アジア研究
Online ISSN : 2188-2444
Print ISSN : 0044-9237
検索
OR
閲覧
検索
52 巻 , 2 号
選択された号の論文の13件中1~13を表示しています
    • |<
    • <
    • 1
    • >
    • >|
特集1:アジア冷戦史の再検討
  • 宇野 重昭
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 1-6
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 石井 明
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 7-15
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    The 1977 edition of the Xiandai Hanyu Cidian (Modern Chinese Dictionary) defined the Cold War as ‘an international war made without using weapons, especially, provocation, destruction and other activities to increase international tension done against the Socialist States by the Imperialist Group led by the United States of America after World War II’. However, in the 2002 edition of the dictionary, the definition was changed to ‘international hostilities excluding war’.The phrase indicating that US imperialism provoked the Cold War had disappeared.
    In China it has recently become possible to study international relations during the Cold War era based on the principles of ‘shishi qiushi’ (seeking truth from facts).
    The reason why Cold War studies were vigorously pursued in the United States is not only because the United States itself was directly involved in the Cold War, but also because US diplomatic documents have long been made available to the public. In China, the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been disclosed to the public since January 2004, and this has enabled scholars to peruse the pre-1955 records. In addition to this, the disclosure of Russian archival documents has stimulated and supported the progress of Cold War studies in China.Utilizing these documents, Professor Shen Jihua (Huadong Shifan University), Professor Niu Dayong (Peking University) and other scholars of Cold War history are energetically proceeding with studies of this period. Many books on the Cold War have now been published in China, including Lengzhan yu Zhongguo (The Cold War and China) edited by Professor Zhang Baijia and Professor Niu Jun.
    抄録全体を表示
  • 木宮 正史
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 16-25
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Why has the Korean Cold War never ended despite the end of the global Cold War? US– Soviet confrontation implanted division and war in the Korean peninsula after World War II. We can easily envisage that the end of the global Cold War should have given a ‘peace dividend’ to Korea. Since the end of the global Cold War, however, the military tensions in the Korean peninsula have been aggravated due to the nuclear crisis even though North–South rapprochement has to some extent been achieved. This article tries to answer this question by focusing on the divergences between the dynamics of the global and Korean Cold Wars, and the linkages of inter-alliance politics with between-alliance conflicts.
    Early in the 1970s, there was détente in East Asia in the wake of the US military withdrawal from Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine and the consequent withdrawal of US divisions from Korea, and US–China rapprochement. Influenced by these upheavals, both Korean leaders decided to hold talks and agreed to the July 4 South–North Joint Communiqué in 1972. Inter-Korean talks, however, lasted only for one year and inter-Korean détente could not be consolidated. Korean leaders initiated these talks not only to follow the détente among the big powers but also to prevent their political regimes from being destabilized. They decided to install more authoritarian rule by constitutional revisions as if they had conspired.
    When we take the possible destabilization of the US–ROK alliance into consideration, however, we can find another explanation. That is, inter-Korean talks were also initiated in order to engage the big powers. South Korea tried to persuade the Unites States not to destabilize the US–ROK alliance because it had to compete with a tough North Korean regime and such destabilization might be fatally unfavorable for South Korea.
    In the 1960s, inter-alliance politics had an important impact on inter-Korean relations. In the 1950s, North Korea had been in a more favorable situation in terms of competition with South Korea. After 1960, however, South Korea succeeded in overtaking North Korea. South Korea was able to achieve economic development by gaining enough resources from Japan through the normalization of ROK–Japan relations in 1965. North Korea, caught up in the midst of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, could not gain enough resources, even though this period did give it a breathing space to increase its autonomy from the big powers.
    Since the end of the global Cold War, while appealing the importance of Korean nationalism to South Korea, North Korea basically persisted in getting a guarantee of the regime survival from United States by taking advantage of nuclear development as a bargaining card. That is why the Korean Cold War has never ended despite the end of the global Cold War.
