freedom which enables political activities on the street and rule of law which protects the rights of opposition. Although both political freedom and rule of law in Hong Kong are now under threat to a certain extent, internet freedom and judicial independence is guaranteed so far. When the government tries to infringe on it, both Self-determination groups and Localist groups resist strongly.
And both groups are in opposition to the Chinese central government. Both “democratic self-determination” which liberals demands and “self-determination of nations” which localists demands are not acceptable for the central government. Central government tries to isolate “a very few” pro-independence groups by co-opting democrats and moderate localists. But if the central government take action to expel radicals, they would make an enemy of liberals at the same time.
In the Legislative Council election on 4th Sep. 2016, 6 members of the new political groups (3 candidates from “Self-determination groups” and 3 candidates from “Localist groups”) were successfully elected. Legco may experience a huge change by accepting new members of new generations. But before the election, the Government rejected some candidates whom the Government saw as pro-independent and some newly elected Legco members were disqualified by not swearing allegiance to the PRC. They brought some actions against the Government and the new political groups which arose from street politics are to continue its fight against the Government both in the parliament and court.
In Macau, on the 25th of May in 2014, more than 10,000 citizens marched in protest against government’s proposal to pay hefty amounts of retirement benefits to high-rank government officials. There were also citizens who supported the government’s proposal, about 1,000, marched through same route on the same day. Two hundred sixty police officers were dispatched. Despite the size of this political protest in the small Special Administrative Region, no violence took place.
Between the night of 27th and the morning of 28th, 5,000 citizens sat-in surrounding the Legislative Committee Building. On the 29th, the government of Macau has submitted to the action of its citizens and withdrew its proposal. The movement was lead by non-communist labour union, anti-communist political parties and individual journalists. It was organized by SNS such as facebook.
Why do this kind of non-violence movements succeed in Macau? One important factor is that the population at large in Macau forms a sort of ‘Intimate Sphere’ where people have little antagonistic or hostile feeling towards one another.
Historically speaking, the police force of Macau has been reluctant to use physical power to control on-the-street political movements unless the movements are related to constitutional or ‘core interest of the nation’ matters. The court’s decision to support citizens’ freedom to express political opinions in public in 2013 has helped to reconfirm this tendency of police not to engage in political issues.
In this small special administrative region, most of the community members have friends or relatives in both sides of political groups or in the police force. This sentiment inherently makes it difficult for political disputes escalate to physical violence.
The representative system of Macau is not yet completely institutionalized. However, the several informal ways of soliciting public opinions are effective in this small administrative region. This can be taken as an example or experimental case of future democratization of entire China.
For China, H.K., Macau and Taiwan, discussed here, are not part of provincials/autonomous administrative divisions, but are special administrative regions. Articles in this feature, discuss new political trends in this specific region. In these three regions, we can find some similar phenomena and different situations.
The first point is about national security and freedom/democracy. Chinese government strengthens the thread of cyber attack, and importance of national secret intelligences and social security. Such discourses lead the new regulations and acts to manage and sustain democracy, freedom, and constitutionalism, especially in Hong Kong. Facing with these new policy, Hong Kong people have so much negative behavior that they insist on deciding matters on Hong Kong by people there. However, such a situation is not found in Macau society where some matured social network is developed. And Taiwan’s case is also different from Hong Kong’s case, if the national government manages and sustains the democracy or constitutionalism, people would be against it by some activities like Sun Flowers movement, and express their opinions toward the administration by the vote at the elections.
The second point is about social diversities and splits. As economic growth and democratization in these regions, both social diversities and splits are created so seriously among generations, genders, and between urban and rural areas. Such social diversities and splits influences the political activities, like Sun Flower movement in Taiwan and umbrella movement in H.K.. These movements had proposed strong objections to the government, but the activist couldn’t unify these movements and institutionalize them into a political power. On Taiwanese presidential and member of parliament election in 2016, most of Sun Flower activists vote for the DPP candidate on presidential election, but those were partly scattered on the member of parliament election. So it’s so difficult to find the great common divisor among small segments of the society, and the definition of “democracy” and “constitutionalism” in these societies.
The final point is about Chinese stance to such phenomena in this region. As Hong Kong’s case, Chinese governments kept its authority to make interpretation on the situation and to decide the Yes or No on the problems, especially in Hong Kong and Macau. People in Hong Kong cannot decide their situation at present and in the future, in the contrast to people in Taiwan, where they can decide their future by themselves.
In this paper, I confirmed the meaning of the social movements in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau from the perspectives and by the methods of the Constitutional Studies.
First, the concept of “sovereignty” has various meanings. Usually, sovereignty is used as (1) absoluteness of the state power, (2) ultimate decision-making authority of national policies, and (3) the ruling power of the state. While the external part of sovereignty, the absoluteness of the state, was focused in “Sunflower Movement” (Taiwan), the internal part of sovereignty, the ultimate decision-making power, was focused in “Umbrella Movement” (Hong Kong). However, in the “anti-hefty retirement benefits for high-rank government officials’ movement” (Macau) did not involve sovereignty issues in the first place.
Second, Bruce Ackerman proposed the “Dualist Democracy” theory, and distinguished the political processes between “Normal Politics” and “Constitutional Politics”. Because of the Cold War in East Asia and the “rising China” as super power, Taiwan and Hong Kong are still carrying on their “Constitutional Politics”.
Third, it is said that the “narrative” of the constitution is important in order to confirm and inherit the identity of the nation and the ethnic groups. None of “Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”, “Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region”, and “The Constitution of the Republic of China” carries a functional narrative in this regard.