The purpose of this article is to consider the reasons why the Kuomintang’s political tutelage failed to materialize in its expected shape by examining contradictions in political thoughtbetween Chiang Kai-Shek and Hu Han-Min, the two most significant figures in the policymaking process during the period of political tutelage. Completion of the Northern Expedition in June 1928 encouraged the Kuomintang to transform itself from a revolutionary party aiming to overthrow the government into a party in power, and it was the principle of political tutelage that legitimated this transition—or in other words justified the Kuomintang ruling without electoral approval. Since the embodiment of the idea of political tutelage was intrinsic to the power game among political leaders such as Chiang and Hu, the shape of political tutelage policy subsequently changed according to power shifts within the party. Hu Han-Min considered the objective during the period of political tutelage to be the return of political rights from the warlords to the people, who were the original holders of these rights.Therefore he advocated active support for educating people in exercising their political rights under the party’s leadership, while trying to counteract concentration of power in governmental organizations to prevent this power from being seized by warlords. Chiang Kai-Shek, on the other hand, considered stabilization of society, which was to be achieved by eliminating the Chinese Communist Party, to be the primary task. He sought to concentrate power upon himself, and his priority was creating a government capable of constructing society, rather than the party. Thus the two leaders’ differing visions of how to implement political tutelage collided, and rather than political tutelage being led by the party, the party was in fact subjected to a tutelary role under the government. The contradiction in political orientations between Chiang, who had to cope with the reality that the Kuomintang regime, due to its weak position in rural society, was dependent on the government to implement policies it had promised to the people, and Hu, who devoted himself to realizing a tutelary idea true to its original form, inevitably caused the idea of political tutelage not to bear fruit.
This paper examines how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) integrated the economy of Chongqing city, Sichuan under its control after it “liberated” the city in 1949. In the mid-20th century, Chongqing was the most important industrial and commercial city in southwest China. However, the city’s economy went into recession after its “liberation”. In order to reestablish Chongqing’s economy, the CCP government invested huge amounts of money in the city, especially during the Korean War. For example, the government constructed railways to, and purchased many industrial goods from, Chongqing. These policies had a great impact on Chongqing’s economy, and created business opportunities for commercial and industrial enterprises there. Within the framework of the above CCP policies, the Preparatory Committee for the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCCI) organized the industrial and commercial spheres. Themembers of the PCCCI were obliged to join the learning campaign and to purchase government bonds. Nevertheless, many entrepreneurs in Chongqing participated in the PCCCI and tried to find ways to succeed in business. The PCCCI was able to unite the private enterprises that the CCP could not control directly. By using the PCCCI, the CCP attempted to control indirectly the entrepreneurs in Chongqing after “liberation”.
This paper focuses upon the hosiery industry, in which both Japan and China had a comparative advantage in the world market during the pre-World War II period. The hosiery industry in Japan began to expand its exports in the early 20th century, while its counterpart in China experienced an import-substitution phase during World War I, and gradually expanded its exports towards the Southeast Asian market until the 1930s. This paper discusses how institutional differences were responsible for the contrasting characteristics of the industries by analyzing them from various economic viewpoints, such as the scale of the producers, ‘vertical cooperation’ among merchants and producers of different phases, and ‘horizontal cooperation’ among competing producers or merchants. The hosiery industry in China became polarized between large factories and household production, while its counterpart in Japan was dominated by medium-sized factories which cooperated with one another through the auspices of the seizo-tonya (i.e. wholesalers coordinating production-processes as well). In China, however, there was much less vertical cooperation, but rather a tendency to centralize production into large factories. There was no need for large factories and small producers in China to cooperate, as there was too much contrast in the respective interests and market segments of these types of enterprise. There were some differences between the two countries in terms of horizontal cooperation. In Japan, it was necessary to cooperate in terms of acquiring and sharing market information and sharing the reputation (seika in Japanese) of the producing districts, as there were similarities in the interests and markets of the producers. However, the guilds (or trade associations) in China had few functions corresponding to those of their counterparts in Japan, and therefore it can be concluded that horizontal cooperation was weaker in China. To sum up, intra-industrial institutions in Japan were characterized by information-sharing, while those in China were non-cooperative, with individual producers showing differentresponses to the markets.
