The goal of this paper is to examine how the history of laws governing the press and awareness of the concept of copyright have influenced and controlled modern and contemporary Chinese media. This paper looks at the degree to which press policies were enacted and systematized in China from the late Qing period on, and analyzes the level of awareness of publishing rights in society in general. These issues are discussed by focusing on pirated editions, thereby allowing us to investigate two major topics critical for understanding modern and contemporary China’s press policy and publishing industry: censorship and culture, and the promotion of industry. This paper makes clear the following two points: first, in modern and contemporary China, copyright and censorship have been closely linked. This relationship is not apparent in Europe, the United States and Japan, whose legal systems posit a distinction between laws governing the public realm and laws governing the private realm. Secondly, in China copyright was not only held by authors, it was also held by publishers, and in reality the latter had a more dominant position. This was a characteristic of the late Qing and Republican eras and has shaped the legal system and rights-consciousness in contemporary China (see case 7 in the main text). Having a historical perspective is crucial to analyzing the current situation.
This paper investigates whether privatization is sufficient to raise the profitability of state-dominated companies (SDCs). It compares privatization to capital restructuring of listed SDCs and reveals several significant facts. Industry and year-adjusted ROE increases over a long period both in privatized companies and capital-restructured SDCs. Both types of reform succeed in improving the efficiency of equity capital. Year-adjusted ROS and ROA also increase after the change of controlling shareholder, but the effect does not last long. Privatized companies and capital-restructured SDCs face difficult problems in improving the efficiency of assets and sales. However, if the effect of industry change caused by the change of controlling shareholder is excluded, the above short-term effect could only be detected in privatized companies. It suggests that the efficiency problem is more serious in capital-restructured SDCs. The improvement of the efficiency of equity capital depends on increasing the asset/equity ratio. However, privatized companies can raise more funds through bank loans than capital-restructured SDCs, and this results in the increase of assets and asset/equity ratios being much larger in privatized companies. On the other hand, the debt/asset ratio rises rapidly in privatized companies, while it does not change significantly in capital-restructured SDCs. It is found that if the profitability and financial conditions are poor, the possibility of privatization other than via capital restructuring rises. However, there is not enough evidence that the increased profits in privatized companies result from the manipulation of sales management expenses during privatization.
The exchange of a transaction contract and the enforcement of such a contract are different economic behaviors. In order to enforce a contract, some device to prevent traders from engaging in dishonest behavior is needed. This means that the engagement of exchange does not necessarily result in actual exchange, and whenever traders can increase their gain by cheating, they have an incentive to behave dishonestly. There are always some uncertainties of this kind in transaction contracts. In order to prevent opportunistic behaviors during transactions, an institution that decreases the incentives for such behaviors is required. Such an institution is called an ‘enforcement mechanism’ in the field of historical institutional analysis. This paper investigates the enforcement mechanism involved in rice market transactions in Wuxi city in the1930s. In the 1930s rice produced in Anhui province was transported to the intermediary market in Wuxi city, where it was bought by merchants from Shanghai or Hangzhou where the rice was consumed. In Wuxi rice market, the sellers could not deal directly with the rice buyers, but had to be introduced to buyers by brokers. There were no fixed relationships between the merchants and the brokers. In other words, each time the merchants from Anhui province came to Wuxi market, they had to search for the brokers who could introduce the buyers to them. This paper examines how dishonest transactions between brokers and merchants were prevented, in other words, how the transaction contracts between the merchants and the brokers were enforced. The main conclusion of this paper is that the linkage between brokers and merchants decreased their incentive to cheat mutually and enforced their transaction contract. For example, if one broker cheated a trader, the information about that broker would soon be known to all other merchants through the linkage. As a result, the broker would lose future trade, and this potential loss of reputation decreased their incentive to engage in dishonest behavior. It is concluded that such a ‘reputation mechanism’ within the linkage enforced their transaction contract.
After the Asian currency crisis, Thailand shifted to a floating exchange rate regime, and has since May 2000 adopted inflation targeting as the cornerstone of its monetary policy. The key monetary policy instrument is the 14-day repurchase rate, and the target is to maintain core inflation in the range of 0–3.5%. Fully fledged inflation targeting is well regarded and there was no deviation from the target range between May 2000 and June 2005. Accordingly, the Bank of Thailand is assumed to have controled the rate of inflation within the target range over the sample period. The aim of this paper is to examine, using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR), the monetary transmission mechanism and the effects of monetary policy shocks on inflation or other variables in Thailand. We analyzed estimated impulse responses and variance decompositions in two SVARs with short-run restrictions. One of the restrictions reflects a normal monetary channel, and the other a credit channel. According to the estimated impulse responses of the former model, we find that a contractionary monetary policy shock does not instantly lead to a fall in base money and it is impossible to explain the movement of output in the monetary transmission mechanism. However, according to the estimated impulse responses of the latter model, the movements of all variables can be explained theoretically. Moreover, the fractions of forecast error variances attributed to monetary policy shocks in the latter model are also found to follow the results of impulse responses. These empirical results indicate that monetary policy shocks finally affect inflation. Regarding the monetary transmission mechanism, however, the operations of Thailand’s monetary policy seem to affect more private credit or commercial bank credit than money supply or monetary base. That is, not only the monetary channel but the credit channel is assumed to be important for explaining the monetary transmission mechanism because the financial sector of Thailand may not yet have matured. Furthermore, the new finding is that the empirical evidence indicates that a contractionary monetary policy shock (a rise in the interest rate) leads a rise in real output.This is paradoxical according to standard macro-economic models. A suitable rise in interest rates may stimulate commercial banks’ incentive for lending to the private sector because a credit squeeze occurred in Thailand following the Asian currency crisis.
The strategy of driving the development of an economy through promoting exports arouses several concerns. First of all, the development of export-oriented industries may result in high levels of imports of capital products and intermediate products such as mechanical equipment, etc., which in turn reduces the balance of trade accounts. In addition, it is also very important whether the export-oriented industry per se has higher production efficiency and has the ability to consolidate those industries with lower production efficiencies to finish the production of exporting products collectively so as to lead the lagged industries’ development and promote their increase of production efficiency. Through comparisons with Japanese counterparts, this paper examines the characteristics of the collaborations between the main Chinese exported-oriented industries and other industries in their production process as well as using the level of imported intermediate products. The results show that main Chinese export-oriented industries keep changing and the industries involving in collaboration of finishing production with industries with lower production efficiencies keep increasing. However, unlike their contemporaries in Japan, the main Chinese export-oriented industries have failed to reduce their usage of imported intermediate products in their production process. On the contrary, they have kept increasing their usage of these products. This results in a situation in which more exports lead to more imports of intermediate products, and this has become one of the many reasons affecting Chinese import.