    抄録全体を表示
  • 黒柳 米司
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 26-35
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the Cold War was a global phenomenon, it had been described primarily in terms of either its major protagonists — the United States and the Soviet Union — or principal crises, such as Berlin or Cuba. To nations in specific regions, however, such a narrative may not be the only one or even the most important picture of the Cold War. Due to its historical background and geo-strategic complexities, for instance, the Asian Cold War was both volatile and fluid, whereas the European Cold War was far more structured and solid. This paper tries to demonstrate the major features of the Asian Cold War by analyzing the origins, developments and implementations of ZOPFAN. ZOPFAN was first proposed by the Malaysian parliament in 1968 as the ‘neutrality of Southeast Asia guaranteed by the three great powers including Communist China,’ and was endorsed by an ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in 1971, which declared a ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.’ At the outset, agreement on ZOPFAN was tentative at best, but in the course of its implementation, ZOPFAN was modified and transformed into a so-called ‘ZOPFAN-II,’ which in turn led to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976.
    As was often the case in ASEAN projects, agreement on ZOPFAN did not mean a consensus on approaches regarding its implementation. The main locomotive of ZOPFAN was non-aligned Malaysia under Prime Minister Tun Razak: the staunchly anti-communist Philippines and Thailand were unenthusiastic about reconciliation with their Asian communist neighbors, while Indonesia proposed yet another approach of strengthening ‘national resilience.’ What made ASEAN one of the most successful regional bodies in the Third World was its modus operandi, the ‘ASEAN Way’, which enabled it to overcome its heterogeneity and maintain the ‘unity in diversity’ among its member countries. Persuant to the logic of ZOPFAN-II, ASEAN members managed to overcome the Cold War mentality — if not the Cold War structure — in improving diplomatic relations with previously hostile socialist nations like China and the Indochinese countries. To put it simply, the Cold War was not monolithic, but rather mosaic in nature, with regional settings giving the local Cold War a particular rationale. In a nutshell, ZOPFAN was an ‘ASEAN Way’ to deal with the Cold War in Southeast Asia.
    抄録全体を表示
  • 堀本 武功
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 36-47
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Indian diplomacy since that country’s independence in 1947 can be broadly divided into three phases: (1) a policy of non-alignment (from 1947 until the end of the 1960s); (2) alignment with the Soviet Union (from the 1970s until the end of the Cold War); (3) the post-Cold War phase of participation in multilateralism and the forging of closer links with the United States.
    Although the Cold War environment had a considerable influence on India’s foreign policy, certain crucial factors, such as promotion of national interests and a constant desire to pursue an independent diplomacy, played a vital role in the evolution of that policy. The non-alignment policy was an upshot of that exercise, which India stuck to despite enormous external pressures.It essentially meant joining hands with those that shared this perception — this was the beginning of maintaining strategic partnerships — but India obviously looked at the Soviet Union more favorably than the United States. This in turn led Moscow to emerge as a strategic partner for New Delhi, which is the main characteristic of the second phase. It would be wrong to assume that India’s foreign policy was merely a dependent variable of the Cold War.
    In the more recent and current phase, while taking an active participation in regional multilateral mechanisms, India’s endeavor appears to be to incorporate the United States as a strategic partner. Aside from mutual economic gains, shared concerns and interests, the rise of China seems to be instrumental in shaping the evolving India–US relationship.
    In short, the Indian diplomacy can be characterized by the struggle to advance its national interests by balancing an independent foreign policy with the international politico-security environment. In this respect, India could be called the ‘France of Asia’. France shares certain values and interests with the United States but pursues its own autonomous policy. India looks like following this line until such time as it becomes a major power.
    抄録全体を表示
特集2:アジア社会の少子高齢化と社会保障制度
  • 渡辺 利夫
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 48-50
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 梶原 弘和
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 51-65
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Demography explains the relationship between population and economic development that occurs in the growth process of a developed nation and East Asia as demographical bonus(hereafter a population bonus). A long-term change of population begins with the stage in which the population does not increase very much; this then shifts to the stage in which the death rate falls, and population increases rapidly. This period is known as a ‘baby boom’. These children then grow up, creating high economic growth — a so-called ‘population bonus’.
    Korea represents a newly industrialized country that has matured into a developed nation via such a population bonus. A long-term change of population occurs when population increases rapidly, but not every country can benefit from this situation and enjoy economic growth as a result of a population bonus. It is clear from the present conditions that many developing countries are still poor, and continue to suffer. The Philippines cannot acquire a population bonus, and many people there still suffer from poverty.
