Studies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have not so far included much investigation of the Party’s media strategy. The radio broadcasts of the Chinese Nationalist Party have been the subject of much study, but there is little corresponding research about the CCP. This paper therefore examines the operating conditions of CCP broadcasting during the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War, and defines its characteristics in comparison with the radio broadcasts of other countries. In 1940, when the CCP started broadcasting, radio was the latest media. Radio, unlike printed media, can communicate with anyone, irrespective of literacy, and does not need to be physically delivered. These characteristics were very important for China, because most of the population were illiterate, and with no transport infrastructure it was very difficult to reach some regions—especially key CCP territories in remote mountainous lands such as the Shanganning district. For these reasons the CCP gave a great deal of thought to radio. At this time, as in Nazi Germany, the Japanese empire and the United States, radio as a propaganda tool played a major role in promoting national unity. When information was blockaded by the Nationalist Party and the Civil War, the CCP used radio for intelligence and psychological warfare. The main radio programs provided internal party communication and external propaganda to the enemy (black propaganda). The CCP noticed that there had been hostilities between Jiang Jie Shi and various regional armies. These armies surrendered, and in addition asked to surrender to the CCP. Historical material suggests that these discussions were made based on strategic considerations. Although it cannot be claimed that these propaganda programs aimed at the Nationalist Party turned the tide of the Civil War completely, once the tide of war turned against the Nationalist Party, the CCP broadcasts greatly influenced the Nationalist Party’s officers and men as they fought their last-ditch battles. Although the Nationalist army was better equipped than the CCP army, the Nationalist army soon collapsed. The CCP did not consider the general public to be their audience, because radio receivers were not widely available and standard Chinese had not spread. Most importantly, however, the CCP was not at the stage of considering national unity, because it had not yet come into power. Ironically, most of the people who met the requirements for listening to the radio were the Nationalist Party’s army and the residents of Nationalist-controlled areas. Other countries used radio to establish a system of total war, but the CCP did not follow this approach. The CCP mainly used radio as a tool for military activity.
This article explores how and why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided to abandon its New Democracy policy and implement the Socialist Transformation in 1953. It argues that abandoning New Democracy, which had been part of a grand strategy change that included planned industrialization, was an action taken in response to changes in the international environment. First, the start of the Socialist Transformation was deeply linked to a change in the industrialization strategy. Second, these changes were a reaction to a perceived US threat that intensified after the outbreak of the Korean War. This study analyzes domestic and foreign policy linkages in the early period of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), an area still little covered in existing research. In the early days of the PRC, the CCP reasoned that the Socialist Transformation could not be initiated in haste. The period before the transformation was to be executed came to be known as the New Democracy period, a stage in which the CCP planned to first cooperate with the domestic bourgeoisie and individual farmers who would later have to be eliminated to pave the way for the future Socialist Transformation. According to this plan, China’s path to industrialization was to be a gradual one in which agriculture and light industry would come first. These plans were based on the assumption that hostilities with the United States would not escalate to direct confrontation. In 1953, however, New Democracy was called off and the Socialist Transformation was initiated. The abandonment of New Democracy was a gradual process. Starting in 1951, it was led by Mao and comprised a step-by-step turnaround in China’s industrialization strategy. By the autumn of 1951, the CCP had decided that its economic strategy should be to focus on heavy and defense industries. This was in stark contrast with the New Democracy strategy, which prioritized light industry and agriculture. At the same time, positions on when to bring about Socialization were also changing as Mao thought Socialization would give impetus to industrialization. After outstanding conditions were met, in 1953 the CCP declared the start of Socialization (the General Line for the Transition Period) and launched the First Five Year Plan. An important factor behind these strategic changes was the perceived threat from the US policy of containment after the outbreak of the Korean War. Before the war, although American imperialism was seen as the main adversary of the Chinese Revolution, it remained unclear to the CCP to what extent the United States constituted a threat to mainland China. The fact that CCP leaders did not expect America to engage with the PRC directly was a fundamental assumption that supported New Democracy, but American intervention in the Korean War and the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait in 1950 dissolved this premise. CCP leaders thought the United States would encircle the PRC from three directions: the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and Indochina. This perceived threat spurred demands to develop heavy and defense industries, while the moderate strategy of New Democracy was no longer considered suitable to the PRC’s needs.
This paper considers the various kinds of activity used to promote the development of Chinese language education in Cambodia. After first surveying the situation, focussing mainly on the rebuilding of Chinese immigrant education in Phnom Penh and the surrounding district, this report aims to consider the problem at various levels caused by other developments in Chinese language education, and the development of the Chinese language education in Cambodia where there is the largest Chinese immigrant school in Southeast Asia. The prosperity of this Chinese immigrant school with the development of Chinese language education is greatly influenced by the national political system, parts which are influenced by relations with China and the sensitive issues concerning anti-Chinese immigrant policy. Therefore, the writer thinks that the status of Cambodian Chinese language education is an important indicator of the current state of the mutual relations between the Chinese immigrant community of Cambodia and the Cambodian government.
