This paper discusses the ‘Three Anti Campaign’ (against ‘corruption, waste, and the bureaucratic spirit’) implemented by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the early period of the Chinese People’s Republic, and seeks to analyze the following two aspects of the campaign: (a) the political techniques used by the CCP to mobilize Shanghai workers and establish firmer political control over the factories; and (b) the campaign’s process and social influence, especially in the industrial sector of Shanghai. The ‘Three Anti Campaign’ was launched early in 1952. Directed against corruption, waste and the bureaucratic spirit of government officials, its main weight fell on the managers, administrators and technicians left over from the old regime (some of whom had served under the Kuomintang). In this campaign, a person who had embezzled more than 1,000 yuan was categorized as a laohu (tiger), and a person who had embezzled more than 10,000 yuan was called a dalaohu (big tiger). The primary target groups of this ‘tiger-hunting’ were the non-Communist workers and administrators of factories. In May 1952, 80.4% of laohu were ordinary residents who were not Communist party members, and 11.3% of laohu were technicians, including factory managers and administrators. The political techniques the CCP used to eliminate non-Communist local leaders can be categorized as follows: 1. The allocation of laohu arrest rates to each party branch. The CCP assigned each party branch an arrest rate for laohu, and the factory party committee had to radicalize its political investigations to meet its quota. 2. The combination of political investigation and mass mobilization. The factory party committee mobilized workers and held ‘struggle sessions’ to put pressure on ‘suspects’ to confess their crimes. 3.The utilization of blood relations. The CCP mobilized the family members of ‘suspects’ to persuade the ‘suspect’ to admit to crimes, and some committees proclaimed that if the family members of a ‘suspect’ confessed his/her family member’s crime, a mitigated sentence would be given. As a result of this campaign, ‘political norms’ were brought into effect in factories, and workers began to be conscious of their own political acts. Political evaluation by the CCP began to be important in the industrial workplace in the 1950s. This campaign also had a great influence on the home environment. When the Communist ideology was applied to society, this ideology turned into moral obligations (‘living and dressing plainly’, ‘serving the people’, and so on). This moralization of socialism affected the social and political behavior of people living in Mao’s China.
The Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) was established in 1994. From the outset, the ADBC had problems with risk management, and as a result had to drastically restructure its services in 1997. Many Chinese economists had pointed out the risk control problems of the ADBC. We can largely classify their opinions into two major groups. Firstly, the ADBC provided a wide range of services from the time of its founding, but did not have enough management ability. Secondly, the ADBC was not able to effectively control the risks of its main service, namely lending to the state-owned food (grain, cotton and edible oil materials) purchase enterprises. However, these economists did not discuss the risk management of the ADBC in detail, especially after 1997. Moreover, they did not analyze the ADBC’s historical role as a (policy-based) directed credit bank. In this paper, firstly, we see how the ADBC operated after its establishment, and analyze its character by surveying discussions within China. Secondly, we analyze the mechanisms that resulted in bad loans, and examine the reconstruction after 1997, from the view of risk management. Thirdly, we reconsider the roles of the ADBC, and point out what kind of problems the bank still has. The results of this paper may be summarized briefly as follows: 1.The ADBC was established as a policy-based, directed credit bank serving the agriculture sector. However, it lacked risk control ability for lending, and so had to reconstruct its service in 1997 by strengthening lending risk management, and specializing in its main role of food purchase. 2.After its reconstruction in 1997, the main role of the ADBC conformed to the new food control policy of China. One of the most important changes in risk management is the yiji-sanzhuang (one basic and three exclusive accounts) lending control system; this new risk control now works very effectively. 3.We should not neglect the contributions of the ADBC in the agricultural sector, especially for China’s food control policy. The ADBC played very important roles in the latter half of 1990s, such as reducing the bai-tiao (white slip) phenomenon. We can see that the ADBC has played more important roles as a directed credit bank since 1997. 4.The ADBC still has many problems. Firstly, the bank has to build up management systems that are not influenced easily by political powers. For this, it is necessary to consider establishing the legal basis of the ADBC. Secondly, the ADBC will have to introduce an effective system of ethics checks and external controls.
This paper clarifies the significance and implications of Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘cultural construction’ and his ‘Taiwanization’ (localization) policy that brought a drastic change in the Kuomintang’s cultural policy in postwar Taiwan. ‘Cultural construction’, launched by Chiang Ching-kuo, is the name that has been given to the last of the twelve major construction projects beginning in 1977, and includes the construction of local cultural centers and the establishment of a Cultural Commission in cabinet. By the construction of cultural centers in every county and major city, this ‘cultural construction’ is acknowledged as the most important cultural policy in the 1970s, having a strong impact on cultural developments in Taiwan thereafter. The major findings of this paper are concerned with the implications of Chiang’s ‘cultural construction’ and his intention of promoting a ‘Taiwanization’ policy, not only in political administration but also in cultural administration. The basis of this discussion will be centered on the following observations. Firstly, Chiang Ching-kuo’s landmark announcement to launch his own cultural policy marked a clear transition from Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of the 1960s. Secondly, the highly symbolic appointment by Chiang Ching-kuo of Ch’en Ch’i-lu, a prominent Taiwanese scholar in the field of Taiwanese aboriginal studies, to the chair of the newly founded Cultural Commission in 1981, represented the first time the KMT was to place a local-oriented personality as the head of the government’s national cultural administration. As a result, Ch’en’s concern with local culture and the notion of Chinese culture opened up new horizons for the KMT’s cultural policy. Thirdly, Chiang Ching-kuo’s policy of cultural localization is evident through the establishment of Taichung’s first cultural centre, founded in 1976 by the well-known Taiwanese poet Ch’en Ch’ien-wu. When examining the significance of Chiang’s localization policy, we should not neglect the fact that the ideas of a single Taiwanese intellectual became the base upon which Taiwan’s cultural policy was formed after 1970. Fourthly, the establishment of display rooms and museums in local cultural centers, exhibiting notions of the ‘tradition’ and ‘uniqueness’ of various local places, presents a good illustration of the enhancement of local history and culture to represent the cultural policy of the new age. Such museums, initially conceived by Ch’en Ch’i-lu, can nowadays be seen everywhere, while the concept itself continues to be strongly promoted by the present government. Finally, following the ‘Local Autonomy Act’, enforced in 1999, local cultural centers were gradually reorganized into local cultural bureaux. In short, it can be said that Chiang’s cultural centers became a prototype that since the 1990s has provided the basis for the decentralization of cultural policy. Hence, due to the above reasons, it is possible to state that Chiang Ching-kuo’s ‘cultural construction’ was a significant part of his ‘Taiwanization’ policy, which can be defined clearly as the ‘turning point’ in the KMT’s cultural policy.