    In global population terms, the ratio of developed countries to developing countries was 32.9 versus 67.1 in 1950. This became 25.5:74.5 in 1980 and 19.6:80.4 in 2000. The world population reached 4.07 billion in 1975 and 6.08 billion in 2000. The United Nations estimates that the world population in 2050 will be between 7.68 billion (with developing countries comprising 86.2%) and 10.64 billion (86.5%). Therefore, developing countries will in future face a problem of an increase in the scale of the world’s population.
    The population of the Philippines has grown from 19.99 million in 1950 to 83.05 million in 2005. The yearly average percentage increase was 2.59%, resulting in an increase of 4.15-fold in 55 years. Population growth exceeded 3% in the 1950s and 1960s, and even in 2000–2005 was 1.84%. The rate of increase exceeded the average of the period when the population of Japan and other developed countries increased rapidly. Korea first acquired a population bonus, but then suffered from a population problem common in developed nations, i.e. the number of children decreased, and the number of older people increased. The differences that occurred in economic growth between Korea and the Philippines during this demographic transition was due to differences in the power of employment to absorb these changes. Employment in manufacturing industry and the service industry sector spread in Korea. Expansion of employment improved the life of the nation, and hastened demographic transition. However, the situation in the manufacturing and service sectors in the Philippines was weaker, leading to unemployment and underemployment. As a result, the influence on demographic transition was also weak. The difference between Korea and the Philippines shows a big lesson for developing countries where the economic activities of the populations are soon to peak. In other words, if there is to be a population bonus it is vital to increase employment.
    抄録全体を表示
  • 大泉 啓一郎
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 66-78
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    The fertility rate in East Asia has declined rapidly, so the aging of this region’s population will accelerate over time. The speed of population aging in East Asian countries will be equal to or faster than that of Japan, currently the fastest among the developed countries. In China and Thailand in particular, the fertility rate has begun to decline among low-income groups, and is now lower than the population replacement rate of 2.1. Thus, low-income groups in these countries will age more compared to developed countries. The immediate task for both China and Thailand is to take the following two measures.
    First, an appropriate development strategy regarding demographic transition must be adopted to maintain sustainable economic growth. Both countries could realize high growth by taking advantage of demographic dividends including plentiful labor and the high domestic saving rate in the past two decades. However, the demographic dividends will be finished before higher-income levels can be attained. The employment structure of both China and Thailand has not changed very much, and a lot of the labor force is still in agriculture. To promote sustainable development, the main task is to cope with how to improve the productivity of middle- and upper-age laborers in agriculture as well as upgrading the education system for younger people.
    Second, a social security system must be designed that takes account of the demographic transition. Both governments clearly desire a social security system that would cover the entire population including farmers and self-employed owners. However, they must take into account the future budget burden caused by the rapidly aging population. In addition to designing an effective and sustainable social security system, they must make the most of the informal systems such as family, community and non-governmental to take care of the aging society. Furthermore, the aid community must assist in coping with the aging societies in developing countries from the point of view of human security whenever necessary.
    抄録全体を表示
  • 新田目 夏実
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 79-94
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Many Asian countries have rapidly aging populations. While Asian governments are trying their best to address this issue, the present social and economic conditions do not allow them to adopt either the European model (high welfare levels with high contribution levels) or the US model (market-based, emphasizing self-responsibility) of social welfare for the elderly. The family and community, two traditional sources of support for the elderly under inadequate formal insurance programs, are also losing their functions as society modernizes rapidly. Where, then, should the Asian elderly look for support for their old age? The present paper proposes that the Japanese social welfare policies based on communities may well be a realistic option for many Asian developing countries.
    The Japanese model, while adopting US and British concepts and practices after World War II, has evolved over the past 30 years in such a way that it is no longer identical to the Western model. The Social Welfare Law of 2000 clearly states as its objective that communities should be the focal point of action for welfare to be realized. How it is realized with respect to the ­elderly is laid out by the Public Long-Term Care Insurance (PLTCI) enacted in 1997 and put into practice in 2000.
