In the 1920s and the 1930s, Leninism and fascism were the two dictatorship models imitated by the Chiang Kai-shek regime in China. In this study, I would like to discuss the characteristics of Chiang’s dictatorship and the development of his ideology by focusing on how he brought Leninism into his policy and his transformation of Leninism into fascism. The legitimacy of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) party-state was based on the principle of party dictatorship. The KMT’s formal ideology lacked the ability to build a party-state system, and therefore Chiang Kai-shek had to use the prevailing models of dictatorship from Russia, Italy and Germany as his basis. Essentially, Chiang Kai-shek was an anti-communist. Notwithstanding the ideological conflict between Leninism and fascism, Chiang combined democratic centralism and the Führerprinzip into a model of a party-state regime for the KMT. Although there was an ideological conflict between Leninism and fascism, as far as proposing an elitist dictatorship, power centralization, rigid organization and the negation of human rights were concerned, the two ideologies were completely coherent. Chiang Kai-shek attempted to establish the party-state by building centralism and Führerprinzip into a formal system of ideology. Leninism and fascism were most influential under the KMT’s political regime, especially in the following three aspects: (i) the strategy of the National Movement; (ii) the establishment of the revolutionary dictatorship; and (iii) the principle of organization. Therefore, the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek can be seen as a mixture of Leninism and fascism. Nevertheless, Chiang did not accept Leninism and fascism unconditionally. Originally, Leninism was created to realize the Marxist revolution, while fascism was characterized by conquest and ethnocentrism; however, Chiang Kai-shek separated class conflicts from Leninism and disconnected fascism from ethnocentrism. In this way, without incorporating the concepts of communism and conquest, the National Revolution Movement launched by the KMT modified the western ideology of dictatorship and turned it into a simple model for dictatorship. What Chiang seriously feared was the lack of the rigid party organization necessary to support the strong one-party politics essential to Leninism and fascism. In fact, because the KMT was organizationally weak, Chiang Kai-shek could not establish himself as a charismatic leadership in the mould of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini. Although Chiang’s dictatorial regime had the characteristics of the party-state and totalitarianism, its actual method of ruling was different from that of Leninism and fascism. The structure of the one-party dictatorship created by the KMT was an authoritarian regime based on military force.
Since the mid-1990s, the operating environment of China’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has changed dramatically as the market economy has deepened and developed. SMEs are playing an increasingly important role in China’s national economy and social development. However, due to its small scale, lower market share, lower levels of technology and equipment, and lower labor productivity, the SME sector is at a disadvantage in the face of fierce competition from large enterprises. China’s government has formulated and implemented a series of policies to support and promote the development of SMEs. The most noticeable of these policies is the establishment of institutions to guarantee SME financing and a pilot SME credit guarantee system. In China, the development of SMEs is restricted by both financing and credit guarantee difficulties, i.e. it is hard for an SME to get efficient credit guarantees when it applies for a loan. The establishment of SME credit guarantee institutions should efficiently alleviate this situation. Starting from the development status of China’s SMEs, this paper explains the special position and importance of today’s SMEs in China’s economy. It reveals the core reasons for the financing and credit guarantee difficulties of SMEs. Furthermore, it analyses and discusses the current situation of China’s SME credit guarantee system, and explores ways and means of developing and improving the system. Based on an investigation of the credit guarantee institutions in Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu Province, this paper provides a detailed study and objective analysis of the operation of the three main types of credit guarantee (government policy type, commercial type and co-operative type), and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. It then makes the following suggestions related to the development of China’s SME credit guarantee system: 1.The current credit guarantee institution in China is deficient in some respects. It is necessary to develop both government policy type and commercial type credit guarantee institutions. 2.It is essential to perfect laws, rules and regulations related to the administration of SME financing guarantee institutions and to formulate an entrance system for guarantee companies. 3.The government should establish preferential policies for SMEs, such as fund compensation for the loss of credit guarantee and business tax exemption. 4. In co-operation with credit guarantee institutions, small to medium-sized financial institutions need be established to serve SMEs. 5.The implemention of a re-guarantee system, built up by national and provincial SME credit re-guarantee institutions, also needs be established.