In the aftermath of the Cold War period the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has faced many contradictions between its political ideology and realities in its society. One of the largest contradictions lies between Vietnam’s participation in the global market economy and the achievement of ‘Vietnamese socialism’ inside the country. This contradiction inevitably causes much instability in domestic society. This paper considers recent incidents among ethnic minorities from aspects of national participation in the global economy, in order to understand how the Communist government is dealing with contradictions between international relations and domestic policy. In the preparation for the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam held in February 2001, the country’s Communist leaders discussed the current state of globalization in terms of both ‘positive aspects’ and ‘negative aspects’. They regarded globalization as an inevitable reality, although they deemed recent globalization to be ‘capitalist globalization’ or ‘Americanization of the world’. Therefore they insisted that they should ‘take the initiative’ in participating in this process and ‘make good use’ of globalization. The 9th National Congress presented a policy of ‘great national unity’. This was based on the reality that the economic interests and social classes of Vietnamese people have increasingly diversified in the process of participating in the global market economy. The purpose of the ‘great national unity’ policy was to keep Vietnamese society under the totalitarian control of the Communist Party. As the government set about implementing the ‘great national unity’ policy, some clashes between Christian ethnic minorities and local Communist authorities occurred in mountain areas. As some leaders of the riots were connected with overseas Vietnamese groups in the United States, the Hanoi government insisted that the ethnic minorities movements formed a part of ‘international terrorism’ derived from capitalist globalization by ‘American imperialists’ who aimed to overthrow socialist regimes. After widescale efforts to crush opposition in the central highlands in 2001 and 2004, the Communist authorities warned that Vietnamese national culture had been erroded by the Americanization of the world. Consequently, it can be said that the Hanoi government regards taking the initiative in participating in the global market economy as a way of enlarging national economic interests as well as denying foreign intervention in domestic affairs, and that the policy of ‘great national unity’ legitimizes their totalitarian regime. The Communist authorities also insist that capit alist globalization will in any case reach its conclusion and the world will go forward under ‘socialist globalization’.
It is thought that, at least in theory, democratization promotes the development of welfare policy, because economic and social equality are essential features of modern democracy. This article attempts to examine the relationship between democratization and welfare policy in South Korea, by investigating the change of health policy during the dramatic decade of the 1980s. Before 1980 some public medical insurance programs did exist in South Korea, but these covered only a small proportion of the population and were managed separately by workplaces. Most people such as farmers, self-employed workers and employees of small-sized companies were excluded from this social protection. Expanding the coverage of the public system to the entire population was the objective of the government since early 1980s, but as the failure of the ‘model project’ of regional insurance showed, it was difficult to achieve unless the Korean government changed its traditional principle in health policy: evasion of direct intervention and responsibility. It was the political transition in the mid-1980s that forced the government and the ruling party to take action. Faced with increasing pressure from the oppositions side, the ruling party chose regional medical insurance as one of its key election promises in 1985, and in September 1986, a few months earlier than the symbolic ‘6.29 Declaration’, the South Korean government officially publicized the schedule for expansion. Under this schedule, in January 1988 farmers and fishermen/women, followed in July 1989 by the urban self-employed, became the beneficiaries of the public program. A universal medical insurance system for the entire population, exceptional among developing countries, was realized in South Korea. However, in spite of considerable governmental subsidies to insurance finance (35% of cost), people did not accept the scheme positively. The ‘civil society explosion’ after democratization caused a nationwide correction movement among farmers, who demanded that the subsidy rate be raised to 50%, and integrate the decentralized systems to strengthen the redistribution effect. Although the movement failed in the end — President Roh Tae-Woo exercised his presidential veto on the integration bill — it was the first protest movement in the history of South Korean welfare policy, and it damaged the authority of the pro-development system. The main findings of this article can be summarized as follows. Firstly, realization of Korea’s universal medical insurance was not just an additive enlargement of coverage but also entailed a qualitative change of health policy, and it was Korea’s democratic transition that caused this change. In comparison with most developing countries, where healthcare systems for employed and for others tend to be characterized by dualism, the single universal system in South Korea itself represented meaningful progress. Secondly, the fact that the policy of expansion had been done before 1987 implies another dimension of welfare policy, especially social insurance: it can serve the regime as a means of political legitimacy and social control. Finally, democratization changed welfare policy from the ‘exclusive field’ for state élites and professionals to the arena where interests of different groups conflict and compete. In other words, welfare was ‘politicized’. Another important impact was the emergence of the idea of ‘health as a right’. While social insurance programs can be introduced or expanded under all kinds of regimes, ‘welfare as a right’ can only exist in a democratized society.