    Unlike other national insurance programs, the PLTCI is administered by the local government, and is characterized by the community and institutional care services to the elderly over 65, with the participation of formal and informal organizations such as the local government, the semi-public regional welfare association, non-governmental organizations, community associations as well as private businesses.
    This approach, while unintended, resembles the multi-pillar policy that World Bank now proposes. While the Japanese welfare system is difficult to adopt as it is, the emphasis on the idea of community-centered welfare and formal and informal practices that buttress the idea may prove quite informative to many Asian developing countries that face the rapid aging of their population.
    抄録全体を表示
  • 若林 敬子
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 95-112
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    Nowadays, the falling birthrate and the problem of an aging population has become an issue across East Asia. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have been experiencing lower total fertility rates than Japan. Within a short time, China and these ASEAN countries have changed from aging societies to aged societies.
    The above trend, it is argued, resulted partly from an increase in the education levels of women, which has caused the appearance of more career women at the expense of raising ­children or even their marriages. It is also believed that the rapidly increasing costs associated with children’s education have contributed greatly to the emergence of this serious social problem. Although various measures have been taken to deal with this issue, an effective way has yet to be found to improve this serious situation in East Asia.
    抄録全体を表示
  • 末廣 昭
    52 巻 (2006) 2 号 p. 113-124
    公開日: 2014/09/30
    ジャーナル フリー
    As they entered the latter half of the 1990s, the governments of East Asian countries had ­simultaneously shifted their attention from economic development to social policy. Behind impressive changes in government policies, we can find three major elements: increasing public concerns over the quality of life (QOL) in the aftermath of the Cold War as well as the ­development of local democratization movements; the urgent need for governments to build nationwide social safety nets in order to help the people who were hit hard by the financial ­crisis in 1997; and serious demands for governments to tackle new problems caused by an ­increasingly aging populations.
    These three elements combined together to force the governments of East Asia to launch ­notable reforms in their social security systems such as the introduction of national pension schemes and nationwide healthcare systems. At the same time, these movements have also caused policy-related debates on desirable welfare regimes among political parties, non-governmental organizations and academicians, as exemplified in the past decade by the ‘productive welfare state’ debate in South Korea, the ‘nationwide healthcare scheme’ debate in Taiwan, and the ‘people’s basic right’ debate in Thailand.
    More interestingly, these movements also provided academic circles outside East Asia with strong incentives to clarify the peculiar characteristics of the welfare system of newly industrialized economies of Asia in comparison to the Western experience, and to develop the argument for new paradigm for an East Asian welfare model beyond the Western one. For instance, Holliday categorized the East Asian welfare system as a ‘productivist welfare system’ in association with the developmentalist state regime, while Jones described an ‘oikonomic welfare regime’ in reference to the Confucian cultural background. Regardless of the extent of their emphasis on the nature of state and culture, these arguments seem to share a common ­understanding on the ‘East Asian welfare model’ in two distinguished aspects of devoted family supports and company benefits system in large-sized firms.
    According to such implementation, this paper primarily aims to explore the background of recent government social policies, and to examine a variety of arguments on the East Asian welfare models. After tracing and criticizing these arguments, the paper points out three movements taking place in the field of social security, including institutionalization, socialization, and commercialization. More specifically, we examine the increasing role of the government in designing the national welfare regime under the pressure of social change (institutionalization), diversification of agents in welfare services to non-public sector such as family, ­community and NPO/NGO due to the limitation of budget resources (socialization), and the emerging role of the private sector such as provident funds and life insurance companies to supplement limited services undertaken by the government as well as voluntary organizations.
    The paper also attempts to introduce new major movements of regulating the direction of East Asian welfare regime in the near future. These movements include: the serious impact by the so-called ‘compressed population transition’ or the negative effect of a rapidly aging population and a decreasing economically active population upon economic growth; the urgent need to cope with the new type of ‘health transition’, including how to synchronize dealing with three different types of diseases (new infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, chronic diseases such as cancers and heart diseases, and degenerative illnesses); and the decreasing role of the occupational welfare or company benefits in social security due to the enhanced global com­petition in reducing production cost.
    Finally, the paper points out the necessity of careful empirical study on the current situations facing East Asian
    抄録全体を表示
書評
    • |<
    • <
    • 1
    • >
    • >|
feedback
Top