The movements of students across national borders in East Asia have recently been changing drastically. Our image of these movements used to be that East Asian countries only sent their students to advanced countries in North America and Western Europe, not to any of their fellow countries—except for a trickle to Japan—while receiving very few. In short, the movements were one-way out from East Asia. More recently, however, we see two-way flows of students going abroad in many different directions within the region; rapidly increasing numbers of students are going abroad to study at colleges and universities in other East Asian countries, making most countries the recipients as well as the senders of students and producing a very lively student exchange “market” in East Asia. How do we interpret this phenomenal change? First, the transborder movements of students in East Asia are regarded as a part of a wider migration that has been rapidly increasing in the region. It is likely that the transborder movements of people in general had already started to create a region of mutual transportation, exchanges, and communication in East Asia when Bin Mahatir, then the prime minister of Malaysia, proposed an East Asian Economic Group in 1990–91. People repeatedly flying in passenger airliners over fairly short distances have created a region by proximity. Secondly, as many East Asian countries now have fairly well developed middle-class societies, their higher education is no longer for the elites only. More and more students want to study abroad as an extension of their education in their home countries. Thirdly, many East Asian governments have been trying to draw more foreign students, believing that the number of foreign students the country receives is an index of its international status. Universities have been required by governments to institute various transnational programs to attract more students from overseas, mainly from neighboring countries. It is ironic that international competition among the governments has helped to increase the transnational movements of young people in the region. Ordinary people moving transnationally are creating a loosely defined East Asian community. Young students who study in another country, communicate with others of the same generation and increasingly share the same culture, giving the community a firmer shape, and it is hoped that the international and transnational education they receive will give this East Asian community its direction.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify a trend in international student mobility in Asian higher education. This mobility is characterized by a multilayered structure which is affected by the higher education strategies of Asian countries. International student mobility in Asian countries has been more active since the mid-1990s, and has three characteristics. First, the number of Asian students studying abroad—especially in English-speaking countries (USA, UK, Canada and Australia)—has been increasing. However, secondly, a new mobility of student exchange has also appeared within the Asian region, e.g. the student flow between China and Korea, China and Japan, Korea and Japan, and also among China, Korea and ASEAN countries (in particular Singapore and Malaysia). Thirdly, as a result, those Asian countries have come to be key countries in the international student network. Asian international student mobility has been increased by the economic and political strategies of those Asian countries. Each country has attached an importance to its higher-education policy and the internationalization thereof as a means of manpower development and there is severe competition to attract more highly qualified international students. This mobility can also be an effective way to become a regional political position as a center for cultural and educational exchange in the international education market. Nowadays, more actors, i.e. Thailand and Taiwan, have started to be involved in this respect. On the other hand, ordinary people’s demand for higher education has been growing and they are seeking a more effective transnational program in order to get degrees and certificates more easily and economically not only in English-speaking countries but in Asian countries This trend seems to have begun to influence international student mobility from other parts of world to Asia. For example, recent increases in the number of international students from African countries to China and from Middle Eastern countries to Malaysia have become striking. From this point of view, international student mobility in Asian higher education has changed from the old model to a new multilayered model, namely the unilateral mobility from Asia to English-speaking countries has been replacing by a multilayered mobility which includes various flows within Asian countries and flows from outside the region to Asia, which can bring some new subjects and the possibility of a truly international education exchange.