This paper compares the results of research in central Java in 1995–1996 before the economic crisis in Asia and in 1999–2000 after the crisis. The decreased market-derived income of small women traders and the increased dual role of housewife and breadwinner in their households becomes clear. An immediate cause of the decreased sales, income and number of customers is the depression in consumption due to a reduction in real income and intensified competition brought about by new entrants into the informal sector. Behind the gender separation structure in the informal sector, the crisis further sharpened competition as well as encouraged the tendency of large merchants to form monopolies. As a result, some small women traders working at the lower levels had to give up their businesses, and the income of those traders who were marginalized fell even lower. As for the income distribution in the informal sector, the income gap between the highest and the lowest, and the Gini coefficients, became larger. Sales decreased 50% due to depression in consumption. The concentration of income in the top 20% become remarkable, while the share of the smallest women traders decreased. The dual role of housewife and breadwinner has added to the burden of small women traders. After the economic crisis, personal income and household expenditure decreased. However, wives are responsible for more than half of the household expenditure despite their income accounting for only one-third of total family income. The difference between husband and wife in terms of hours spent earning and doing housework increased as a result of the wife’s ‘working hours’ being double those of her husband. The housework role carried by men tended to decrease too. The dual role of housewife and breadwinner of the women traders has maintained and strengthened the gendered division of labor in the informal sector. The woman defined as housewife has the obligation and the authority to manage the household to fulfill her family’s needs. However, it is the husband who controls household finances by varying the amount of money put in the household economy. Many wives who try to supplement the household budget brought home by their husbands have no other option but to start as small traders or in the small-scale production of commodities with a low profitability, because, unlike for men, there is insufficient capital.
Although deaths in the North Korean famine of 1995–1997 are estimated to be roughly 600,000–1 million in the most recent surveys, only a few attempts have been made to analyze the famine. This paper aims to analyze the causes of the North Korean famine using Amartya Sen’s entitlement approach, which has been widely used in the study of modern famines. The unique aspect of the North Korean famine is that it happened during a drastic change in the entitlement system. As is well known, the main entitlement system in North Korea until the early 1990s was the public distribution system (PDS). However, following the collapse of the PDS, food was increasingly allocated through the informal sector, called the Changmadang in North Korea. After the collapse of the PDS, the food entitlement of the urban population relied mainly on market exchange, though there were other sources of food acquisition. Indeed, a new entitlement system emerged from the informal food market in the middle of the 1990s. However, North Korea had been undergoing a serious economic recession since the collapse of the socialist market in the early 1990s, and therefore many factories and firms could not operate normally. Many workers were threatened with unemployment or non-payment. Furthermore, people were severely restricted by the state not only in respect of private ownership but also with regards to free trade activity. Hence it was not easy for many laborers, especially in local urban areas, to acquire food through market exchange during the transitional stage. The main victims of the famine in North Korea were laborers in local urban areas, especially in North and South Hamgyung. Surprisingly, when the famine reached its peak at the end of 1996 the price index of rice rose to 1206 (taking the informal market price in 1992 as 100). While there was a sudden surge in food prices, the wage rate actually fell in absolute terms and the index of the exchange rate of labour vis-à-vis rice declined from 100 in 1992 to 5 in 1996. Indeed, the violent decline in rice-entitlement of wages that occurred in North Korea at this time was unprecedented in the modern history of famines. To understand the causes of the North Korean famine it is very important to appreciate that it occurred as a result of a number failures of entitlement. The first is the failure of the PDS by regional ‘triage’, etc. (i.e. the cause was not simply a decline in food availability), and the second is the collapse of the exchange entitlement in the informal market during the dramatic transition of the North Korean economy.