Of all the Filipino revolutionaries, the historical ﬁgure most familiar to the Japanese is General Artemio Ricarte (1866–1945). Recent research raises the issue of his anti-American thoughts, which are frequently mentioned in his autobiography. This study concentrates on the formation of his pro-Japanese thoughts after the Filipino revolution against Spain, the Philippine–American war, and the period of his exile in Japan. Previous research has reported his “stubborn” national¬ism and his ﬂuctuating anti-American thoughts, but did not succeed in clarifying the process of formation of his pro-Japanese nationalism, which might be, to some degree, different from that of any other Filipino revolutionary. This nationalism eventually led to his collaboration with the Japanese during their occupation of the Philippines. This paper furthers my previous analysis regarding the formation of his nationalism, which has not yet been studied in depth. My current analysis also extends to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines when the general envisaged his original dictatorial government, called in the Tagalog language, or in Filipino, “Pamahalaang Magulang.”
The characteristics of his thoughts as a Filipino nationalist in the context of Philippine history are pointed out in the conclusion. Unlike the other Filipino elites studying abroad in Europe dur¬ing the second half of the nineteenth century, Ricarte did not leave the country in order to become involved in the education of youths. Being an educator, he truly felt the necessity for education of the Filipinos in terms of the revolutionary movement against the Spanish administration. After much deliberation, he took part in the Katipunan movement led by Andres Bonifacio. The political philosophy of Bonifacio might form a sound basis for Ricarte’s nationalistic ideas of Philippine independence. The outbreaks of the Sino-Japanese War (1894) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904) also exerted a great inﬂuence on the mind of Ricarte. After mingling with a Japanese ultra-nationalist (Onkihiko Usa) in Hong Kong, who eventually extended assistance to him when he sought political exile in Japan in 1915, Ricarte manifested a strong inclination for the ultra-nationalist thought of the Japanese being favorable to the expansionism of Japan toward Asia. While acknowledging a sound American colonial regime established in the Philippines, Ricarte lamented the ongoing “Americanization” of the country, and at the same time expected a charismatic Filipino politician, such as Manuel L. Quezon, to pursue immediate Philippine independence.
However, Ricarte blamed Quezon entirely for not having succeeded in obtaining the immediate independence that was superseded by the independence act (the Tydings McDufﬁe Act) with the provision of a “ten-year transitional period,” the so-called Commonwealth proclaimed in Novem¬ber 1935. This certainly caused his adamant refusal to return to the Philippines from Japan before the outbreak of the Paciﬁc War in December 1941. After the outbreak of the war between Japan and the USA, Ricarte went back home to the Philippines with the Japanese Imperial Forces. As soon as the Japanese Military Administration was proclaimed in January 1942, Ricarte submitted to the authorities his written proposal for the establishment of a dictatorial government, Pamahalaang Magulang. Ricarte wanted to reactivate the Katipunan spirit of the Filipino revolution against Spain while stressing the necessity of pagkakaisa (spirit of solidarity) for the independence movement. In drawing up the outline for a government, Ricarte tried to blend the spirit of Katipunan with the Asiatic principle of Japan that should have been understood by the Filipinos. However, the Filipinos were too “Americanized” at that time to understand his thoughts.
On the basis of the German-Chinese treaty of 1898 (Deutch-Chinesischer Vertrag betreffend die Überlassung Kiautschous an Deutschland) concerning the management of Qingdao, Germany invested about 200 million marks in military installations, city services, sea and land transportation, and educational installations. After 1914, Japan tried to expand the city of Qingdao. At the same time, they established modern factories and opened industrial zones. As a result, they laid the foundations for the industrialization of Qingdao. After 1923, Qingdao, which enjoyed particular status as a Chinese “Special City”, had cultural centers and public entertainment amenities that served the upper classes and the staff of foreign financial institutions. By the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945, all functions were well established. It can be said that German and Japanese building prompted basic economic progress at Qingdao. In the 40 years after 1897, Qingdao changed from a rural area on Jiaozhou Bay with 60,000 people, to a modern industrial city with a population of 580,000. This paper shows how this formation and development had an effect on industrialization in Qingdao through the changing process. It focuses on Germany’s and Japan’s reasons and purpose for developing Qingdao, the establishment of the administration system along with a leased territory policy, and urban development and building from 1897 to 1945.