The purpose of this article is to examine international student policies and related issues in Singapore and South Korea with regards to the recent trends of international student mobility, the expansion of the international student market, and the diversified modes of study in transnational education. Both Singapore and South Korea are aiming to build up an education hub in the region in order to transform their countries from providers of international students to the USA, UK, and Australia to popular destinations for international students, in order both to prevent a brain-drain and to acquire high-potential young people from other countries. Under its Global Schoolhouse strategy Singapore, instead of establishing new institutions, has invited foreign world-class universities to set up on its own soil. In this way, the country hopes to increase its higher-education capacity and to attract a large number of international students with the brands of those invited foreign universities. For the purpose of increasing the inflow of international students, South Korea has attempted to upgrade its own leading institutions to world-class universities by way of promoting the internationalization of these leading institutions and strengthening the international competitiveness of their education and research as part of its international student policy. Responses to commodifying higher education are a crucial part of the international student policy in both of these countries regarding recruiting more privately financed students. However, their approaches are different. In Singapore, private colleges (post-secondary and non-university institutions) play a major role in operating academic programs of foreign universities and hosting a number of international students for these programs. Thus, the Consumer’s Association of Singapore administers a registration scheme for private education operators, addressing consumer protection issues such as fee policies, means of student redress, and an insurance scheme in case of operator failure. The Product and Innovation Board has established the Singapore Quality Class for Private Education Operators, addressing their governance and business structures. However, neither addresses the question of academic standards of those foreign institutions’ academic programs operated by local private colleges. On the other hand, in South Korea, establishing academic programs entirely conducted in English and converting existing courses taught by Korean into English-based courses are important measures in order to stimulate the influx of fee-paying international students to the country. Overall, approaches to and policy rationales in transnational higher education are diversifying and becoming hybrid. In the increasingly competitive market of international students, Japan’s Plan for 300,000 International Students needs to be developed and implemented in order to build up an education hub in East Asia to cultivate human resources not only for Japan but also for other countries.
For students, studying abroad offers the experience of an educational pilgrimage tour through which they may learn to imagine themselves as members of the community of their journey. Studying abroad, therefore, becomes a significant component of a state’s blueprint for regional integration, and encourages universities to redefine their identity in the globalizing world.
This article challenges the notion that the ideas and strategies for foreign students designed in the report of the Council for the Asia Gateway Initiative at the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office have had a great impact on the subsequent strategies for foreign students formulated by the Education Rebuilding Council, by Prime Minister Fukuda’s Plan of 300,000 Foreign Students, and by the interim report of the Special Committee on Foreign Students of the Central Council on Education. The current investigation is based on the analysis of the major characteristics of the Asian Gateways Initiatives. Next, the article studies the possibility and feasibility for UMAP to meet the needs of short-term student exchange programs which will emerge as the major programs of international education, instead of the current programs of sending students to other countries with the intention of obtaining the skills needed for national development in modern society. Finally, the author makes concluding remarks emphasizing the new patterns of short-term student exchange programs in future Asian societies, as have emerged in EU countries.
This study attempts to establish the limits of the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s perception of Japan based on negotiations over the Fourth Japan-China Private Trade Agreement and the Nagasaki national flag incident. It explains the underlying rationale for and reason why the Chinese decided to break off relations with Japan, what their perceptions of the situation were, and what they had failed to perceive. In addition, this study analyzes the interaction between Chinese intelligence acquisition, data analysis and the perception of Chinese policy-makers.
When the trade negotiations began in Beijing in September 1957, China’s policy-makers, albeit wary of the Kishi cabinet’s attitude towards China, were optimistic about the prospects for Japanese domestic approval of Sino-Japanese trade; China’s negotiators were not ready to compromise. After the negotiations broke down, demand for trade with China grew strong in Japan and the Kishi cabinet actively worked towards concluding an agreement, whereby the Chinese leaders, although holding fast to certain principles, displayed a more flexible stance. Negotiations were reopened in February 1958, but there was no change in the ambivalent position of the Chinese policy-makers on Japan and their negotiator won some concessions from the Japanese side. During these negotiations, any arbitrary analysis of information obtained by China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies was checked and nothing suggested that the policy-makers entertained any noteworthy misunderstandings of Japan.
China turned to stronger methods when Taiwan’s objection to the Fourth Japan-China Trade Agreement developed into a dispute between Japan and Taiwan. At the time of Japan’s general elections, Chinese policy-makers tried to encourage a more China-friendly public opinion by criticizing the policy towards China that the Kishi cabinet was practicing, thereby hoping to alter the Kishi government’s position on China. These moves were consistent with China’s existing policy of “Japan neutralization”. However, there was limited domestic criticism of how Kishi dealt with China, a fact that Chinese intelligence agencies were to some extent informed of. Motivated by a disapproval of the Kishi cabinet and high hopes for Sino-Japanese trade, they made arbitrary deductions based on gathered information suggesting that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results.