There are many claims that the large-scale plantation monoculture of trees is accompanied by negative social and environmental impacts such as ecological disturbances and infringement of human rights. In this sense the recent structural shift in the Thai forestry sector, most typically in the pulp industry, deserves attention. This paper examines how the pulp industry in Thailand has developed a farm-based supply system for its raw material, namely eucalyptus, and how at the same time the industry’s intrinsic dilemma has developed within a free market economy. The relevant actors—the government, firms and villagers—are discussed according to their strategies and responses to their socioeconomic situations. The high social costs that resulted from the anti-eucalyptus movements during the late 1980s pushed aside the first strategy used by the business sector and the government to ensure a stable supply of eucalyptus, i.e. that of a ‘plantation-based’ supply system. By the early 1990s, the second-best strategy, a‘ farm-based’ supply system, had been chosen. The sociopolitical situation after the ‘Bloody May’ events in 1992, which led to the creation of Anand Panyarachun’s second government, contributed significantly to this shift. Given their situation, some farmers agreed to plant eucalyptus in response to the rapid rural socioeconomic changes.Thus it seems that the difficulty of further land reclamation by farmers and the sociopolitical situation in Thailand during the early 1990s, including the development of civil society, triggered a ‘voice’ that had some affect on governmental policies and the behavior of firms. Such changes did not occur in other countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia, where the industry manages its own plantations to ensure a stable supply of raw material. It may even be said that a unique market system, which, to some extent, reduces the negative social and environmental impacts of the industry, have emerged in Thailand as a result of social pressure, as suggested by ecological modernization theory. This system, however, had a serious flaw in terms of economies of scale in the case of both eucalyptus and pulp production. A case study suggests that a differentiation of eucalyptus management has been in progress in the villages. Market saturation and the 1997 economic crisis also worsened market conditions for planters. Even pulp mills faced constraints in increasing their production capacities because of their own raw material supply systems. Thus, firms in the Thai pulp industry face a choice of whether to follow a ‘plantation-based’ or a ‘farm-based’ system, and their choice is influenced by the tradeoff between social costs and economies of scale.
‘Cold politics’ in current Japan–China relations is accelerating the termination of Japan’s yen loans to China. This situation is in turn generating official development assistance (ODA) ‘friction’, which aggravates the‘ cold politics’. Why has post-war reconciliation betweenJapan and China become deadlocked? Didn’t Japan’s economic cooperation with China, including ODA, contribute to post-war reconciliation? The government of Japan has made post-war reparation part of its post-war settlements.However, the diverse forms of the post-war settlements, the controversial concept of post-war reparation, and the divergence between the domestic and international law concepts of reparations have made it more difficult for Japan to link post-war settlements with post-war reconciliation. Approaches to post-war settlements with Asian countries have centered on reparation and cooperation in order to achieve reconstruction. However, the governments of the PRC and Taiwan both renounced reparation claims against Japan because of the Cold War and the “two Chinas” issue. This is why China accepted ODA without receiving reparation beforehand. From the perspective of the post-war reconciliation process, China’s renunciation of its reparation claims in the Japan–China Joint Statement of 1972 can be seen as its willingness for reconciliation with Japan in return for Japan’s expression of remorse. However, Japan did not make clear within what framework it accepted China’s renunciation of its reparation claims. In1979, Prime Minister Masahiro Ohira, who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1972, launched ODA to China. While Japan has not referred to a link between the renunciation of reparation claims and the launch of ODA, China has often touched upon such a link. The basic structure of the Japan–China relationship that Ohira attempted to create (the ‘1979regime’) rests on the following three pillars: (i) the ‘1972 regime’ (based upon an understanding of the Taiwan issue, the history issue, etc.); (ii) an understanding of Japan’s active support for China’s economic reconstruction, and its reform and open-door policy; and(iii) establishing long-term friendly relations with China. The ‘1979 regime’ is also a political structure that has been shaped by multiple factors such as international and domestic political crises in both Japan and China, in addition to elements associated with the post-war settlement. Therefore the‘ 1979 regime’ was formed in the contexts of both crisis and reconciliation, and economic cooperation based on the reconciliation context has helped to promote the process of reconciliation. However, the reconciliation process is now drifting; completion of this process will require joint efforts by Japan and China to formulate new international policies, or in other words, peacebuilding policies.