In these circumstances, Chinese policy-makers adopted an even tougher position on Japan in the wake of the Nagasaki national flag incident and decided to break off relations. The Chinese did not intend a complete and permanent cessation of relations, but rather wanted to apply pressure on Kishi. As such, the decision was in line with China’s policy of “Japan neutralization”. On the other hand, Kishi perceived China’s hard-line stance as interference with Japan’s general elections, and chose to observe calmly how events unfolded. Japanese opinion continued to support Kishi government policies. However, China’s pro-Japan intelligence agencies disregarded this fact and produced arbitrary intelligence that China’s hard-line stance was in fact bringing results. Hence Chinese policy-makers persisted with their hard-line stance and did not modify their “Japan neutralization” policy.
In retrospect, this chain of events suggests that one cause for China’s failed Japan policy was the failure of its intelligence agencies to comprehend that mounting Japanese domestic demand for trade with China had the potential to alter Japan’s foreign policy. Chinese intelligence analysis had backed up its policy-makers’ hard-line stance, and hence China continued to maintain the ambition of achieving its “Japan neutralization” policy.
The limited insight of China’s Japan-related intelligence agencies was the result of the following three factors: firstly, their abilities to collect and analyze intelligence were not yet fully developed;
This paper examines the hypothesis that one of the possible reasons for the recent negative perception of Japan in China is the relatively low volume of mutual human exchange between the two countries. Based on an analysis of various opinion poll data, the characteristics of Chinese perceptions of Japan can be summarized as follows: (1) Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese perception of Japan has been consistently negative. (2) Such a negative perception of Japan is stronger in China than in other East Asian countries. (3) In terms of the medium- and long-term trend since the mid-1990s, Chinese perception of Japan has continued to worsen, which is a unique phenomenon unseen in other East Asian countries including South Korea. (4) Those Chinese who have experienced direct contact with the Japanese in general have a more moderate perception toward Japan than those Chinese who have not had such experience. Apart from the historical fact that Japan and China have fought against each other, such a uniquely negative perception toward Japan in China can be attributed to the following reasons: (1) The strengthening of patriotic education campaigns in China since the mid-1990s. (2) The upsurge in anti-China perceptions in Japan since the 1990s (which are reflected back to China). (3) Misperceptions and misunderstandings at an individual level in China, mainly due to the lack of objective knowledge about Japan as well as cultural differences. One of the possible reasons for the misperception and misunderstanding at the individual level in China could be the relatively low volume of human exchange between China and Japan, which is still relatively low compared with the volume of exchanges between Japan and other major Asian countries. For instance, Japan’s “visitor-population ratio” (ratio of the number of visitors to Japan compared to the nation’s population) in 2006 is as follows: China, 0.04% (one visitor per 2,500people); South Korea, 4.14% (one visitor per 24); Taiwan, 5.61% (one visitor per 18); Hong Kong, 5.04% (one visitor per 20); Singapore, 3.12% (one visitor per 32). Data analysis indicates that the current negative perception of Japan in China is unique compared with similar perceptions in other East Asian countries. There are several reasons for such a situation in China, and the current situation may not be due to only one reason. Nevertheless, the enhancement of human exchanges between the two countries could be useful to prevent any increase in mutual misunderstanding as well as for managing any outbursts of negative feelings.
This paper aims to reveal the mechanism of how prudential policy such as differential regulations and corrective actions resulted in unexpected outcomes in Thailand, and thereby to demonstrate the features of the prudential policy of the Bank of Thailand (BOT). The prudential policy of BOT is considered characteristic in the following respects. Firstly, BOT is the major enforcing agency of prudential policy in Thailand. After the three laws related to finance (Bank of Thailand Act, Commercial Banking Act, Act on the Undertaking of Finance Business, Securities Business and Credit Foncier Business) were revised in 1985, BOT became the supervisor and de facto regulator for local commercial banks as well as finance companies. Secondly, while pursuing prudential policy, BOT had to take commercial banks into consideration in order to obtain their cooperation in implementing monetary policy. Thirdly, prudential policy was pursued consistently by BOT in order to maintain the credibility of the domestic financial market, especially in the eyes of foreign investors. Prior to the economic bubble bursting in 1996, the purpose was to attract international funds to underpin economic growth. On the contrary, BOT attempted to stop the outflow of international short-term funds after 1996. At the same time, the economical and financial situation of Thailand has gone through rapid changes. This, together with the above features of prudential policy, brought the unintended results in reality. This paper’s originality lies in the demonstration of the overall features of prudential policy in Thailand even though this failed to prevent the severe destabilization of the financial system. This paper presents a new view on further discussions related to the Asian currency crisis.